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ABSTRACT
There has been extensive research examining the relationship between the public
mission of the accounting profession and the private interests of its professionals.

All

professions have been offered a special place within society due to the importance of the
functions they perform as well as their stated public missions. In exchange, society
delegates specific rights to the professions such as exclusivity of practice, self-discipline,
and self-selection of their membership. Existing research suggests that the accounting
profession's private interests have potentially encroached upon its public mission.
By using the Economic Theory of the Self Regulated Profession, Disclosure
Theory, and Signal Theory, testable hypotheses are generated that examine the
accounting profession's self-disciplinary function. Specifically, disciplinary actions of
the accounting, legal, and medical professions are compared scores of the Defining Issues
Test - 2 derived from panel data. Next, Signal Theory is employed to determine if an
external mitigate potentially influences the disciplinary actions of the accounting
profession. Finally, Disclosure Theory is examined in terms of the number and severity
of punishments issued by the legal, medical, and accounting professions.
Results of the study find that that the disciplinary actions of the legal, medical,
and accounting professions appear benefit their memberships over public mission.
However, tests of Signal Theory report increased levels of disciplinary actions during
periods of potential external regulation to the profession.

iii

Finally, tests of Disclosure Theory suggest that increased transparency of
disciplinary actions increase their number and severity.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION
Purpose of Study
The intention of this research is to examine the potential conflict between the
stated public mission of the accounting profession and the private interests of its
practitioners. Accounting, as with most professions, has been offered a specific place
within society to perform services that are of such importance that they are allowed the
capacity to self-regulate their membership.

These self-regulatory rights include

establishing membership requirements, self-selection, and self-discipline. In exchange
for these rights, professions are required to establish a code of conduct that will be used
as the disciplinary measure for self-regulation as well as support its "public service"
mission (Puxty et al. 1997). The private interests of the profession are motivations by
membership to protect the social position, political power, capacity to generate wealth,
and influence over business and economic policy. The cornerstone of this interest has
been the membership's ability to serve their own self-interest through the manipulation
of the professions ethical codes and its delegated capacity of self-regulation (Parker
1994).
The American Accounting Association promotes the public interest through
"knowledge and responsible action with respect to the role and effects of accounting

1

2

information and social and ethical responsibilities of accounting professionals in areas
including

social

and

environmental

accounting,

public

interest

issues,

government/profession regulation, professional and business ethics, direct assistance
programs, and, in general, contributing to the quality of our common life" (American
Accounting Association 2008). The profession is dependent on its ability to provide
financial information that is sufficiently reliably and timely.

Failure to produce

information that is sufficiently timely and reliable has potentially lead to a series of audit
and accounting failures in recent history such as the accounting frauds of Enron and
Worldcom.
The private interest of accounting has been defined as the "latent motivation of
ethical codes to protect the interests of the professional accounting body corporate and its
individual members over the interest of its public mission" (Puxty et al. 1997). The
private interests include expanding the profession's social status, political power, and
influence over economic status (Parker 1994). One of the significant means of protecting
the private interest is through the use of the profession's ethics codes and the related
disciplinary actions.
regulation.

Accounting, as a profession, is given the capacity for self-

A poor disciplinary process infringes on the public interest by allowing

members of the profession to extend their influence beyond the scope of the profession.
Also, and more importantly, practitioners whose actions are deemed to damage the public
interest and are not removed from the profession or at least sufficiently disciplined to
deter the behavior from reoccurring.
Existing research examining the Public/Private interest has focused on areas of
political influence, claims of professionalism, and examination of disciplinary actions of

3

accounting societies and boards. The primary analysis has been based on historical
reviews of documents, structured interviews, and examination of disciplinary actions by
regulatory bodies. This study expands this research stream that examines the disciplinary
actions of regulatory bodies to include the Economic Theory of Self-Regulation (ETSR),
Positive Accounting Theory, and Signal Theory. The majority of accounting research
that examines the public/private interest has focused numerous phenomena that shed light
on the existence of the private interest overshadowing the public interest. However, to
date, no theory has been employed that allows a side-by-side comparison of multiple
professions and their disciplinary processes.

By using ETSR, a unifying testable

hypothesis can be made that compares the behavior of the accounting profession to other
professions.

This process allows the accounting profession to have specific control

groups that can be used to benchmark behaviors.
ETSR also offers two predictive behaviors that can be hypothesis tested. First,
self-regulatory schemes for professions will increase disciplinary actions against
memberships as a means to stave off a direct regulatory scheme (DeMarzo et al. 2005).
In effect, the profession is signaling to its public interests that its code of ethics and
disciplinary processes are sufficient to protect the public interest. In a parallel stream of
literature, accounting research has employed Signal Theory as a means of examining
communications of positive information by a firm market participants. This research is
applicable to this study because of the nature of information communicated. Specifically,
the profession is attempting to communicate positive information to its stakeholders.
The second predictive behavior is the impact of disclosure on the behavior of the
self-regulated profession. ESTR postulates that the profession will behave as a monopoly

4

due to the delegated powers of self-selection, authority of the function of the profession
within society, and self-disciplinary processes (Shaked and Sutton 1981). Accordingly,
an agency problem develops between the profession and the public interests where the
profession is the agent and the public interest is the principal.

To mitigate the

information asymmetry caused by the agency problem, disclosure forced upon a
profession will mitigate the agency problem (Border and Sobel 1987).

Study Operationalized
In order to operationalize this research, tests of the public/private interest are
conducted through a comparison of an ethics survey and disciplinary actions of the
accounting, legal, and medical professions. The DIT2 test is employed as a benchmark
for establishing the ethical standards of the profession. Disciplinary actions are obtained
and compared with DIT2 scores to establish a rank order of disciplinary actions to ethics
levels. Next, signal theory, as predicted by ETSR, will be tested using inflection points
of 1992 and 2002. The 1992 inflection point represents the professions reaction to the
accounting failures related to the savings and loan industry. The 2002 inflection point
represents the implementation of the Sarbanes Oxley Act and the creation of the Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board. Each point represents periods of time when the
accounting profession was threatened with external direct regulation. Last, disclosure
theory of accounting and ETSR will be examined by reviewing the types of disclosure
made by the legal, medical, and accounting professions and its relationship between
disciplinary actions and their severity.

-

5

Contributions
This research inquiry potentially adds four contributions to the accounting
literature. First, the hypothesis and methods used within this study offer a means to
operationalize ESRT and provide validation of its theorems.

Next, the accounting

literature that examines the public/private interest can be expanded to include ESRT.
Also, a significant amount of accounting research that analyzes the private interests of
accounting has not been performed with empirical data and testable hypothesis. Finally,
this study employs Signal Theory and Positive Accounting Theory to generate
hypothesizes to test mitigating factors to the private interest of the profession. Signal
Theory and Positive Accounting Theory have been used extensively within accounting
research to assess the characteristics of the firm. However, this research is potentially the
first time that they have been employed to examine the characteristics of the accounting
profession.

Organization of the Study
The remainder of this proposal consists of five additional chapters. Chapter 2
provides a selective literature review that include: the definition of a profession, a review
of public/private interest research in accounting, an examination of Economic Theory of
Self-Regulation, an overview of Positive Accounting Theory with a specific focus on
Disclosure research, an examination of Signal Theory, the cognitive development
theories of Kohlberg and Rest, and existing research examining disciplinary actions of
the accounting and medical professions. Chapter 3 develops the theoretical basis for the
three hypothesizes tested by this research. Chapter 4 establishes the methodology that is
used to test the established hypothesis. Chapter 5 provides the results of the study as well

6
as its analysis. Finally, Chapter 6 offers conclusions of the study, its limitations and
directions for future research.

CHAPTER 2

SELECTED LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter presents prior empirical research and its accompanying theory that
are relevant to this study. First, an overview of the definition of a profession is provided
with supporting literature to identify accounting as a self-regulated profession. Next, the
public/private interests of the accounting profession are defined and identified in
conjunction with Interest Group Theory of Accounting Regulation. The parallel research
stream of Economic Theory of Self-Regulation is examined as an extension of existing
accounting theory. Next, Positive Accounting Theory is briefly defined and a selective
literature review of Disclosure research is provided. In addition, Signal Theory is defined
with a selective review of accounting related articles.

Positive Accounting Theory,

Disclosure Theory, and Signal Theory are included as extensions of untested theory
postulated by the Economic Theory of Self Regulation.

Finally, the cognitive

development theories of Kohlberg and Rest (Kohlberg 1986; Rest 1979) as well as
empirical studies using disciplinary actions of self-regulatory authorities of accounting
and the medical professions are examined. These final two topics are provided as a basis
for the operationalized methods of this research inquiry.

7
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Accounting as a Profession
Definition of a Profession
This research is based on the assumption that accounting is a self-regulated
profession. To support this conclusion, it is important to establish the definition of a selfregulated profession and that the accounting profession meets this definition. Several
definitions of a profession have been established in the literature. These definitions are
based in examinations of the profession's powers, professionalism, and attributes.
Freidson (1986) scrutinizes professions in terms of the powers that they hold.
Specifically, Freidson (1986) notes:
"Professional groups representing disciplines or bodies of knowledge that claim
the right to control particular areas of social policy that affect particular areas of
human life are professions. Professional groups are often represented as creators
and proponents of particular bodies of knowledge that play important roles in
shaping both social policy and the institutions of everyday life."
By using a definition based on powers, the author permits a profession to be based
on social policy and fabric.

This definition is sufficiently broad to address the

profession's influence on society. However, the definition of powers does not address
the potential for self-regulation and self-selection.
Larson (1977) focused on the profession in terms of developing professionalism.
This definition is based on the social status of the profession in terms of the service they
provide and the resulting guarantee of social status. Specifically, Larson (1977) describes
professions as:

9
"Those occupations in which caveat emptor cannot be allowed to prevail
and which, while they are not pursued for gain, must bring to their
practitioner income to such a level that they will be respected and such a
manner of living that they may pursue the life of the mind. Moreover,
professions are and were a means to earning an income on the basis of
transacted services."
Additionally, Freidson (1973) defines a profession as the process where an occupation
makes a claim that its specific skill sets are of such importance to society that it must
obtain the control over its work product to fully benefit society. Once control has been
established, the occupation becomes a profession within the context of society and an
external party cannot exert influence over the type of work performed. The definition
expands the role of professionalism to include the profession's right to control its actions
based on its control of its work product.
Attribute definitions are used to expand the definition of a profession beyond its
social contract and control of its work product. Downie (1990) articulates four attributes
that separate occupations from professions.

They include a required degree of

substantive theory and technique, a monopoly over claimed professionals or semiprofessionals, external recognition from clients and other associations, and a degree of
organization where members are bound by a sense of identity, share common values, and
exert power over its members including self-selection. Last, Pavalko (1971) developed
an eight-attribute model based on specific characteristics. First, the profession is based
on a body of theoretical, abstract, or esoteric knowledge. Next, the work of professions is
seen as strongly related to the realization of specific societal value functions. Examples
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include the relationship between the legal profession and justice or the medical profession
and health. Professions are required to have a length of training for entrance due to the
complexity of the knowledge base. Ethical codes are established to emphasize the ideal
of service to clients and society as their primary objective. Professions are self-regulated
and self-controlled for matters of general interest to its members. Self-regulation is
specifically limited to the profession's ability to self-select, discipline, and expel
members for actions detrimental to the profession and the public interest it serves. This is
offered to the profession by society in exchange for a detailed code of ethics and the
requirement to discipline its members. Membership in a profession is taken seriously and
the commitment to the profession is assumed to be life long. Members hold a common
identity with a shared norm of value and control of behavior. Last, adherence to a code
of ethics is required for membership within the profession. Codes are written to control
member behavior, client relationships, relationships with the public, and practitioner to
practitioner relationships. Codes are offered to society as a means of self-regulation and
self-disciplinary capacities.
Freidson (1973) identified five professions that are included in modern society.
They include engineering, public accounting, medicine, legal, and clergy. Engineering
meets the requirements of a profession because it is treated as the technology elite. It is
further broken into market segments by the specialization of skills. While engineers meet
the definition, they lack power within the market place. Public accounting is defined as a
profession because it rationalized its body of knowledge while standardizing practices.
In addition, it is a knowledge oriented profession that has gained societal recognition as
well as a degree of self-regulation. The medical profession is licensed with a mandate
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from society, is independent in practice, and has a social responsibility.

Clergy is

allowed professional status due to its laity and the priest/minister acting as a
representative of it.

Lawyers are defined as a profession due to its client centered

services, control of recruitment, and training with an internal sanctions system through
self-regulation. Last, it confers prestige in the market with promises for a higher than
average wage rate.
Accounting as a Profession
The Pavalko (1971) attribute definition of profession is used as the basis for
defining accounting as a profession. This model includes the following eight factors: a
knowledge base, value functions, required training, service to society as the primary
function, self-regulation, life-long membership, common identity, and ethical codes. The
accounting profession's primary base of knowledge is Generally Accepted Accounting
Practices (GAAP). GAAP is a "widely accepted set of rules, conventions, standards, and
procedures for reporting financial information, as promulgated by multiple authoritative
sources" (West 1998). Accounting's value function to society was formalized in the
passage of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.
These acts required all firms registering to be publically traded companies have financial
statements audited by certified public accountants. Prior to these acts, companies were
not required to have their financial statements audited.

However, prior to the

establishment of the two securities acts, governmental bodies consulted with accounting
firms due to their "growing reputation" (Zeff 2003).
The next attribute of a profession is a lengthy required training period due to the
complexity of its knowledge base. The profession currently requires most new members
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to have 150 semester hours of accounting and business related courses prior to sitting for
the certified public accountant examination. The current education requirements are an
accumulation of several efforts to improve the educational requirements of the
profession. As early as 1959, the profession advocated training and education beyond the
standard 120 hour undergraduate requirement. Currently, 45 of 50 states have adopted
the 150-hour requirement. Five states have not approved the 150 education requirement
(New Hampshire, Vermont, Georgia, Arizona, and California). New York will phase out
the 120 hour requirement in August of 2009.

Colorado approved the 150 hour

requirement but repealed the requirement in 2002 (Boone and Coe 2002). Service to
society is defined as the function to "promote the reliability of information that is used
for guidance in financial transactions or for accounting or assessing the financial status or
performance

of

commercial,

noncommercial,

and

governmental

enterprises"

(AICPA/NASBA 1994). In addition, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)
defines the public interest as "serving the investing public through transparent
information resulting from high-quality financial reporting standards developed in an
independent, open, public sector due process" (Baker 2005).
Several accounting studies have examined the attributes of life-long service and
common identity within the accounting profession.

Bline et al. (1991) examined the

accounting profession using two different measures of organizational commitment. The
author used organizational commitment as a proxy for commitment to the profession.
Results showed that accountants reported more commitment to the profession than their
current employer.

Gregson (1992) examined job satisfaction and organizational

commitment. The author found that job satisfaction and turnover were causal factors in
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their equation. In addition, the authors found that the majority of accountants do not
leave the profession despite job turnover. Finally, Padgett et al. (2005) examined job
turnover in the context of expectations and experiences within the accounting profession.
The authors found that work schedule, mentors, gender, and children in households were
the primary indicators of turnover in the accounting profession. In addition, it is worth
noting that the author reported that 59% of the new hires within public accounting were
female.
Ethical codes within accounting were initially developed through the founding of
the American Association of Accountants in 1886. In 1907, an initial ethics code was
established within the association's bylaws that were formalized in 1917. Moderate
changes to the existing code until the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
provided a newly expanded ethics code in 1960. In 1973, the ethics code was expanded
based on three principles: independence, integrity, and objectivity (Casler 1964). The
Code of Ethics was modified again in 1988 in response to external pressures due to audit
failures during the savings and loan crisis (Backof and Martin 1991).
Law as a Profession
The knowledge base of the legal profession is based on the specialization of the
legal code within the practicing state as well as federal statue. The body of knowledge is
acquired through state recognized institutions through formal training programs
(Constantinides 1990). The legal profession has a direct relationship with the notion of
justice within the social fabric of society as its value function as well as its dedicated
service to society (Bilodeau 2004).

The legal profession's regulatory process has

developed in a similar manner as the accounting and medical professions. Each state

\
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offers the status to practice law with the associated benefits subject to the completion of
educational requirements and the passage of a comprehensive examination. Individual
states establish associations that are appointed by each governor subject to approval by
legislative bodies. Composition of the bar associations vary by state but each require that
the majority of members be from the legal profession. The process of acceptance into the
profession as well as all disciplinary processes are made through the state bar
associations (Thakor and Kumar 2000). To facilitate self regulation and self-attraction,
each state bar maintains a code of conduct that can be used to discipline membership
(Bilodeau 2004). Common identity and life-long membership within the profession has
been established through longitudinal studies (Boylan 2004).
Medicine as a Profession
The medical profession's knowledge base is codified through the Current
Procedural Terminology as well as accepted protocols of the profession. Education is
provided through licenses within the United States which are subject to comprehensive
examinations to begin practice and ongoing educational requirements to maintain practice
(Bilodeau 2004).

Service to society as well as value functions are based in the

profession's ability to provide medical services. Accordingly, the medical profession, as
accounting and legal, has been offered the rights for self-regulation in attracting,
selecting, and disciplining membership.

These rights are delegated to a medical

board/board of medical examiners for each state. The boards are comprised exclusively
of medical professionals appointed by state governors with varying levels of approval by
state legislature (Thakor and Kumar 2000). Marchiori and Henkin (2004) examined the
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commitment and turnover of practitioners. Results show a strong life-long commitment
to the practice of medicine.
Accounting Profession and Self-Regulation
Self-regulation of accounting is a key assumption of this research. Therefore, it
has been afforded additional space within the review of accounting as a profession to
examine the development of the regulatory process of accounting. In order to be a
profession as defined by the attribute definition of Pavalko (1971), an occupation must
be self-regulating. Self-regulation is specifically limited to self-selection of membership
and the disciplining of members for actions that are detrimental to the profession and the
public interest. In the current regulatory scheme of the accounting profession, individual
states have the right to certify accountants as well as provide for their disciplinary actions
(Lawrence and Grambo 2007). In addition, the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board (PCAOB) has the authority to sanction or suspend individuals from association
with public accounting firms that are registered to perform public company audits (Boster
2007).
State certification boards were established by lobbying efforts of the Institute of
Accountants and the American Association of Public Accountants.

The Institute of

Accountants was founded to provide education for the profession and membership was
open to individuals subject to the passage of an exam. The American Association of
Public Accountants was primarily focused as a lobby for the interest of the profession
(Lee 1995). In 1896, due to the lobbying efforts of these two organizations, the first state
sponsored licensing law was passed in New York. The law reserved the right to the title
of "certified public accountant" for those who were capable of passing the examination.
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As part, of the statute, New York established a board of accountancy to administer the
examination.

By 1922, all 48 states had passed similar statutes. Currently, similar

formats are now in effect for all 50 states (Mills and Young 1999).
Recent lobbying efforts to affect changes to state board of accountancy
regulations have been pursued by the National Association of State Boards of
Accountancy (NASBA) and the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(AICPA). NASBA and the AICPA have pursued a regulatory framework called the
Uniform Accountancy Act (UAA) to create uniformity across state boards of
accountancy.

The UAA has been the platform for implementing educational

requirements, interstate reciprocity, experience requirements, and limits to non-attestation
services. No state has passed the entire proposed legislation without tailoring changes to
meet their specific needs (Colbert and Murray 1999). Versions of the UAA have been
promulgated in 1992, 1998, and 2007.

The 1992 version focused on improving

educational requirements and introducing the 150 hour requirement. The 1998 version
focused on experience requirements, interstate reciprocity of licenses, offering nonattestation services, and changes to the composition of state boards of accountancy. In
addition, the 1998 UAA made attempts to change license mobility and the disciplinary
process for each state (Lawrence and Grambo 2007). Within the 1998 proposed UAA
legislation, the act offered changes to the composition of the board of accountancy
members.

Specifically, the state board of accountancy will be comprised of seven

members of whom five will be from the accounting profession. Two members will be atlarge appointments outside the profession. Currently, all fifty states have approved some
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version of this legislation with at least five members derived from the profession (Colbert
et al. 2008).
PCAOB was created by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SARBOX) in response
to several accounting scandals to restore public confidence. PCAOB is a government
sponsored non-profit corporation that has the regulatory power over accounting firms that
perform public company audits. Its charter gives PCAOB the responsibility for setting
audit standards, inspecting firms performing public company audits, and enforcing
violations of its established audit standards for accounting firms performing public
company audits (Boster 2007). As part of its investigating and enforcing authority,
PCAOB may suspend or revoke the registration of firms or individuals that perform
public company audits, limit the activities of firms or individuals, issue monetary
penalties, require additional professional education, require reviews of operations, and
require policy changes. However, it does not have the capacity revoke a license of an
individual or firm (Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 2003).

Definition of Public-Private Interests and Interest Group
Theory of Accounting Regulation
Definition of Public and Private
Interests
To examine the public/private interest in accounting, it is important to establish
definitions of each. Within the accounting literature, public interest is, at best, loosely
defined. The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) defines the
public interest as the "collective well being of the community and institutions that the
profession serves" (Baker 2005). The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)
defines the public interest as "serving the investing public through transparent
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information resulting from high-quality financial reporting standards developed in an
independent, open, public sector due process" (Baker 2005). Additionally, the American
Accounting Association promotes the public interest through "knowledge and responsible
action with respect to the role and effects of accounting information and social and
ethical responsibilities of accounting professionals in areas including social and
environmental accounting, public interest issues, government/profession regulation,
professional and business ethics, direct assistance programs, and, in general, contributing
to the quality of our common life" (American Accounting Association 2008).
A definition of public interest has been open to debate within the accounting
literature.

A succinct definition has been defined as "the production of impartial

accounting and auditing knowledge" (Sikka et al. 1989). However, a significant amount
of accounting literature has been dedicated to not identifying a specific definition of the
public interest due to the nature of its definition. A definition would simply be too vague
to generate values to be used in formal analysis (Sikka and Willmott 1995b; Nicola and
Dimitri 1999). In effect, the accounting literature has taken the view of Supreme Court
Justice Potter Stewart in his 1964 ruling in Jacobellis v. Ohio.

"I can't define

pornography, but I know it when I see it" (Gewirtz 1996).
Private interest, in contrast, has been defined with more clarity within accounting
literature. Parker (1994) defined the private interest as "the latent motivation of ethical
codes to protect the interests of the professional accounting body corporate and its
individual members.

Interests include the body's social status, political power, and

influence over economic and business activity". Sikka and Willmott (1995) expanded
this definition by including the disciplinary process of accounting societies as a "proven
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mechanism for diffusing

criticisms, restoring the aura of independence

and

professionalism and protecting the profession's jurisdiction." Preston et al. (1995) added
to this definition the dimension of morality and ethical codes by stating that "the scope of
the accountant's morality is now limited to the profession's ethics rules and their
increasingly precise interpretations." Finally, Canning and O'Dwyer (2001) furthered the
Parker (1994) definition to include the private interest as unstated "yet powerful, as
demonstrated of an effective and accountable disciplinary may reduce the chances of a
profession losing its self-regulated status.

The disciplinary processes can be also

recognized as part of the territorial battles which enable professional bodies to ward off
challengers and retain their ascendancy."
Interest Group Theory of Accounting
Interest Group Theory of Accounting Regulation

(IGTAR)

views the

development and management of regulation within accounting as a "product of
relationships between different stakeholders and the state." Regulation of accounting
becomes more of a competition of power that is solely based in the public interest"
(Gaffikin 2005). Within this context, it is the political struggle between stakeholders that
shapes accounting policy and forms the direction of accounting regulation.

This

struggle, in turn, delineates the boundaries of the interests of the public and private
stakeholders of accounting regulation as well as the regulatory strategy taken by
governmental regulatory agencies (Parker 1994).
Within IGTAR literature, four separate streams of literature have developed that
examine specific aspects of the conflicts between the public and private interest. These
included the Parker model, public space, political theory, and professionalism. Each of
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these methods and theories examines how the private interest of the accounting
profession uses its ethical codes and self-regulation to promote its selfinterests.
Parker (1994) developed a model to describe five interrelated constructs that
examine the private interest's influence within the accounting profession. This model,
known as the Parker Model, includes insulation of the profession from external parties,
minimization of interference, self control, professional authority, and socio-economic
status preservation. The Parker (1994) model is graphed below:

Interference
. r Minimization

^^^

I

?
Professional
Authority

Professional
Insulation
^ *

Socio-Economic
Status Preservation

Self-Control
Figure 2.1 Parker Private Interest Model

Within this model, the basis of protection of self interest is held within the
profession's ethical codes. By providing insulation from direct government regulation of
licensing and disciplining accounting professionals, the profession can maintain self
control, limit external interference, and exert professional authority over the regulatory
space of accountant licensing. Through these four cornerstones, the profession's socioeconomic status is preserved. Parker (1994) tested his model through an examination of
the Australian Societies of Accountants disciplinary files.

Results showed that the

profession was limited in its disciplinary actions towards members. The model was
explored again by O'Dwyer (2003) in an examination of the disciplinary process of the
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Institute of Chartered Accountants in Ireland. Fisher et al. (2001) also used a modified
version of this model to examine disciplinary actions across cultural boundaries. In this
research, the author used the United Kingdom and the Pacific Basin as control groups.
Results showed that cultural differences potentially played a role the number and type of
disciplinary actions.
The question of the appropriateness of public space (or regulatory space) has also
provided a view of the private interest of the accounting profession. In this research
stream, the conflict between regulatory regimes of the state is examined in terms of the
allowance of self-regulation for the profession in exchange for the development and
policing of its ethical codes. Sikka and Willmott (1995) examined the relationship of the
profession, self-regulation, and independence in terms of a "system of professionals" and
its jurisdiction. Through an historical topology of events, the authors argue that the
profession has employed differing efforts to protect its "aura" of independence. Baker
(1993) broached a similar topic of regulatory space through the efforts of large
international public accounting firms to defend against external threats to self-regulation.
The author suggests that the complexities of the operating environments of these firms
limit the ability of researchers to understand the impact and effectiveness of these firms
efforts to protect their regulatory space. MacDonald and Richardson (2004) examined
the development of the regulatory space that governs Ontario, Canada's Public
Accountants' Council.

Through an historical review of correspondence and public

records, the authors found that the profession was capable of establishing a specific
regulatory space that allowed for self-regulation through the implementation of a code of
ethics.

Through an examination of public statements and correspondence from the
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AICPA, Rogers et al. (2005) examined the first public statements after the audit failure of
Enron Corporation. The author found that the profession dealt with the public crisis
through a series of "image management techniques" designed to protect its self-interests
instead of developing a specific "cultural changes" for the profession.

Finally, Neu

(2006) offered a different perspective of the public space by defining it as "the portion of
the institutional field where there is more open debate through the participation of the
media." The author, through an historical typology, offers that the profession changed its
practices within its educational efforts due to the impact of additional disclosure and
scrutiny.
Several authors have examined the impact of politics within the context of the
behavior of the profession to address threats of potential external regulation. Young
(1986) through an empirical study of the licensing regimes examined the political
influence of Certified Public Accountant Societies within the United States. The author
found that states with higher concentrations of CPAs to non-CPAs (construed as political
strength by the author) developed higher licensing standards that those with lower
concentration levels. The author concluded that the higher licensing standards proved a
measure of strength of interest group politics. Luehlfling (1995) examined the political
necessity of self-imposed regulations through an examination of five historical cases of
potential governmental control over the profession. Findings suggest that the profession
acted through a political necessity to prevent external regulation. In an examination of
the influences of historical external events and responses, Neu and Saleem (1996) viewed
the actions of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Ontario's actions through political
necessity to protect its rights to self-regulation through a code of conduct. The study's
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findings suggest that the institute changed its code of conduct to meet external threats to
maintain self-regulation.

Finally, Canning and O'Dwyer (2006) examined "political

causation" within the disciplinary process of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in
Ireland. Through structured interviews, the author's findings suggest that internal strife
within the organization caused the disciplinary process to be driven by a "lack of
precision or logic."
The process of professionalization within the accounting profession has been
examined in terms of IGTAR by several studies. Lee (1995) performed an historical
review of the invocation of professionalism as a means for protecting the public interest.
The author theorizes that the industry uses the promise of professionalism as a means of
self-interest. In another study, Mitchell et al. (1994) examined professionalism in terms
of audit failures. The article suggests that the profession has used its professional status
as a means of expanding and legitimizing its activities through its ethical codes and
enforcement. However, the profession has failed to take any actions against the firms
that suffered an extensive number of audit failures. Preston et al. (1995) viewed the use
of the codes of ethics in the United States as a claim for professionalization due to moral
status. The authors performed an historical analysis of the establishment of the codes of
ethics in the 1980's. The findings suggest that the establishment of the code of ethics as
well as its alterations is a response to political challenges to the legitimization of the
profession. Finally, Puxty et al. (1997) examined a single event and the profession's
response. The findings suggest that claims of the "public interest" have been historically
used to claim accountancy as a profession. In a response to the Future Development of
Auditing: A Paper to Promote Public Debate (Auditing Practices Board 1992), the major
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accounting bodies of the United Kingdom responded by making claims of private interest
instead of concern for the public interest.

Economic Theory of the Self-Regulated
Profession
Stigler (1971) provided one of the first theories of economic regulation and the
self-regulated occupation with the establishment of two alternative views of industry
regulation. First, regulation is a political process that defies logic and at worst is a drain
on the economy through political "featherbedding." The second view of regulation is that
it is desired or "acquired" by the industry and operated as a benefit. Stigler (1971) offers
four direct benefits from regulation to the profession: government subsidy, increased
barrier to market entry, control over "substitutes and compliments", and direct price
fixing. With the acceptance of regulation, an industry loses control of its price and
output, increases costs, and outsiders are allowed to participate in the decision making
process. Within these constraints, the industry players maximize their profitability and
utilization of the benefit of regulation.
The author expands the article by examining occupational licensing as a political
process used to "improve the economic circumstance of the participating group." Four
external characteristics are offered as potential influencing characteristics of the
occupation.

They include the size of the occupation, per capita income, large city

concentration, and the presence of a cohesive opposition to licensing. As part of their
study, a regression analysis was performed comparing regulated and non-regulated
professions. The author found that licensed professions had higher income, more stable
employment, and were more likely to be self-employed.
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Shaked and Sutton (1981) expanded the work of Stigler (1971) by extrapolating
the self-regulating profession as monopolistic enterprise. This work is based in the
assumption that the profession can admit as many or as few members as it deems
desirable. In effect, they control the supply of professionals within the market. This
authority is based in the profession's capacity to maintain quality of service because the
consumer alone cannot measure the quality of services. A profession can increase price
without increasing the quality of services provided. Specifically, the increased price that
the profession can obtain verses the increased quality offered by self-regulation. The
author develops this assumption through a proof of two equations. Three assumptions are
made for simplification: quality is uniform, no profession to profession services are
provided, and no consumer preferences. The author first develops the following
equilibrium equation:
nt = LM+l,
where n
t
L
M
L

(1)

= units purchased
- labour services
= size of profession
= Demand
= entry requirements.

From this equation, the author introduces quality as an additional variable:
Mi = Mji + MaQa,

(2)

where Mi
Mxti

= Demand given entry requirements to profession
= Demand given the size of the labour market subject to entry
requirements
MaQa =Demand subject to quality of services provided.

The author notes that "as the profession shrinks below the maximum value size,
the relative income increases when ti > 0, M/ > MaQa > 0. Hence M will increase with /
with reduction or forced shrinkage in the size of the profession."
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Shaked and Sutton (1981) also examine the impact of outside forces that could
shape the potentially monopolistic nature of the self-regulated profession. They expand
their theorem to include potential threats to a single self regulated profession by a
complementary service (in this case lawyers and para-lawyers).

This example is

expanded by the introduction of new services within the equilibrium equation listed
below:
nt = LMp + PMr + l,
where n
t
L0
M/s
L
Py
My

(3)

= units purchased
= labour services
= size of profession /?
= demand fi
= entry requirements
= size of profession y
= demand y.

From this basis, the authors develop the following equation that develops the
possibility that a profession of quality y can co-exist and potentially threaten a similar
profession of /5:
U =

where n
t
Lf
Mp
L
Py
My

PMyuQya-Mrl)

, ,,

n-LMfiz-PMfy '

{V

= units purchased
= labour services
= size of profession ft
= demand f3
= entry requirements
= size of profession y
= demand y.

In this case the author proposes that a secondary profession can gain market share if
My>\.

This equation makes the assumption that quality of services provided by the
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secondary provider (M y) within the market is at least marginally acceptable. Given this
case, the authors suggest that the primary profession (M ?) can be threatened.
Border and Sobel (1987) examine agency theory specifically with a focus of
information asymmetry and the use penalty and auditor discovery. The authors develop
the following equation:
2 [ ( 1 - P 0 * + Pi/H]fc.,
where p;
tj
fi
h]

(5)

= Probability of audit function
= Submission of payment to principal
= Penalty
= Probability of wealth.

From this model, the author theorizes that any solution that mitigates the
information asymmetry within the relationship must "force the agent to tell the truth".
The article offers two methods: punishment or payment. Punishment would include high
audit probabilities as well as large penalty payments. Payment would include large
reward payments that minimized audit payments. In either method, the principal must
engage in audits at some probability level with penalty payments for actions taken
outside the agent-principal agreement.
In another attempt to model self-regulation, Donabedian (1993) examines the
enforcement of professional codes of conduct in terms of "exit costs". The author
theorizes that the enforcement of professional codes is based in losses that a member
would face if they were removed from the profession. The authors offer that trust is the
basic element to the profession services (from repeated exchanges, family ties, or formal
institutions). The author provides the following equation to help explain the role of
monopoly and enforcement of professional codes:
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hmnun + b(k)gVe(rs + nu) = RvVErs + RVVEIUC ,
where Hm
Mc
b(k)
g
Ve
r
s
Rv

= Political costs of monopoly
= Professions control over monopoly
= Political costs of government imposed punishment
= Probability of detection and conviction by government
= Number of offenses committed
= Return to human capital investment in competitive market
= Ratio of human capital investment to the profession
= Political revenue gained from the reduction of offenses.

The authors conclude from their theorem that the left hand side of the equation
represents the marginal costs of the self regulated profession that exerts control over its
members while mitigating government costs by limiting the number of offenses that are
identified and fined. The right hand side of the equation examines the exit costs to
member of the profession through control of human capital and through professional
costs. Simply stated, the costs of the enforcement of codes and maintenance of monopoly
over the profession are equal to the costs of exiting the profession.
Stefanadis (2003) examined the benefits to the financial industry of self regulation
by the introduction of innovation. The author develops his theorem through the use of
the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) status as a self government
organization within the eyes of the Securities and Exchange Commission. Within this
relationship, the NASD has a delegated power to discipline its membership as well as to
provide some of the regulations governing the industry. As an example, the author uses a
comparison of the London Stock Exchange (LSO) forced separation of investment and
commercial banking operations and the lifting of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933. Each
format imposed some form of separation between ownership of the different types of
entities. However, the United Kingdom was able to pursue the abolishment of arbitrary
function sooner that the United States because the LSO was a self-regulating body.

(6)
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Ashby et al. (2004) examined a similar function through game theory to establish
the possibility of successful self regulation with interactions between government and
industry. In this game scenario, the authors establish that government's responsibility is
to initiate and then delegate the management of the regulatory process to industry. The
alternative to self-regulation is a statutory scheme where regulation is generated and
administered by governmental bodies.

The authors propose that self regulation has

administrative and design advantages over statutory schemes.

However, with its

advantages, risk is also introduced into the market. In order to mitigate this risk, selfregulated industries have the explicit threat of intervention within by government
authorities. From this, the authors have developed a gaming topology for two firms that
comply and violate self-regulation. Using the topology, the author's role played four
scenarios: zero tolerance, partial tolerance, chicken game, and prisoner's dilemma.
Results show that government should generate an expectation of a zero tolerance regime
despite the true intentions of its regulatory intentions.
Finally, DeMarzo et al. (2005) examines self regulation in terms of government
oversight.

While not directly quoting Ashby et al. (2004), this work examines the

conflict of self regulated professions and governmental oversight. However, Demarzo et
al. (2005) uses agency theory as a basis for examination with the profession acting as the
agent and government as the principal. A theorem is generated based on an agents
expected utility. The following equations are developed that are used to develop and
provide proof of the theorem:
•

Agent's expected utility: p(r)u(max[w- z(r) - x(w,r),o] + (1- p{r))u{w- z{r))

•

Agent's maximum penalty payment:

w-z(r)
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Feasibility constraint (AF): z(w) < wfor all w
•

Incentive compatalibility constraint (AIC):
u(wi - z(wi)) > p(wl)u(max[w2 - z(w,) - x(wi, wi),0] + (1 - p(w\))u{w2 - z{w\))

•

Self reporting payment (SRP):
max,,,, ,E[p(W)u(max\W - z(W) - x(W,W),0]) + (1 - p(W))u(W - z(W))]

•

Customer incentive compatibility constraint (CIC): z solves CP(p,x)

•

Customer individual-rationality constraint (CIR): £"[z(W)]

•

Budget Constraint (RB): t > E[p(W)(c-min[x(W,W,W

•

Feasibility constraint (FB): z(w) < wfor all w,
where W
= Realized Cash Flow
P
= Policy Enforcement
C
= Reported Cash flow
X
= Transaction Fee and Fine
P(r) = Probability of R
R
= Report to Principal
Z (r) = Contract enforcement Probability
U
= Utility
T
= Transaction fee
a
= Reservation pay-off SRO
c
a

-t>a

- z(W)])]

- Reservation pay-off customer.

Once the authors established their theorem, a graphical representation is made to
describe three "states of nature" within the relationships. They include a self regulated
monopoly, a self regulated organization with government oversight, and a competitive
verses self regulation. Figure 2.2 is a representation of a competitive solution verses selfregulation.
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SRO Solution

CIR(a)
Agent
pay-off
in high
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Competitive

CIR(aC)

I Probability of investigation in low state

I

Figure 2.2 SRO Verses a Competitive Marketplace

In comparison of self regulation and competitive markets, the competitive
environment gives authority to the customer or the agent over contract terms and
enforcement. In self regulation, the agents have monopoly power over enforcement and
complete power over negotiating contracts. Within this comparison, the self regulated
organization chooses a lower probability of investigation with a higher payoff to
members of the organization than the competitive contract.

This is seen by the

differences between individual-rationality constraints (CIR) for the profession and the
customer.

The incentive compatibility restraint (AIC) examines the truthfulness of

reporting based in incentive payment.

The higher the incentive payment, the more

truthful reporting will be made. The AIC is bracketed by the rational constraints of the
profession and the customer.
Next, the author provides a view of the self regulated organization as compared to
a monopoly solution with associated external regulation. This is provided in Figure 2.3.
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SRO Solution

SRO_CIR(a)
Agent payoff
in high
state

Monopoly _CIR(a )

Monopoly
AIC

Figure 2.3 Self-Regulated Organization Verses Monopoly

In the monopoly solution, the agent chooses both the contract terms and
enforcement. However, the agent may choose a feasibility constraint of z(w,) < w,. This
constraint allows for cash flow to be equal or less than the probability of punishment and
an associated payment. This may be allowed to encourage positive consumption. When
this occurs, the reporting truthfulness is more desirable but payment must be used to
induce consumption of the services. The monopoly individual-rationality constraints are
shifted upward to provide an incentive for the profession to participate due to the fact that
the cash flow from participation may be equal to the punishment of false reporting.
Finally, a model of self regulation and government oversight is modeled and is
shown in Figure 2.4.
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Figure 2.4 SRO with Government Oversight

This model acknowledges that the government assumes the contract provision
provided by the SRO for enforcement and payment. Maximum penalties are levied to
ensure accurate reporting.

In this model, the self reporting organization chooses a

maximum payment that provides the lowest percentage of investigation for fear of
penalty.

This theorem allows the self reporting agency to regulate first with the

government reserving the right to enforce regulations if the existing enforcement is lax.
It is this threat of regulation that will ensure that the self regulating organization has
sufficiently regulated its members. Within this scheme, it may prove more important to
have structure of oversight that the actual processes to enact the scheme. This "hollow
structure" allows for the threat of regulation that to influence professions to act on their
own to issue punishment to its members as well as enforce its contracts to delay direct
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government invention. This is can be extrapolated because the government can still act
after the fact to issue greater punishment than the self regulation of the body itself.

Positive Accounting Theory, Disclosure,
Market Response, and Firm Response
Research examining firm disclosure and market responses is based in Positive
Accounting Theory derived by (Watts and Supreme 1986; Watts and Zimmerman 1978,
1990). Positive accounting views the firm as a "nexus of contracts" with accounting
serving as a tool to facilitate the formation and performance of contracts as well as
mitigation of potential agency concerns. Accordingly, accounting practices develop to
mitigate agency costs associated with contracting by establishing agreements with parties
prior to executing contracts. Two types of contracts are included in this theory: debt
contracts and management contracts with shareholders.

Debt contracts are explicit

contracts and management contracts can be explicit or implicit.
Positive Accounting Theory expanded into firm disclosure through its basis in the
"nexus of contracts" view of the firm. Specifically, the firm acts, in relationship to the
market, to mitigate potential information asymmetry problems that managers hold. By
disclosing information through accounting, the potential agency problem is mitigated. In
examination of this problem, three research streams have developed:

disclosure and

market responses, changes in accounting treatments, and voluntary disclosure (Healy and
Palepu 2001).
Firm disclosure and market responses research has developed three models to
examine the phenomenon. Holthausen and Verrecchia (1988) developed a two-period,
multi-asset model that examines stock price and sequential disclosure.

This model
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reported that increasing the variance of disclosure results in no increases to variance of
equity returns. Kim and Verrecchia (1994) established a single stock non-time dependent
model that examines market responses to financial accounting disclosure which carry
unique information that cannot be easily interpreted. The authors found that market
participants report variances in trading volume and returns due to the information
asymmetry suffered by market participants. Holthausen and Verrecchia (1990) examine
a non-time dependent model of informative disclosures and rational equity trader
responses. This model reported increasing trader information precision and trader belief
correlation that result in similar trader valuations.
Research examining market responses to accounting treatment changes has
focused on the economic consequences of the change and shareholder wealth changes
(Healy and Palepu 2001).

Dyckman (1979) examined the impact of the elimination of

full cost accounting in the oil and gas industry. The authors performed a two stage
analysis due to limited sample size. The authors concluded that the elimination of full
cost accounting procedures had no significant impact on the marketability of related
equity securities. Collins et al. (1981) also examined the elimination of cost accounting
for the oil and gas industry.

However, the authors expanded this research to four

constructs: naive investor theory, modified naive investor theory, contracting cost theory,
and estimation risk theory. The authors found that the new standard had a significantly
negative effect on equity values of impacted firms.

Leftwich (1981) examined the

application of new merger accounting standards to debt structure and firm value. The
authors reported that the costs of the mandatory accounting changes were an influential
variable to the amount of debt outstanding. Holthausen and Leftwich (1983) review the
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economic consequences of mandatory and voluntary changes in accounting treatments.
Specifically, the authors examine contracting costs, monitoring costs, bond covenants,
regulation, and political visibility. The authors found that firm size and leverage were
significant. These factors serve as proxies for political visibility and contracting and
monitoring costs.

Finally, Healy et al. (1987) examine the impact of accounting

treatment changes and financial compensation to chief executive officers. The authors
examine two accounting method changes: FIFO/LIFO change and accelerated
depreciation to straight-line depreciation.

The authors found that compensation was

based on reported earnings based on the new accounting treatment but the potential
compensation effect was not significant.
Voluntary disclosure research examines the impact of non-required disclosure on
firm financial characteristics. Two specific measures have been included in the literature:
improved stock liquidity and reduced cost of capital.

Kim and Verrecchia (1994)

established a theoretical model to attempt to explain the relationship between increased
disclosure, lowered information asymmetry, and liquidity. The authors suggest that the
bid-ask spread which is used as a proxy for liquidity will decrease. Welker (1995)
performed an empirical study to examine the relationship between the increased
disclosure and stock liquidity. The authors report that the bid-ask spreads for firms with
the lowest levels of disclosure are 50% higher. Also, Healy et al. (1999) performed a
similar study as Welker (1995). However, the authors limited their control group to 97
observations and used stock returns, institutional ownership, and analyst following as
proxies for stock liquidity. The article reported that using the author's self-developed
ranking system that firm liquidity improved as disclosure increased.
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Barry and Brown (1984, 1985, 1986) established the theoretical grounding for the
relationship between the cost of capital and the level of disclosure. Specifically, they
allow that imperfect information offers risk in forecasting future payoffs.

If the risk

cannot be mitigated, market participants will require an additional return. The resulting
increased return, whether through equity or debt markets, increases the cost of capital for
the firm. Botosan (1997) performed an empirical study to examine the relationship of
cost of capital and disclosure rates. The authors performed a regression analysis based on
a cost of capital measure, beta, firm size, and disclosure level. To facilitate the research,
the author creates a disclosure ranking system based in actual non-required disclosure and
analyst following. Results of the study show a higher level of cost of capital for firms
with lower disclosure rates for firms with low analyst coverage. For firms with high
analyst coverage, the author found no effect.

Signal Theory
Signal theory is based in establishing an equilibrium between high and low
information types Riley (1979). In order to be an effective signal, Riley (1979) offers the
following four criteria: exit mechanisms, accounting choice as high quality information,
high and low quality information firms must have a concaved distribution, and firm type
and accounting choice are correlated. Some exit mechanism must exist to prevent a
lower quality information firm (low) to mimic the higher quality information firm (high)
by sending false signals. Generally this implies that high firms find it cheaper to use a
market signal than other methods. Next, the high firms see their choice of accounting as
a signal to market participants. The market, in turn, sees the use of choice of accounting
to assess the valuation of the firm. Third, the distribution for high and low firms must be
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sufficiently concaved which insures that there are fewer higher firms. More specifically,
higher quality firms are expected to increase at a decreasing rate with higher quality of
accounting information. Finally, quality and accounting choices are correlated.
Within accounting specializations, financial accounting has utilized signal theory.
Generally, financial accounting research has focused on the signaling of positive private
information by management to market agents. Financial accounting research has utilized
signal theory in three areas: accrual, dividends, and stock splits. Subramanyam (1996)
examined discretionary accruals and stock price changes. In this study, the signal given
to market participants was the quality of accruals made by the firm. The author found
that discretionary accruals were found to be valuable provided that it improves earnings
that reflected an economic value and that the markets were inefficient. Guay et al. (1996)
performed an evaluation of discretionary accrual models and price valuation. The article
found that discretionary accruals signaled more reliable firm performance in its stock
price and that opportunistic accruals signal poor performance. Specifically the authors
reported that discretionary accruals help managers produce a reliable measure of firm
performance, opportunistic accrual management is used to hide poor performance or
postpone disclosure of unusually positive earnings, and discretionary accruals serve as
noise in earnings.
Dividend research examines the signals to market participants that dividend
payments (or lack thereof) equates to changes in stock price and trading volume. Miller
and Rock (1985) examined both trading activities and dividend declaration as signals to
market participants to mitigate information asymmetry.

The authors examine price

change as well as trading volume of shares to examine information equilibrium in the
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market. The authors found that consistent signaling equilibrium exists under asymmetric
information due to the volume of trading.

Healy and Palepu (1988) performed an

analysis of announcements for the establishment, cancellation, or changes of dividends.
The authors found that earnings changed significantly for the year prior to dividend
announcements; earnings increase in year of dividends as well as the following year of
the announcement; abnormal stock price changes to dividend announcements are
correlated to the firms earnings in the year of announcement; and the market reaction to
announcements are less than one year.
Stock split signal research examines the use of splits to as a method to signal
private information. Ikenberry et al. (1996) examined the stock performance for firms
post stock splits. The authors found excessive returns in three years following the
announced split. The evidence suggests that managers of firms are using stock splits to
signal future performance. Louis and Robinson (2005) furthered Ikenberry et al. (1996)
findings by examining stock splits in conjunction with accruals. The authors postulate
that the combination of a stock split with accrual signals reinforce the signals sent to
market participants.

Cognitive Developmental Theories of
Kohlberg and Rest
Moral reasoning has been developed by several researchers as a "reference to the
assumption that individuals acquire and utilize cognitive structures at developmental
milestones in order to develop and organize cognitive abilities" such as moral reasoning .
This area of research was initially developed by Piaget (1931) through the study of
children's "conceptions of justice and attitudes about rules and transgressions". Through
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his research, Piaget developed a two-stage model:

heteronymous morality and

autonomous morality. Heteronymous describes the period of childhood where the subject
is egocentric where rules are "sacred and unbreakable" because they are derived from
"adult authority". Autonomous morality is the period where cognition becomes more
sophisticated and children learn to develop and follow rules in an environment of mutual
respect for others. In addition, they recognize that cooperation can offer mutual benefits
for participants (Griggs 1990).
Kohlberg's Theory of Moral
Development
Kohlberg (1958) expanded Piaget's theory of cognitional development by
focusing moral reasoning as the main component of moral development. Specifically, the
author expanded Piaget's concentration on the adherence and development of rules by
children. Kohlberg focused on the concept of justice and universal moral principals that
are learned through human development. In order to develop these concepts, individuals
progress from lower stages to higher stages. Kohlberg (1981) established three levels of
human moral development: pre-conventional, conventional, and post-conventional. In
addition, each level is further subdivided into two stages.
The pre-conventional level is generally found in children from the ages of six to
eleven years old. In this stage, individuals act in a manner that is perceived to be in their
best interests (Griggs 1990).

This level's two stages are: heterogeneous morality,

obedience and individualism, instrumental purpose, exchange. Heterogeneous morality,
obedience establishes that it is right to avoid breaking punishable rules, to be obedient for
its own stake, and to avoid physical damage to persons and property. In this stage,
persons are egocentric point of view in which the views of others are simply not
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considered. Also, individuals are not capable of considering two points of view. The
second stage, individualism, instrumental purpose, and exchange develop the right to
obey rules that are in one's immediate interest. It is right to do an equal exchange in the
form of an agreement or deal (Kohlberg 1981).
The conventional stage is primarily focused on maintaining social order and is
seen in individuals from the age of 12 to 17. This level's stages are mutual interpersonal
expectations, relationships, interpersonal conformity and social systems, conscience.
Mutual interpersonal expectations, relationships, interpersonal conformity is based in the
right to meet the expectations of people that are closest to you. Proper behavior is
important which involves having good motives and concern for others.

Finally,

individuals are capable of sharing feelings, agreements and expectations that take
precedence over their own interests. Social systems, conscience focuses on fulfilling
duties that have been agreed and following laws except in extreme cases. Contributions
to society or to a group are seen as right because the individual seeks to avoid a
breakdown of the system due to failures to meet individual obligations (Kohlberg 1981).
The post-conventional level is governed by the concern of principals and justice
and is initially developed in individuals at about 18 years old. Judgments are made
according to over-reaching concepts of human rights, morality, and universal justice. It is
divided into the social contract and individual rights and the universal ethical principal
stages. The social contract and individual rights stage allows that individuals hold a
variety of values and opinions. In addition, others may not hold most values that are
relative to your peer group. This impartiality to others interests is established through the
social contract where individuals agree to obey the rules and meet the obligations of
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society as the price of admission. However, there is a concern for laws that are not
passed for the concern of the greater good. Universal ethical principal stage postulates
that people will behave ethically if they follow self-chosen ethical principals. As such
ethical principals, laws are valid because they rest on moral principals.

Individuals

believe that equality of human rights because they are based in universal moral principles
that serve as a foundation for society (Kohlberg 1984).
Kohlberg theorized about the experiences that promote development in moral
judgment (Rest 1979).

Existing cognitive structures are transformed when new

experiences cannot be assimilated into the existing moral structure. The resulting conflict
between the new experience and the existing framework causes the structure to be altered
or an entirely new system to be adopted. As changes occur, the old structure serves as a
foundation for the new structure. Some experiences that might facilitate change include
exposure to an individual's higher moral reasoning or an experience of personal tragedy
that shocks individuals into re-examination of their moral system.
Rest's Six Component Model
Rest (1979) expanded the work of Kohlberg by developing a similar six-stage
model to operationalize moral development in individuals. His theoretical groundings are
similar to the work of Kohlberg with the exception of the sequence of stages used in
moral development. Rest theorized that individuals used simultaneous reasoning of many
types. All of these types of reasoning are viewed in aggregate rather than the use of a
specific stage. In effect, each stage of Rest's model is used in some proportion to resolve
ethical quandaries. Rests six stages are obedience, instrumental egoism, interpersonal
concordance, law and duty, societal consensus, and no arbitrary social cooperation.
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The obedience stage's morality is based on obedient behavior to caregivers and
authority figures. In this stage, children cannot partake of a negotiated agreement for
mutual benefit.

Rules are established with morality based in the adherence to the

established order.

There is no distinction between the purpose for the rules or the

relationship between rules. They are simply unchangeable with punishment following for
disobedience. A specific child's rules are extended to other children as the basis for the
concept of the generality of rules.
Instrumental egoism and simple exchange represents the individual's rights to
their specific motive or point of view. Morality serves the purpose of self-interest to the
individual. Specifically, individuals are independent agents that are motivated to pursue
their own interests. However, co-operation is considered when it is in both parties
interest to participate. If the two parties cannot reach agreement, one party will not
interfere with the other due to each other's individual rights. This stage assumes that the
parties have the capacity and willingness to negotiate.
The third stage of interpersonal concordance is based in the belief that considerate
behavior will increase societal good. Individuals are aware that others are aware of their
behavior and thoughts and vice versa. The awareness that others having thoughts of the
individual offers the opportunities of mutual friendship. People can now anticipate and
understand each other's goals and general dispositions. This insight assumes that an
individual can establish a "balance of interests" where each party is considerate of the
other's interests and offers support.
Law and duty social order allows the concept of shared expectations and how they
can be established.

Expectations are formalized and coordinated through laws that
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control two party's expectations without the direct knowledge of each other. Morality is
defined through categorical rules that are binding to all individuals of society and provide
a basis for social order. Deviations from the law threaten the social order. Roles within
society are formalized with specific rights and responsibilities.
Societal consensus addresses the concern of choosing different social orders as
their associated system of law. Law and duty order offers a reason to follow established
laws. Societal consensus offers a method for following specific laws chosen by a society.
Individuals can reach an agreement for a social order and a legal system by acting
rationally to minimize the inequities and maximize the stake each individual has within
the society. A definition of basic human rights is offered as the minimum guarantees that
any social system must make to the participants in order for the commitment to be
worthwhile. Basic human rights are a precondition to accepting the social order. Social
cooperation is established by rational individuals based on the balancing of the interests
of the participants.
Finally, no arbitrary social cooperation stage attempts to proxy for what the
rational person would accept as the procedure for making and policing laws. In addition,
the stage anticipates what individuals of society would desire for its system of governing
cooperation. In this stage, moral judgments are ultimately justified by principles of ideal
cooperation with individuals having an equal claim.
Rest's Six Component Model Operationalized:
The DIT and DIT2
The Defining Issues Test (DIT) is an objective test that operationalizes the moral
judgment and reasoning theories of (Rest 1979). Scores are based on stages of Rest's Six
Component Model that have been named Stage Two, Stage Three, Stage Four, Stage Five
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A, Stage Five B, and Stage Six. Stage two focuses on the direct advantages to the actor
and fairness of simple exchanges. Stage three represents the consideration that focuses
on the good or bad intentions of two parties, a concern for maintaining friendships, and
maintaining approval. Stage four examines the need for maintaining the existing legal
system and maintaining existing roles within the social order. Stage Five A represents
considerations that focus on organizing a society based on consensus, insistence on due
process, and safeguarding minimal basic human rights.

Stage Five B examines the

organization of society in terms of ideals that appeal to rationale for eliminating arbitrary
factors and optimizing mutual human welfare. Stage Six focuses on the organization of
society in terms of ideals that appeal to a rationale for eliminating arbitrary factors that
are designed to optimize human welfare (Rest 1986).
The DIT was initially developed by Rest (1986) as a paper and pencil objective
test. The test is based on six hypothetical dilemmas followed by twelve statements.
Subjects are asked to rank the four most important issues with the most important
receiving a four points, the second ranked item receives a three, the third ranked item
receives a two, and the fourth ranked item receives a one. The test has no correct or
incorrect answers and has a reading requirement of a 12 year old. Rest et al. (1999a)
updated the DIT (DIT2) by reducing the number of dilemmas to five (from six), updating
the existing dilemmas, and providing new instructions.
The DIT2 is scored on two moral judgment scores. The "P" score refers to the
extent to which a subject prefers post-conventional moral reasoning (Bebeau 2003).
Post-conventional thinking matches the fifth and sixth stages of Rest (1986) Six
Component Model. A total of ten points is available for each dilemma for a total of 50

46
points that is divided by .50 to yield a percent score. The scores are indexed across the
preference for Stages Five A, Five C and Six with a weighted average. The P-score can
range fromO to 95.
The second score is the N-score (Rest et al. 1997).

The N-score has two

components: the degree to which the subject prefers post conventional moral reasoning
and the degree to which lower stage items (Personal Interest Items or stages two and
three) receive lower ratings.

Participants are scored in the same manner for both

components (most important item gets 4 points, next 3, third 2, final 1). Next, the higher
stages (5 and 6) are subtracted from the lower stages (2 and 3) and divided by the
standard deviation of stages 2, 3, 5 and 6. Missing ratings are replaced with the average
of the entire dilemma. The two parts of the N2 are combined (the old P-score and the
new lower stage weighted average) by weighting the lower stages by 1/3 and the upper
stages by 2/3. The P-score and the N-score are correlated because each measures the
same components.
Rest et al. (1999b) cited over 400 published articles that have employed the DIT
test examining its construct validity. The author found six potential validity concerns of
the DIT test. They include: education bias, longitudinal gains, cognitive capacity, moral
education, and political bias. Studies have found that up to 30% to 50% of the variance
of the DIT is based in education. Cognitive capacity and DIT scores are also closely
correlated (r = 0.60s). Moral education interventions (ethics programs of professions)
reported moderate gains in DIT scores (r = 0.41).

Finally, the DIT appears to be

significantly linked to political choices with scores correlating in the range of r=0.40 to
0.65. If DIT scores are included in an ordinary least squares regression, up to two-thirds
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of the variances in controversial public policy issues (abortion, gay rights, etc) is
explained Rest et al. (2000). The DIT2 instrument as well as the N-score index has not
been subjected to the extensive usage as the DIT. Therefore, the tests construct validity
has not been as thoroughly tested. However, two studies have specifically focused on the
potential political bias of the DIT2.

Crowson and DeBacker (2008) examined the

potential bias of the DIT2 through a regression analysis of political identity. Result
found that the DIT2 remained subject to political bias. Bailey et al. (2005) also examined
political bias of the DIT2 within the context of accounting studies. The authors found
that while still biased the DIT2 performed better than the DIT.

Empirical Studies of Disciplinary Actions of Professions
Accounting
Studies examining disciplinary actions have historically been divided into three
research streams: examinations of the disciplinary actions of licensing boards and
accounting societies, reviews of the peer review processes of the AICPA, and, as an
extension of peer review, examination of Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
findings. Loeb (1972) performed one of the first examinations of disciplinary actions
taken by a state licensing board. The author examined cases brought to the board of
accountancy of a major Midwestern state from 1913 to 1969 and the state accounting
society from 1905 to 1969.

The analysis of cases was divided into three factors:

obligations to clients, obligations to colleagues, and obligations to the public.

In

addition, the author also compared complaints filled with the New York state bar
association where sanctions were imposed. The findings of this early work reported that
65% of all actions were taken due to violations to colleagues, 27% to the public, and 8%
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to the client for the accounting licensing board.

Attorneys of the New York Bar

association reported 7% of violations to colleagues, 28% to the public, 28% to the client,
and 37% where the charges were not noted. The author theorized that the difference of
the distribution of violations was based in the fact that accountants provided
"reoccurring" services and attorney's typically provided single use services.
Parker (1994) examined the disciplinary actions of the Australian Society of
Accountants for years 1961 to 1987 and the Chartered Accountants in Australia from
1974 to 1987. The Australian Society of Accountants and the Chartered Accountants in
Australia operate with a "delegated" authority to license and self-regulate the accounting
profession within the country. Therefore, the disciplinary actions taken by each of these
organizations are indirectly governmental actions.

This study was conducted as a

validation of the Parker (1994) model of public/private interest. The combined bodies
review found that 307 violations were made of the "private interest" and 211 actions were
taken in defense of the "public interest".
Fisher et al. (2001) and Higgs-Kleyn and Kapelianis (1999) performed a similar
studies as Parker (1994) but included comparison groups to gauge differences in
disciplinary actions.

Fisher et al. (2001) used the dimension of culture across the

Association Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA) over three groups: the United
Kingdom, Asian countries territories of Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, and other
countries that were members of the association.

Disciplinary actions were totaled a

compared using paired t-tests. 1989 was used as an inflection point (the passage of the
Companies Act of 1989 that began regulation of the ACCA).

Results showed

significance between countries as well as the 1989 inflection points. Higgs-Kleyn and
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Kapelianis (1999) examined the ethical perceptions of the codes of conduct for three
professional groups: Chartered Accountants, engineers, and lawyers within South Africa.
This study did not use disciplinary actions but engaged a survey instrument to gauged the
perceptions of the profession's use of codes of conduct. The authors found that the three
professions had differing perceptions about the acceptability of the use of disciplinary
actions within a code of conduct.

In addition, when faced with a conflict between

corporate and professional codes of conduct, participants would adhere to the
professional codes.
Moriarity (2000) performed an event study using the implementation of the Code
of Professional Conduct in 1988 of the AICPA.

The longitudinal study reviewed

sanctions of the AICPA from 1980 to 1998 with 1988 as an inflection point. The study
found that in the years after 1988, disciplinary actions made by the AICPA increased
despite an increase in the number of accountants working in public practice. The author
inferred from this finding that the newly implemented ethical standards were effective in
providing self-discipline to the profession. Canning and O'Dwyer (2001) performed a
similar study using the Institute of Chartered Financial Accountants in Ireland (ICAI).
The ICAI manages the regulation and disciplinary actions of accountants through
delegated authority provided by the state. The authors of this study attempted to expand
the public/private interest concept promulgated by Parker (1994). Disciplinary actions
taken by the ICAI (suspension, fine, etc) were compared to the offense. The authors
found that violations of auditing standards and independence were the primary causes of
loss of licensure.
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In a more encompassing research, Bedard (2001) examined the disciplinary
process of the Quebec Chartered Accountants Professional Association's disciplinary
process. As with Australia and Ireland, the Quebec Chartered Accountants Professional
Association acts with delegated authority to license and discipline members on behalf of
the state. This research examined the specific disciplinary process as well as its results
for the years 1974 to 1995. Sanctions given, violations of the society, notoriety of the
case, subjective factors, and objective factors were coded and analyzed through a logistic
regression.

Findings showed that the specific rule violation, objective factors, and

subjective factors were found to be significant. However, notoriety of the case was not
significant.

Finally, Colbert et al. (2008) examined the disciplinary actions of the

Securities and Exchange Commission from 1996 to 1998 in comparison to actions taken
by state boards of accountancy. The authors identified 73 CPAs who were disciplined by
the Securities and Exchange Commission. Of these, 59 received some disciplinary action
by the state boards of accountancy.
The next type of analysis of performed on disciplinary actions is from the
examination of the AICPA SEC Practice Section (SECPS) peer review function. (Brown
2000) examined the effectiveness of the SECPS program through a longitudinal survey
from 1992 to 1994. 703 review reports were examined with mixed findings. The author
coded disciplinary actions and findings and analyzed the results through a logistic
regression equation. Findings were mixed with the author's perception that the overall
function of the program was effective.

However, the author recommended that the

program needed improvements for the treatment of reoccurring findings. Hilary and
Lennox (2005) examined the peer review process for its information quality and
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effectiveness for end-users. A longitudinal study was performed from 1997 to 2003 with
the exclusion of Arthur Anderson due to its potential external validity concerns (the
Enron scandal had begun during the time of the study). 1,001 peer review reports were
examined with 41 reported adverse or modified findings.

Authors found that firms

gained clients with clean opinions and lost clients with poor opinions. The authors,
however, did not examine the quality of the peer review process or question specific
findings.
The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board through the passage of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, superseded the SEPCS Peer review program in 2003
(Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 2003). Two studies have been performed
to examine the disciplinary actions of their inspection process. Hermanson et al. (2007)
performed an analysis of all inspection reports for firms with fewer than 100 issuers. The
longitudinal study reported 316 reviews from 2003 to 2006. Results showed 190 of the
firms reviewed reported some type of audit deficiencies. Lastly, Abbott et al. (2008)
performed an analysis of change of auditors and auditor deficiencies for the period
1/21/05 to 7/13/06. For firms with GAAP deficient auditors, insider ownership, firm
size, financial activities (amount of borrowing and stock issuances), and outside
ownership were significant in a logistic regression. For clients with a GAAS deficient
auditor, only a reduction in fees charged to the client was significant. An interesting
finding of the authors stated that 3% of all SECPS peer reviews were found to be adverse
or required modification. However, PCAOB findings reported over 17% of auditors to
report GAAS or GAAP deficient audits.
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Medical
Academic studies examining the disciplinary actions of state medical boards
within the United States can be broadly grouped into three areas of study: medical
specialty specific, behavior modeling, and geographic areas. Morrison and Morrison
(2001) examined the disciplinary characteristics of Psychiatrists within the state of
California during an undisclosed 30 month period. The authors found that 42
psychiatrists were disciplined from a total of 584 physicians. During this period, 104,000
physicians were licensed by the state of California. The author's found that within seven
areas of disciplinary actions (selling drugs, drug use, mental impairment, fraud,
incompetence, and sexual harassment), psychiatrists were more likely to be disciplined
for sexual harassment.
The next type of medical disciplinary studies models the behavior of physicians
that have been disciplined by state medical boards. Morrison and Wickersham (1998)
examine the state of California's medical board for an undisclosed thirty month period.
The authors found that 375 physicians were disciplined over the observation period
within a total of 104,000 practicing physicians (0.36%). Of the physicians disciplined,
130 had their licenses revoked or suspended. Clay and Conatser (2003) reviewed the state
of Ohio's disciplinary files from January of 1997 to June of 1999. Results of the study
showed 340 physicians were disciplined with 26,818 practicing during the period of the
study. 7,500 complaints were received during the period of the study. The most common
disciplinary forms were drug use (21%), inappropriate drug possession (10%), previous
actions by out of state medical boards (7%), and incompetence (7%).
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In an expanded analysis, Cardarelli and Licciardone (2006) analyzed the state of
Texas' disciplinary files from 1989 to 1998. The authors employed a logistic regression
to identify the specific physicians most likely to suffer some form of disciplinary action.
Over the period of the study, 1,129 physicians were disciplined. Disciplinary actions
were regressed on primary medical specialty, years in practice, and history of disciplinary
actions. Results showed that anesthesiologists, psychiatrists, and general practitioners
were most likely to be susceptible to license revocation as well as physicians with prior
disciplinary actions. Finally Khaliq et al. (2005) examined the disciplinary actions taken
by the Oklahoma medical board. The authors found that of the 14,316 practicing
physicians at the time of the study, 396 (2.8%) had disciplinary action taken against
them. Of these physicians, psychiatry, family practice, and obstetrics-gynecology were
the most likely to be disciplined.
In a nationwide survey, Grant and Alfred (2007) performed a longitudinal study
that examined State Medical Boards from 1994 to 2002. The authors used the Federation
of State Medical Boards sanctions database which reported roughly 50,000 physicians
incurring some form of disciplinary action. The authors reported three significant
findings. First, the total number of sanctions has increased from 3,370 in 1992 to 6,265
in 2004 (an 86% increase over twelve years). Severe sanctions, defined as a temporary or
permanent loss of license, increased from 1,091 in 1992 to 2,116 in 2004 (a 94%
increase). Next, unprofessional conduct was the single largest defined sanction (33.4%)
with chemical dependency and substance abuse second (16%). Lastly, and most
significantly, the authors found an increase in the recidivism rate among subjects. The
authors divided their study into two paired groups: years 1994 to 1998 and years 1999 to
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2002. 10.8% of those who had suffered some disciplinary action in the first period
received a severe sanction in the second period.
The second tract of research used to examine disciplinary actions by the medical
profession involved modeling previous behaviors to identify at risk physicians.
Katsavdakis et al. (2004) used a unique approach by identifying 334 health professionals
that sought mental health treatment between 1985 and 2000 at a specific mental health
center. The authors postulated that the most common problems leading to their seeking
medical attention were marital and emotion problems not alcohol and drug abuse. In a
similar study Papadakis et al. (2005), examined 235 physicians who were disciplined by
40 different medical boards from 1990 to 2003. The authors compared behaviors in
medical school with the types and severity of disciplinary actions. Results showed that
unprofessional behavior, low Medical College Admission Test scores, and unprofessional
behavior in medical school were the best predictors for disciplinary actions.

CHAPTER 3
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Interest Group Theory of Accounting Regulation
Economic Theory of Self-Regulation
Interest Group Theory of Accounting Regulation views the regulation of
accounting as a method for the profession to obtain and maintain power. Regulation is
used to establish a line between the public and private interests of stakeholders within and
outside the profession (Gaffikin 2005). In research that examines the use of the private
interest of the profession to maintain socio-economic status, authors have focused on
employing the Parker Model (Fisher et al. 2001; O'Dwyer 2003; Parker 1994), public
space (Baker 2005; MacDonald and Richardson 2004; Neu and Graham 2005; Rogers et
al. 2005; Sikka and Willmott 1995), politics (Luehlfling 1995; Neu and Saleem 1996;
Young and October 1991), and professionalism (Lee 1995; Mitchell et al. 1994; Preston
et al. 1995; Puxty et al. 1997).
The Parker Private Interest Model (Parker 1994) focuses on the processes that the
profession employs to maintain its socio economic status. Central to self interest in this
model is the role of self-regulation and ethics. Regulatory space research examines the
processes of establishing a regulatory boundary to insulate the profession from external
direct regulation through the appropriateness of the boundary between self-regulation and
the public interest. Politics examines the influence of the profession in external political
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processes and the use of politics by the profession to maintain self-regulation (Canning
and O'Dwyer 2006; Luehlfling 1995; Neu and Saleem 1996). Finally, professionalization
of accounting has been examined as a means to protect both the public and private
interest through the development of professional codes of ethics and self-regulation (Lee
1995; Mitchell et al. 1994; Preston et al. 1995; Puxty et al. 1997).
Excluded from the existing literature is an examination of Economic Theory of
Self-Regulation in terms of the accounting profession.

Economic Theory of Self-

Regulatory (ETSR) parallels similar constructs within the existing IGTAR research.
ETSR postulates that the profession will benefit from regulation by increasing barriers to
entry, price fixing, and decreasing viable substitutes (Stigler 1971). In effect, professions
will use these factors to behave as monopolies to control their existing socio-economic
power (Shaked and Sutton 1981).

With the expansion of monopoly powers, self-

regulated professions can generate information asymmetry by establishing an agency
relationship with their public interest mission as well as potential regulatory authorities.
By holding the abilities to control price, supply, as well as information, the profession
will act in a manner that it most economically beneficial (Border and Sobel 1987). The
ability of a profession to gain powers is based in its self-regulated status. Professions
with no direct external regulatory regime will choose to enforce its ethics codes at a more
lax pace verses direct regulatory oversight (DeMarzo et al. 2005).
Accounting, Medical, and Legal Professions
as Control Groups
IGTAR, by its nature as an accounting specific theory, examines the roles that the
accounting code of ethics and self-regulation plays in preserving the status of the
accounting profession.

ETSR expands this research into the areas of monopolistic
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behavior, pricing, product substitutes, and disciplinary actions. Also, importantly for this
research, ETSR offers the ability to provide comparisons between self-regulated
professions with a universal theory. This capacity has limited existing IGTAR research
due to the lack of available control groups to make comparative research.

Freidson

(1986), Larson (1977), Pavalko (1971), and Freidson (1973) have classified physicians,
attorneys, and accountants as professionals. Also, as established within the selective
literature review section, accounting, law, and medicine meet the Pavalko (1971) attribute
definition of a profession. Accordingly, each profession could be used as a control group
to examine ETSR in the context of IGTAR research.
Disciplinary Actions and the Defining
Issues Test
Studies using disciplinary actions in accounting literature have made an attempt to
examine the public-private interest through the effectiveness of ethical codes (Bedard
2001; Brown 2000; Canning and O'Dwyer 2001; Fisher et al. 2001; Hermanson et al.
2007; Higgs-Kleyn and Kapelianis 1999; Loeb 1972; Moriarity 2000; Parker 1994).
Within medical literature, disciplinary action studies have been performed to examine
specific disciplinary actions of a medical specialty (McErlean et al. 2006; Morrison and
Morrison 2001), behavior modeling (Cardarelli and Licciardone 2006; Khaliq et al. 2005;
Morrison and Wickersham 1998), and geographic areas (Aranya and Ferris 1984;
Katsavdakis et al. 2004; Papadakis et al. 2005). With the exception of Loeb (1972), none
of these studies were completed using other professions as control groups. Fisher et al.
(2001) used geographic boundaries to provide a control group between different groups
of Chartered Professional Accountants.

Further, only Abbott et al. (2008b), Bedard
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(2001), Brown (2000), Fisher et al. (2001), Hilary and Lennox (2005) developed
hypothesizes that were empirically tested.
The Defining Issues Test has been used in over 450 academic studies including
accounting, medical, and legal research. The instrument has been consistently used as a
treatment for comparison of two different groups (Rest et al. 1999b). However, it has not
been examined in the literature in terms of disciplinary actions of professional bodies. In
a similar research area, three existing studies have examined the relationship between
scores on the DIT and risk taking personalities.
Priest and Kordinak (1991) examined the relationship between non-violent
offenders, violent offenders, a general population control group, and scores on the DIT.
For this research, non-violent offenders were defined as an offense that does not involve
harm to individuals or property. The authors found that DIT scores were significantly
lower for non-violent criminals that the general population. Specifically, the cognitive
functions used for moral decision making were from lower level functions of the DIT
test. Levenson (1990) reviewed the moral cognitive functions of risk taking personalities
by comparing residents of drug treatment programs, rock climbers, and policemen. The
author found that those in drug treatment programs suffered from lower scores on the
DIT instrument than other risk taking personalities. Last, Fabian (1999) performed an
examination of cognitive moral reasoning for criminals and non-criminals. Criminals
were subdivided into non-violent and violent classifications. The authors reported that
criminals, regardless of the nature of their crimes, suffered from lower cognitive
reasoning than their control group.

59
By drawing conclusions from Fabian (1999), Levenson (1990), and Priest and
Kordinak (1991) scores of DIT instruments should report an inverse relationship to
disciplinary actions. This assumption is drawn by substituting non-violent crimes to
disciplinary actions within this existing research.

Levenson (1990) and Priest and

Kordinak (1991) establish a relationship between a lower cognitive reasoning capacity
and risk taking activity. Fabian (1999) and Priest and Kordinak (1991) found that nonviolent criminals report lower DIT scores. In the absence of ESTR or IGTAR, a lower
cognitive development level within a profession should generate more risk taking and, as
a corollary, more disciplinary actions. If the profession is properly self-regulated, it
should identify the violations of ethical codes at a level that is in relationship with its
moral cognitive capacity.

Rates of disciplinary actions that do not follow this

relationship should support both IGTAR and ETSR.

HI: DIT Scores from the Medical, Legal, and Accounting
Professions Will Not Report an Inverse Relationship to
their Levels of Disciplinary Actions
There are several factors that might prove to mitigate this hypothesis. First, the
DIT test reports two significant biases that might impact findings.

The instrument

consistently reports a bias towards political affiliation and ethics training. A control
variable is used to help mitigate the potential political bias during analysis but might not
fully negate it. Next, individuals who have received ethical training also report a bias
within the instrument.
concern.

No control variable has been used to mitigate this potential

The last concern is the regulatory role of PCAOB and its impact on the

accounting profession. ETSR requires that profession be self-regulatory but the PCAOB
is a regulatory body of the accounting profession that can discipline membership.
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ETSR and Signal Theory
Ashby et al. (2004) and DeMarzo et al. (2005) have established through ETSR
that the most efficient regulatory regime for professions is a self-regulatory model with
government oversight. Specifically, the governmental oversight component acts as a
potential threat of a direct regulatory environment. This threat of regulatory oversight
ensures that the profession polices itself. Under the direct threat of external regulation, a
profession will discipline its membership to excess as a means to stave off regulation. In
effect, the profession is applying Signal Theory to potential regulatory agencies that it has
the capacity to govern its own practices.

Signal Theory, as currently applied in

accounting research, is the process of signaling mostly positive information to market
agents.

Signals examined in existing literature have included dividend payments,

changes in accruals, or stock splits (Crowson and DeBacker 2008; Guay et al. 1996;
Healy and Palepu 1988; Ikenberry et al. 1996; Louis and Robinson 2005; Miller and
Rock 1985; Subramanyam 1996).
Accounting Signal Theory and ETSR communicate positive information to
secondary parties.

However, accounting theory attempts to communicate to market

participants and ETSR communicates to regulatory bodies. Also, ETSR assumes a direct
threat of regulation exists before a signal is made and that the signal will specifically be
increased enforcement actions upon its membership.

Signal Theory makes the

expectation that some form of positive information is available and should be transmitted
to market participants. This information signal is at the discretion of the firm and can be
made without external pressures. Despite differences within each theory, it is reasonable
to make the assumption that the profession will behave in a similar manner as the firm.
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H2: The Accounting Profession Will Increase Disciplinary
Actions toward Its Membership during Periods of
Threats of External Regulation
A potential weakness within this hypothesis is the necessity of an external event
to trigger a signal from professional organizations. Signal Theory is based in the ability
of the firm to make discretionary signals without external pressures. It is reasonable to
assume that this may not be a significant factor due to the basis of Signal Theory. Riley
(1979) formulated the theory as a basis for establishing information equilibrium. High
quality and low quality information firms make sufficient signals to the market to reach
equilibrium. Lower quality firms are required to make greater signals for the market to
receive information. By substituting the profession for the firm and regulatory bodies for
market participants, information quality is assumed to be the number and severity of
disciplinary actions despite the influence of external factors.
Positive Accounting Theory,
Disclosure, and ETSR
Disclosure Theory within accounting research is based on the capacity of
accounting information to mitigate information asymmetry that managers of firms hold.
Firm disclosure has examined market responses, changes in required accounting
treatments, and voluntary firm disclosure (Healy and Palepu 2001). Market response
literature has examined stock price response, trader information asymmetries, and
information precision (Holthausen and Verrecchia 1990, 1988; Kim and Verrecchia
1994). Firm impacts of accounting treatment changes have examined required full cost
accounting, merger accounting, and voluntary changes in accounting treatment (Collins et
al. 1981; Dyckman 1979; Healy et al. 1987; Holthausen and Leftwich 1983; Leftwich
1981). Voluntary disclosure research has examined the impact of additional disclosure
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on firm liquidity and cost of capital (Barry and Brown 1985, 1984, 1986; Healy et al.
1999; Kim and Verrecchia 1994; Welker 1995).
ETSR has examined the impact of disclosure through the principle of forced
disclosure and penalty (Border and Sobel 1987; Donabedian 1993). This extension of
ETSR is based in agency theory where the profession acts as the agent and potential
regulatory agencies as the principal.

Information asymmetry is mitigated by forced

disclosure by the profession through mandatory audits and availability of information to
the principal. Punishment of disciplinary actions must be made through additional audit
as well as payment of fines.

The DeMarzo et al. (2005) model of self regulating

organizations with government oversight (Figure 2.4) makes reporting requirements to
principals one of the primary factors to mitigate the agent's utility. Failure to make
reporting requirements to the principal increases the profession's incentives for lower
disciplinary actions as well as increases the cost of services.
Disclosure Theory examines the characteristics of firms through the disclosure of
accounting information. Existing research has found that a firm's disclosure quality and
quantity impacts market responses and firm characteristics. Higher quality information
disclosure decreases information asymmetry within the marketplace (Holthausen and
Verrecchia 1990).

As expected, lower quality of disclosed information increases

marketplace information asymmetry (Kim and Verrecchia 1994). Required changes in
accounting treatments and related disclosure can negatively impact firm valuation
(Collins et al. 1981) as well as the composition of capital (Leftwich 1981). Finally,
voluntary disclosure of high quality can improve a firm's liquidity (Kim and Verrecchia
1994) and lower cost of capital (Botosan 1997).

63
The consolidation of Disclosure Theory of Accounting and ESRT offers an
extension to existing accounting research. By postulating that the profession has similar
characteristics of a firm, it should have the capacity to reduce information asymmetry for
potential regulatory bodies as well as the public interest. Characteristics of the profession
can be changed by increasing the quality and quantity of disclosure. Also, professional
behaviors can be altered with increased disclosure. ETSR postulates that information
asymmetry surrounding the profession is mitigated by forced disclosure and that failure
to require disclosure will offer an incentive to decrease disciplinary actions.

H3: The Type of Disclosure of Disciplinary Actions Made
by State Boards of Accounting, State Bar Associations,
and State Medical Boards Will Impact the Number
and Severity of Disciplinary Actions
The assumption of similarities between firm and profession characteristics could
provide a potential weakness for this hypothesis. Firms are felt to be homogeneous by
industry within existing accounting research. Therefore, their behavior can be tested
based through the application of theory. Accounting, legal, and medical professions are
not homogeneous within or across professions. The composition of professions include
individual as well as collective practitioners. Accordingly, uniform adherence to any
specific theory may have mixed results.

CHAPTER 4
METHODOLOGY
This chapter examines the data collection and analytical methodologies used to
test the three hypothesis generated in the previous chapter. The participant selection for
the DIT2 instrument as well as the data collection and scoring process for the survey is
described. Sources for the secondary data used in the study are established as well as the
specific data that is used to test the three hypotheses. Next, the data coding method is
established for the parameters that are used in the model. Last, the models employed to
test the hypothesis are described as well as their associated statistical tests.

DIT2 Participant Selection and Validation, Instrument
Delivery Method, and Checks of Reliability
The theoretical constructs as well as the design of the DIT2 instrument have been
described in the literature review section of this research. The survey instrument will be
administered using an Internet delivery. The selection of this method is supported by
Yuejin et al. (2007) who tested the delivery of the survey through mailed paper and
internet delivery. The authors found that each method maintained the validity of the
constructs of the survey.

Zoomerang, a third party vendor, is used to generate a

representative sample of the legal, accounting, and medical profession. The company
employs panel data through an incentive payment program to obtain subjects for the
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study (Zoomerang 2008).

In order to verify the accuracy of each panel of

data,demographic information is obtained from the survey participants and compared to
the general demographics of the industry using means testing. Demographic information
is obtained using the following sources shown in Table 4.1 and Table 4.2.

Table 4.1 Sources of Demographic Information
Profession
Medical
Legal
Accounting

Source
Physicians Characteristics and Distribution in the U.S. 2008 Edition;
AMA, Chicago, 11.
The Lawyer Statistical Report, 2007 Edition; American Bar
Foundation, 2007 edition. Chicago, 11.
The CCH Accounting Trends Survey; Commerce Clearing House,
Inc., 2008 edition. Chicago, 11

Table 4.2 Demographic Information
Legal Profession
Gender
Age
Political Orientation
State
Area of Emplovment:
Private Practice
Government
Industry
Judiciary
Education
Other

Accounting Profession
Gender
Age
Political Orientation
State
Area of Specialization:
Tax
Audit
Consulting
Other

Area of Emplovment:
Private Practice
Business & Industry
Education
Other

Medical Profession
Gender
Age
Political Orientation
State
Area of Specialization:
Internal Medicine
Anesthesiology
Pediatrics
Psychology
General Practice
Radiology
Surgery
Other
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Scoring of the DIT2 instruments will be performed by the Center for the Study of
Ethical Development at the Universities of Alabama and Minnesota. Use of this third
party for scoring is beneficial because the DIT2 instrument can be scored and averaged
for comparison with other studies that have employed the original DIT test.

Secondary Data Collection
Disciplinary Actions of State
Bar Associations
The American Bar Association established the National Lawyer Regulatory Data
Bank as a repository of sanctions imposed against practicing lawyers in the United States.
It was established in 1968 and has maintained records of specific disciplinary actions
against individuals as well as professional corporations. Data is collected through the
voluntary cooperation of state bar associations. The database includes the name of the
disciplined party, details of infraction, potential fines, specific disciplinary action taken,
and the date of the infraction. Digitalized data is available dating to 1980.
Disciplinary Actions Taken by
Medical Associations
Federation Physician Data Center is sponsored by the Federation of State Medical
Boards to house disciplinary actions taken against members of the medical profession.
Participation is voluntary with individual state medical boards. Since 1960, Federation
Physician Data Center has obtained voluntary participation from all fifty states. The
database includes the name of the disciplined party, details of infraction, potential fines,
specific disciplinary action taken, and the date of the infraction.
available from 1985.

Digitalized data is
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Disciplinary Actions from State
Boards of Accountancy
The American Institute of Public Accountants generates a disciplinary action
database that is based in the voluntary submission from state boards of accounting. The
database maintains similar records as the Federation Physician Data Center and the
National Lawyer Regulatory Data Bank. However, records are only maintained within a
seven year data retention window. To maintain consistency with disciplinary actions of
the medical and legal professions, disciplinary actions are obtained directly from the
individual state boards of accountancy.

Data Coding
Disciplinary actions from the National Lawyer Regulatory Data Bank, Federation
Physician Data Center, and the individual state boards of accountancy will be reviewed
and coded for consistency.
Sanctions
For each case where the regulatory body of the profession issues a formal
sanction, the individual action will be coded into one of five categories. Each of the
categories represents a broad grouping of actions that could have been taken by the
societies. The four categorical levels are:
1. Censure: no formal restriction of license to practice the profession is taken.
However, a formal admonishment of the behavior is made to the practitioner.
2. Probation: A formal reprimand is made to the practioner with specific
corrective actions. If the corrective actions are not made, further restrictions to
the practioner's license will be made.
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3. Suspension: A formal reprimand is issued, a fine is levied, and the practitioner
is restricted in their practice or not allowed to practice for a specified amount
of time.
4. Revocation: A formal reprimand is issued and the individual is no longer able
to practice within the jurisdiction.
Each regulatory body discloses the disciplinary actions of its members in differing
levels. However, throughout each profession and their associated governing bodies, the
types of disclosure will be categorized in the following classes:
1. None: No disclosure is made in regards to specific disciplinary actions
2. Profession:

Disclosure is been made to the professional body through

publications that specifically target the profession.
3. Other: Disclosure is made to the public through a regional newspaper or
searchable internet database.
4. Internet: Disclosure is made through the Internet.

Tests of Hypothesis
Hypothesis 1: Public/Private Interest
Scores from the DIT2 and data collected from the National Lawyer Regulatory
Data Bank, Federation Physician Data Center, and the individual state boards of
accountancy are used to test this hypothesis. Stated symbolically, the hypothesis is:
DITRankl * DISCRank3;
DITRankl * DISCRankl; ,
DITRank3 * DISCRankl

(7)
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where DITRankl = Profession with the highest average score on the DIT2 Instrument
as ranked by post-hoc ANOVA Tukey Kramer Test,
DITRank2 = Profession with the second highest average score on the DIT2
Instrument ranked by post-hoc ANOVA Tukey-Kramer Test,
DITRank3 = Profession with the third highest average score on the DIT2
Instrument ranked by post-hoc ANOVA Tukey-Kramer Test,
DISCRankl = Profession with the highest rate of disciplinary actions per
practitioner as averaged annually by state for the years 1987 to
2007 as ranked by post-hoc ANOVA Tukey-Kramer Test,
DISCRank2 = Profession with the second highest rate of disciplinary actions per
practitioner as averaged annually by state for the years 1987 to
2007 as ranked by post-hoc ANOVA Tukey-Kramer Test
DISCRank3 = Profession with the third highest rate of disciplinary actions per
practitioner as averaged annually by state for the years 1987 to
2007 as ranked by post-hoc ANOVA Tukey-Kramer Test.
This hypothesis pertains to the relationship between the DIT2 test score and the
rate of disciplinary actions by professions. As previously established, scores of the DIT2
should be inversely related to risk taking behaviors. In order to test this hypothesis, an
ANOVA is performed to determine if the average DIT2 scores are statistically different
by profession. Next, a post hoc ANOVA Tukey-Kramer Test is performed to provide an
ordered rank from the highest score to lowest. The same procedure is performed for each
profession's average of disciplinary actions. In order to increase observation points,
disciplinary actions are segmented by state and averaged by the number of practitioners
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licensed. By ranking scores of the DIT2 as well as an average of disciplinary actions, a
relationship is established between each profession's DIT2 score and its associated
disciplinary actions. Rejection of the hypothesis would report a rate of disciplinary
actions that match the ranked scores of DIT2 tests.
Hypothesis 2: Signal Theory
Disciplinary action scores of the accounting profession are used to examine the
hypothesis based on signal theory and ETSR. This hypothesis examines the potential
relationship between threatened regulatory actions and the behavior of a profession.
Specifically, a profession will act to discipline its own members at a higher rate to
prevent external direct regulation. In order to examine this hypothesis, inflection points
of potential regulation are identified.

Two specific points are used to examine this

hypothesis: the issuance of the McFarland Report and the passage of SARBOX. The
McFarland Report, also known as the Future Development of Auditing: A Paper to
Promote Public Debate (Auditing Practices Board 1992), examined the state of the
accounting profession in the wake of audit failures associated with the savings and loan
failures in the late 1980's. The report was published in 1992 and was critical of the
failures of the profession to address systemic failures.

SARBOX resulted in the

formation of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) due to a series
of audit failures in the late 1990's (Abbott et al. 2008). This legislation began a partial
external regulation of the accounting profession by examining and disciplining individual
practitioners and firms that conducted public company audits.
In order to operationalize this hypothesis, a statistical representation of the
hypothesis is listed in equation (8).
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DiscActpmnc < DiscActposme; and
DiscActpresox < DiscActpo ztsox

,

where DiscActpo = The accounting profession's disciplinary actions as averaged per
practitioner annually by state for the years 1987 to 1991 as ranked
by post-hoc ANOVA Tukey Kramer Test,
DiscAct,m,mt = The accounting profession's disciplinary actions as averaged per
practitioner annually by state for the years 1992 to 1996 as ranked
by post-hoc ANOVA Tukey Kramer Test,
DiscActpmm = The accounting profession's disciplinary actions as averaged per
practitioner annually by state for the years 1997 to 2001 as ranked
by post-hoc ANOVA Tukey Kramer Test,
DiscActpomo, = The accounting profession's disciplinary actions as averaged per
practitioner annually by state for the years 2002 to 2006 as ranked
by post-hoc ANOVA Tukey Kramer Test.
A ranking order is established by performing an ANOVA with post-hoc test of the
Tukey-Kramer Test.

This is chosen due to the probability of unequal sizes within

samples as well as the lack of assumption for homogeneity of variance. This should
allow for comparison between time periods of that offer the greatest rate of disciplinary
action.

If the hypothesis holds, post inflection point periods should experience a

statistically significant greater rate of disciplinary actions.
The first test of this hypothesis examines a statistical difference between periods
before and after inflection points. However, it does not address potential significance of

(8)
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external factors that may impact the issuance of sanctions. Therefore a secondary test is
used based on equation (9).
DisAct = j3o + (5\Fine + fiiNodisc + /?3 Pr ofession + ^Internet +fisMidatl•+
(9)
fieMidwest + j3iNE + f3%SE + foSW + ^Population + e,
where DisAct =

The accounting profession's disciplinary actions as averaged per
practitioner annually by state for the years 1987 to 2006,

Fine =

Summary total of the number of fines issued by each licensing
board on an annual basis,

Nodisc =

Dummy variable representing licensing boards that did not make
public disclosure for disciplinary actions. Coding is: 1 - No
disclosure made; 0 - Disclosure made in different format,

Profession = Dummy variable representing licensing boards that made public
disclosure to the profession of disciplinary actions. Coding is: 1 Disclosure to the Profession; 0 - Other means of disclosure or no
disclosure made.
Internet =

Dummy variable representing licensing boards that made public
disclosure through internet postings. Coding is: 1 - Disclosure
through internet postings; 0 - Other means of disclosure or no
disclosure made,

Midatl =

Dummy variable representing disciplinary actions made in the
States of Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and
West Virginia. Coding is: 1 - Disciplinary action made by
licensing board in region; 0 - Disciplinary action made by other
licensing board in other region
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Dummy variable representing disciplinary actions made in the
States of Indiana, Michigan, Wisconsin, Illinois, Missouri, Iowa,
Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, and
Ohio. Coding is: 1 - Disciplinary action made by licensing board
in region; 0 - Disciplinary action made by other licensing board in
other region,
Dummy variable representing disciplinary actions made in the
States of Connecticut, Massachusetts, Maine, New Hampshire,
New York, Rhode Island, Vermont. Coding is: 1 - Disciplinary
action made by licensing board in region; 0 - Disciplinary action
made by other licensing board in other region,
Dummy variable representing disciplinary actions made in the
States of Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia,
Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Tennessee, Kentucky. Coding is:
1 - Disciplinary action made by licensing board in region;
0 - Disciplinary action made by other licensing board in other
region,
Dummy variable representing disciplinary actions made in the
States of New Mexico, Texas, Oklahoma, Arkansas, and
Louisiana. Coding is: 1 - Disciplinary action made by licensing
board in region; 0 - Disciplinary action made by other licensing
board in other region,
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Population = Log transformation of the number of accounting practitioners in
the state where the disciplinary act was issued.
Statistical analysis of this test is performed by using an auto-regressive moving
average (ARIMA) regression with Chow Tests made at the inflection points of 1992 and
2002. The hypothesis will be substantiated if the Chow Test is significant for the two
periods. An ARIMA regression is chosen due to the time series nature of the data and the
hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3: Disclosure Theory
The final hypothesis is based in the analysis of the types of disclosure made by
the regulatory bodies of the medical, accounting, and legal professions. In this case,
disciplinary actions are segmented by the disclosure made by the professional bodies.
The hypothesis is statistically represented in equation (10).
DiscActi > DiscActN > DiscActr > DiscActo,
where: DiscActi =

(10)

The legal, medical and accounting profession's disciplinary actions
as averaged per practitioner annually by state for the years 1987 to
2007 and segmented by actions disclosed through the internet,

DiscAct* =

The legal, medical and accounting profession's disciplinary actions
as averaged per practitioner annually by state for the years 1987 to
2007 and segmented by actions disclosed through public
newspaper and Internet searchable database,

DiscActp =

The legal, medical and accounting profession's disciplinary actions
as averaged per practitioner annually by state for the years 1987 to
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2007 and segmented by actions disclosed publications to the
profession,
DiscActa =

The legal, medical and accounting profession's disciplinary actions
as averaged per practitioner annually by state for the years 1987 to
2007 and segmented by actions that are not disclosed to the public.

An ANOVA test with the use of a Tukey-Kramer post-hoc test is performed to establish a
ranking order by disclosure type. If the hypothesis holds, the order of disciplinary actions
by magnitude will be Internet, other, professional publication and no disclosure.
A secondary analysis will also be performed using a multinomial logistic
regression. This additional analysis is used in an attempt to gain direction and
significance of the potential affect of disclosure in conjunction with control variables.
The equation to be employed is:
DisAct = /?o + (5iDisclosure +flyArea + Profession
where DisAct =

+ /55 Population + e , (11)

Dummy variable of each disciplinary action made by each board.
Coding is: 1 - Censure; 2 - Probation; 3 - Suspension; 4 Revocation,

Disclosure = Dummy variable that represents the level of disclosure made by the
professional body for the disciplinary action. Coding is: 1 - No
disclosure; 2 - Disclosure to professional journal; 3 - Disclosure to
newspaper or searchable internet database; 4 - Disclosure through
Internet,

76
Area =

Dummy variable that represents the area of the disciplinary action.
Sanctions are coded using the American Accounting Association
Regions. Coding is: 1 - Mid-Atlantic (DE, MD, NJ, PA, WV,
DC); 2 - Midwest (IN, MI, WI, IL, MO, IA, MN, ND, SD, NE,
KS, OH); 3 - Northeast (CT, MA, MN, NH, NY, RI, VT);
4 - Southeast (VA, NC, SC, GA, FL, AL, MS, TN, KY);
5 - Southwest (NM, TX, OK, AR, LA); 6 - West (AK, HI, AZ,
CO, WY, MT, ID, UT, NV, CA, OR, WA)

Profession = Dummy variable that represents the profession. Coding is:
1 - Accounting; 2 - Legal; 3 - Medical,
Population = Dummy variable of the number of accounting practitioners in each
state by year segmented by quartile. Coding is: 1 - First Quartile;
2 - Second Quartile; 3 - Third Quartile; 4 - Fourth Quartile.
The hypothesis will be validated if the profession variable is found to be
significant. A multinomial logistic regression is chosen due to the number of limited
dependent variables that are included in the equation. Also, by using a logistic regression,
magnitude and direction of the influence of each parameter of the independent variables
is determined.

CHAPTER 5

INTRODUCTION
Chapter 5 presents the results of the data analysis of the three hypothesizes
developed in Chapter 4. This Chapter is divided into three sections. The first section
reports the findings of the DIT2 survey with associated internal validity tests.

In

addition, results of an ANOVA with a Tukey-Kramer Ranking Order test is reported
comparing results of the DIT2 and disciplinary actions which is used to examine the
Economic Theory of the Self-Regulated Profession Hypothesis.

The second section

examines the Hypothesis of Signal Theory and includes the results of an ANOVA with a
Tukey-Kramer Ranking Order test as well as a Chow Structural Integrity Test that
compares two potential inflection points in the disciplinary actions of the accounting
profession. The final section reviews the results of an ANOVA with a Tukey-Kramer
Ranking Order test and a Multinomial Logistic Regression that examines the Disclosure
Theory Hypothesis.

Economic Theory of the Self-Regulated Profession
Types of Analysis Employed
Two ANOVA tests with Tukey-Kramer post hoc tests are performed to establish
the ranking order of average disciplinary actions by profession as well as the order of the

77

78

scores of the DIT2 test that is fielded. The DIT2 test was fielded via an Internet survey
employing a third party vendor for data collection. Scoring of the survey was performed
by the Center for the Study of Ethical Development at the Universities of Minnesota and
Alabama. Internal validity of the study was analyzed using SPSS statistical software.
The ANOVA analysis was performed using SAS Statistical Software.

Codes for all

procedures are found in Exhibit "A".
Summary of Input Data
Two data sets are used in the examination of the ETSR Profession: disciplinary
actions of the accounting, legal, and medical professions and the results of the DIT
Survey. Disciplinary actions for the years 1987 to 2007, controlled by profession, are
used to rank the number of actions taken by licensing board. Observations are an annual
average of disciplinary actions by total number of practitioners for each regulatory board.
The time period under analysis, 1987 to 2007, offers 3,150 potential observations.
However, only 2,506 annual observations are available. 63 potential observations from
the state of Kentucky (21 observations for each of the three professions) are not available
for study due to the state board restrictions of disclosure of information. The remaining
581 missing observations are comprised of boards that did not generate a disciplinary
action during a single year over the period of the study. Disciplinary actions were totaled
by each state board and averaged by the number of practitioners.
Disciplinary actions exclude administrative proceedings that were specific to the
profession as well as common to all three professions. Actions were removed from the
study that are not a violation of a profession's ethics codes or its standards of practice.
Common actions include failure to make timely payment of dues, failure to properly

79
record transfer of license from one regulatory region to another, or incomplete record
reporting.

Profession specific administrative actions include lack of administrative

oversight for chemical dependency for medical professionals, failure to file timely
motions before court jurisdictions for attorneys, and failure to register with a state board
that the individual was conducting public company audits despite their registration with
the PCAOB. Total number of violations by Profession is listed in Table 5.1.

Table 5.1 Total Annual Disciplinary Actions and Number of Practitioners of Licensing
Boards Reporting Disciplinary Actions by Profession from 1987 to 2007
Year
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007

Accounting
Action
Population
187,087
28
160,891
15
259,557
33
236,513
50
38
228,959
225,881
103
255,549
30
381,004
75
81
367,646
308,277
43
72
426,311
42
452,378
420,325
50
472,157
56
306,952
48
325,849
55
43
301,091
42
321,004
255,942
88
379,397
88
44
355,205

Legal
Population
2,811,849
2,878,611
3,009,157
3,222,906
3,070,918
3,186,858
3,137,827
3,239,542
3,297,913
3,265,170
3,381,270
3,695,455
3,882,478
4,160,152
4,037,867
4,251,011
4,268,288
4,533,207
4,521,468
4,703,987
4,887,131

Action
2,995
3,085
3,105
3,513
3,478
4,044
3,197
3,411
3,936
3,312
2,395
3,286
3,018
3,359
3,566
3,385
4,085
3,952
4,997
3,652
3,260

Medical
Population
Actions
3,029,430
2,518
2,564
3,087,867
2,718
3,121,979
3,112,452
3,218
3,028
3,126,716
3,252
3,343,504
3,215,172
3,542
4,024
3,314,897
4,271
3,369,450
4,233
3,387,565
3,532,311
4,315
4,352
3,583,507
3,563,939
4,425
3,651,075
4,456
4,434
3,800,966
3,862,210
4,660
3,827,287
5,033
6,192
3,919,895
3,943,898
6,011
5,321
4,083,485
4,237,967
5,082

The second data set used in the analysis of the ETSR is derived from a field
survey of the DIT2. Zoomerang, a third party vendor, is employed to use their existing
panel data as subjects for the instrument.

Completed usable surveys included 86

attorneys, 109 certified public accountants, and 117 medical professionals. Demographic
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questionnaires were included in the instruments that garnered profession specific
information about the demographics of the participants.

The demographics of the

professions and the sample are listed in Tables 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4.

Table 5.2 Comparison of Physician Characteristics Verses Sample
Area of Specialization

Gender

Age

Sample Population

Anesthesiologist

1%

4%

General Practice

18%

22%

Internal
Medicine
Pediatrics

8%

15%

13%

12%

Psychology
Radiology
Surgery
OB/GYN
Opthemologist
Other

4%
4%
5%
4%
6%
37%

3%
2%
14%
7%
3%
18%

Sample Population

Sample Population

25 to
35
36 to
45
46 to
55
56 to
65
+ 65

20%

17%

Male

50%

57%

18%

23%

Female 50%

43%

26%

31%

21%

23%

16%

6%

Table 5.3 Comparison of Attorney Characteristics Verses Sample
Area of Pracl ice
Private
Practice
Government
Industry
Judiciary
Education
Other

Gender

Age

Sample Population

Sample Population

Sample Population

64%

74%

25 to 35

20%

19%

Male

58%

66%

17%
8%
4%
4%
3%

8%
8%
3%
1%
6%

36 to 45
46 to 55
56 to 65
+ 65

27%
20%
25%
8%

14%
28%
13%
12%

Female

42%

34%
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Table 5.4 Comparison of Certified Public Accountants Verses Sample
Area of Practice
Tax
Audit
Consulting
Corporate
Other

29%
7%
9%
41%
14%

Gender

Age

Sample Population

38%
36%
4%
16%
6%

Sample Population

25 to 35
36 to 45
46 to 55
56 to 65
+ 65

14%
24%
25%
30%
7%

16%
20%
35%
27%
2%

Sample

Population

47%
53%

56%
44%

Male
Female

Response Rate, Validity Tests, and Results for DIT2:
Survey of Accountants, Attorneys, and Physicians
The response rate for the survey instrument for each target population is listed
below in Table 5.5.

Table 5.5 Response Rate for DIT2 Survey

Contacts
Partial completions
Surveys removed
Usable surveys
Response rate

Accountants
739
33
49
109
14.75%

Attorneys
701
16
26
86
12.27%

Physicians
698
26
50
117
16.67%

In an effort to prevent participants from completing the survey without effort, four
dummy questions are included in each of the four scenario responses. These survey
questions inquired about a topic that was not relevant to the overall ethical dilemma
presented. An example stated that the height of a protagonist in a scenario was the most
significant component of the overall ethical concern. Participants, who responded to one
of these answers as significant, were removed from the overall sample.
A Cronbach's alpha is computed for each profession surveyed using SPSS
Statistical Software. Cronbach's alpha reports how well a set of variables measure a
single dimension construct and increases with correlations between items. Because of

82

this, the coefficient is used as a measure of internal reliability of the test. It is important
to note that Cronbach's alpha is not a statistical test but it is a measure of consistency. A
general score of 0.70 or higher is felt to provide sufficient reliability of the survey
instrument (Cronbach and Shavelson 2004). Results of the Cronbach's alpha scores are
reported in Table 5.6.

Table 5.6 Cronbach's Alpha Scores for Accountants, Attorneys, and Physicians

Alpha Score

Accountant
0.697

Attorney
0.741

Physicians
0.778

Findings from the Cronbach's alpha tests, report only one survey instrument that
reports borderline reliability. Accountants surveyed reported a score of 0.697 which is
marginally sufficient to prove reliability. The two other test groups reported sufficient
reliability. It is worth noting that the internal validity of the DIT2 is subject to "external
influences" such as starts and stops, interruptions, noise which can impact reliability.
Finally, results of the DIT2 scores for the three survey groups are found in Table 5.7.

Table 5.7 Mean Scores and Standard Deviations of DIT2 Instrument

Accountant
Attorney
Physicians

N
110
86
117

Mean
34.12
49.95
42.75

Std. Deviation
6.732
5.237
6.455

Three recent studies have separately examined each profession using the DIT2
and offer comparison results for the survey performed in this research. In each of these
studies, traditional paper surveys were employed. Results are listed in Table 5.8.
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Table 5.8 Mean Scores and Standard Deviation for Similar Studies
Author
Bailey et al (2005)
Landman and McNeel (2000)
Bebeau et al. (2002)

Profession
Accounting
Legal
Medical

N
253
170
140

Mean
36.66
49.60
45.85

Std. Deviation
13.74
14.86
9.85

Results from other academic studies examining the three profession report
comparable DIT2 findings as the results of this research's Internet Delivery. However,
two exceptions are noted. The accounting and medical professionals report lower DIT2
scores than the current study and the standard deviations are smaller for each population
group. Potentially reducing the standard deviations for the three surveys of this research
are the removal of participants through screening questions. As a result, smaller variance
could be derived from each study.
Methodological and Analytical Assumptions
of Tests of ANOVA for Disciplinary Actions
by Profession and DIT2 Test Scores
The analysis of Analysis of Variance assumes its error term has a normal
distribution, is independence, and is not heteroscedastic. Normality of the error term
allows the analysis to follow the properties of a normal distribution.

Numerical

methodology is chosen for this analysis due to the size of the sample for disciplinary
actions (2,506) and number of observations for the survey instrument (313).

The

Cramer-Von Mises and Anderson-Darling tests are employed with each assuming that the
null hypothesis is a normal distribution (Kutner 2005). Tests of normality are reported in
Tables 5.9 and Table 5.10 for average disciplinary actions and results of the DIT2 test.
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Table 5.9 Tests of Normality - Disciplinary Actions
Test
Cramer-Von Mises
Anderson-Darling

W-Squared Statistic/
A-Squared Statistic
0.167672
97.35941

Pr>0
0.0100
0.0050

Table 5.10 Tests of Normality - DIT2 Score Results
Test
Cramer-Von Mises
Anderson-Darling

W-Squared Statistic/
A-Squared Statistic
0.458048
3.028583

Pr>0
0.0050
0.0050

Results of each test of normality report significant at the 0.05 level which
suggests that the distributions are normal. Independence of the error term is examined
next. Analysis of variance assumes that each error term is independent of other
observations.

If the terms are related, the standard error could be inflated and the

portability of the model as well as its consistency would be questionable. Concerns of
independence of the error terms are not as significant for the survey instrument due to the
random selection process for each population sample. The secondary data is a concern
due to its time series nature. Accordingly, there is a higher possibility that the error terms
are correlated. To examine this assumption, a Durbin Watson Test is performed on both
data sets. This test assumes that the error terms are normally distributed, does not drift,
and has a mean of zero. A score of four would indicate a significant level of correlation
with a score of two as a signal of no autocorrelation (Kutner 2005). The results for the
DIT2 survey results and the average disciplinary action data are listed in Table 5.11.
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Table 5.11 Durbin-Watson Test for DIT2 Survey and Disciplinary Actions
Data Set
DIT2 Survey
Disciplinary Actions

N
313
2,506

Durbin-Watson Score
0.447
1.442

1st Order Auto-Correlation
0.773
0.279

Results for the Durbin-Watson test suggest that the data for disciplinary actions
report a level of autocorrelation within its data sample. However, no data correction is
undertaken. For the DIT2 survey, the entire survey sample was used in this analysis. A
secondary analysis is performed evaluating the independence of the error term of each
classification due to the low score Durbin-Watson Score (0.447). Table 5.12 reports the
results of the Durbin-Watson Test for each classification of professionals for the DIT2
survey results.

Table 5.12 Durbin-Watson Test for DIT2 Results by Profession
Profession
Medical
Accounting
Attorneys

N
117
110
85

Durbin-Watson Score
0.826
0.684
1.321

1st Order Auto-Correlation
0.583
0.652
0.378

Results of the second series of tests are improved from the first data set but still
report some level of lack of independence of the error terms. However, no corrective
actions are taken.
Finally, the assumption of homogeneity of variance is tested to validate that the
error terms are random. If the assumption is not met, the model has the potential to
overestimate the goodness of fit. Tests examining homogeneity of variance assume that
the null hypothesis is an error term is random with no finite variance. The Levene's test is
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used because it is robust to potential departures of normality and is felt to be conservative
(Kutner 2005). Results of the test for both data sets are listed in Table 5.13.

Table 5.13 Results of Levene's Test for Homogeneity of Variance
Data Source
Disciplinary Actions
DIT2 Survey

Pr > F
0.1522
0.1243

F-Value
1.88
2.09

Each data set reports no significance for the Levene's Test therefore it is assumed
that the data set's error term is random and has constant variance.
Results of ANOVA - Disciplinary Actions
and DIT2
Two one-way ANOVA tests are performed using the DIT2 and Disciplinary
Action data sets. Each ANOVA is performed using profession as the classification
variable. Results of the One-Way ANOVA of the DIT2 survey data is provided in Table
5.14.

Table 5.14 Results of One-Way ANOVA of DIT2 Survey Results by Profession
Source

Degrees of
Freedom
2

Sum of Squares

Error
Corrected
Total

310
312

12137.84
24433.76

39.15

R-Squared

0.503235

15.00573

Root MSE

6.257343

Coefficient
Variance
DIT Mean

Profession

12295.92

Mean
Square
6147.96

F
Value
157.02

Pr>F
Value
<0.000
1

41.69968

The one-way ANOVA model with the dummy variable for profession as the
treatment with DIT2 scores report a significance of 0.0001. In addition, the model has
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moderate explanatory powers of with an R-Squared of 0.5023. The Tukey's post hoc test
with the Tukey-Kramer adjustment for unequal samples is performed to rank the average
observations from each survey group. The procedure is performed at the 0.05 level of
significance. Results are provided in Tables 5.15.

Table 5.15 Results of Tukey-Kramer Ranked Means - DIT Survey Results
Ranking
Mean
First
49.95
42.72
Second
Third
34.12
Findings significant at the 0.05.

Profession
Legal*
Medical*
Accounting*

N
86
117
110

The results of the second ANOVA using average disciplinary actions of the three
professions is provided in Table 5.16. This ANOVA is performed using profession as a
control variable.

Table 5.16 Results of One-Way ANOVA of Average Disciplinary Actions by Profession
Degrees of
Freedom
2

Sum of Squares

Mean Square

0.00571534

0.00285767

Error
Corrected
Total

2510
2512

0.02710782
0.03282316

0.00001080

R-Squared
Root MSE

0.174125
0.003286

Coefficient Variance
Sanction Mean

94.12396
0.003491

Source
Profession

F
Value
264.60

Pr>F
Value
<0.000
1

The one-way ANOVA model with the dummy variable for profession as the
treatment with DIT2 scores report a significance of 0.0001. In addition, the model has
moderate explanatory powers of with an R-Squared of 0.1741. The Tukey's post hoc test
with the Tukey-Kramer adjustment for unequal samples is performed to rank the average
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observations from each survey group. The procedure is performed at the 0.05 level of
significance. Results are provided in Tables 5.17.

Table 5.17 Results of Tukey-Kramer Ranked Means - DIT Survey Results
Ranking
Mean
First
0.0046549
Second
0.0036799
0.0004643
Third
Findings significant at the 0.05.

N
1,048
1,000
465

Profession
Medical*
Legal*
Accounting*

A comparison table of the results of the DIT2 survey and disciplinary actions is
provided in Table 5.18.

Table 5.18 Comparison Table for DIT2 Survey Ranking Order and
Disciplinary Actions Ranking Order
Order
First
Second
Third

DIT2 Survey
Medical
Legal
Accounting

Average Disciplinary Actions
Legal
Medical
Accounting

Examining and Interpreting the Models —
ANOVA and Tukey-Kramer
Ranking Order Tests
The two one-way ANOVA models examining DIT2 Survey results as well as
disciplinary actions were significant at the .05 level. The tests supporting the Economic
Theory of the Self-Regulated Profession hypothesis, however, are based in the results of
the Tukey-Kramer Ranked Order of average disciplinary actions. This hypothesis
supported the conclusion that the order of average disciplinary actions should report an
inverse relationship to the average scores of the DIT2 instrument. Results of the ranking
order support the hypothesis.
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Signal Theory
Types of Analysis Employed
Two separate statistical analyses are performed to examine the hypothesis of
Signal Theory. The first method is an ANOVA of the average annual disciplinary actions
of each state board of accounting that compare infractions before and after threats of
external regulation to the profession. Two instances of external threat to regulation are
examined. The first is the issuance of the McFarland Report in 1992 and the second is
the passage of SARBOX in 2002.

An additional test, a Chow Test for Structural

Stability, is performed to identify structural changes in a data set. This procedure is
based on an ARIMA Regression with its related assumptions and diagnostic tests. The
Chow Tests allow for additional control variables in addition to a secondary test of the
hypothesis. SAS Statistical Software was employed in the analysis of the data. The
specific code is attached to this document as Exhibit "A".
Introduction - ANOVA
An ANOVA is employed for the analysis of the second hypothesis due to its
ability to generate a ranking order of average disciplinary actions segmented by a class
control variable that represents the proposed inflection points. The ranked order of
disciplinary actions is an important test of the second hypothesis because it gives a
method to statistically compare the average number of disciplinary actions before and
after the inflection point. An increasing level that is statistically different from the
previous level supports the hypothesis that the profession is signaling to potential
regulatory agencies. The Tukey's post hoc test is used because is has the capacity to
inspect sample sizes that are unequal through the Tukey-Kramer method (Kuehl 2000).
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Summary of Input Data - ANOVA
Disciplinary actions for the Accounting Profession from the years 1987 to 2006
are used in this examination. This time period offers a five year period before and after
the inflection points of 1992 and 2002. Individual observations are comprised of the
annual disciplinary actions of individual state boards of accounting averaged by the
number of practitioners. For the time period of the study, there are 1,000 potential
observations (20 years of disciplinary actions for 50 states).

However, only 441

observations were available for use in the study. The Kentucky's 20 observations were
excluded due to their disclosure regulations. The remaining 539 observations are not
available due to the lack of disciplinary actions taken by a board of accountancy in a
single year.
Disciplinary actions for the accounting profession were included in the study if
they were specifically a violation of an ethics code or failure of professional standards.
Excluded observations include the administrative actions taken during the transfer of
licenses from state to state, failure to pay membership fees because of transfer of license,
failure to register with the state board of accountancy of performance of public company
audits despite registration with PCAOB, failure to pay membership fees due to
retirement, slow payment of membership fees, failure to pay personal income taxes in a
timely manner, and any other action that was did not involve an ethics or professional
standard violation. A total of 2,798 individual actions are reported by the boards of
accountancy for the period of analysis. However, only 1,090 were directly attributed to
ethics and professional standard violations. Total observations by state are provided in
Table 5.19.
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Table 5.19 Disciplinary Actions by Region and State from 1987 to 2006
Mid-Atlantic
State Actions

Northeast
State Actions

CT
IA
10
IL
51 MA
11 ME
IN
NH
8
KS
NY
MI
31
24
RI
MN
VT
MO
36
ND
7
2
NE
OH
27
SD
3
14
WI
Total 168 Total 224 Total
Not available for sample
DE
MD
NJ
PA
WV

1
26
73
58
10

Mid-West
State Actions

30
17
1
4
110
3
1

166

Southeast
State Actions

Southwest
State Actions

AL
FL
GA
MS
NC

AR
LA
OK
NM
TX

13
11
15
1
132

TN
KY*
VA

8
43
26
10
18
9
12
0
20

Total

146

Total

172

sc

West
State Actions

AK
AZ
CA
CO
HI
ID
MT
NV
OR
UT
WA
WY
Total

1
28
100
21
5
3
3
11
5
12
20
5
214

Methodological and Analytical
Assumptions - ANOVA
Analysis of Variance makes assumptions for the error term of a normal
distribution, independence, and homogeneity of variance. The first assumption examined
is the assumption that the error term is normally distributed. A normal distribution allows
the investigation to assume the properties of a normal distribution. Numerical
methodology is chosen for this analysis due to the size of the sample (441). The CramerVon Mises and Anderson-Darling tests assume that the null hypothesis is a normal
distribution. Findings of non-significance at the 0.10 level could report a distribution that
is not normally distributed (Kutner 2005). Two tests of normality are reported in Table
5.20.
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Table 5.20 Tests of Normality
Test
Cramer-Von Mises
Anderson-Darling

W-Squared Statistic/
A-Squared Statistic
0.879832
0.096267

Pr>0
0.0001
0.0100

Independence of the error term is the next assumption that is examined. It is
assumed that the error terms are independent of other observations. If the terms are
related, the standard error could be inflated and the portability of the model as well as its
consistency would be questionable. If primary data is collected, the risk of lack of
independence can be mitigated because the experiment can have a random design.
However, the data used in the analysis is secondary data that is time series. Accordingly,
there is a higher possibility that the error terms are correlated. To examine this
assumption, a Durbin Watson Test is performed on the data set. This test assumes that the
error terms are normally distributed, does not drift, and has a mean of zero. A score of
four would indicate a significant level of correlation with a score of two as a signal of no
autocorrelation (Kutner 2005). The results of the Durbin Watson test are 1.404 with a
first order autocorrelation of 0.298. Findings suggest that, while not significant, the data
reports a level of correlation. No attempts to correct for correlation are made.
Finally, homogeneity of variance is examined. This assumption dictates that the
error terms of the ANOVA are random. If the assumption is not met, the model has the
potential to overestimate the goodness of fit. Tests examining homogeneity of variance
assume that the null hypothesis is an error term that is random with no finite variance.
The Levene's test is used because it is robust to potential departures of normality and is
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felt to be conservative (Kutner 2005). Results of the test have an F value of 1.46 and a
Pr>F of 0.2254. Findings suggest that the sample contains a normal distribution.
Results of Analysis - ANOVA
A one-way ANOVA is performed with a classification variable of chow that is
used to denote the periods of pre-McFarland Report, post-McFarland Report, post-ethics
code change, pre-SARBOX, and post-SARBOX. Results of the model are in Table 5.21.

Table 5.21 Results of One-Way ANOVA by Control Variables for Inflection Points
Source
Chow
Error
Corrected
Total
R-Squared
Root MSE

Degrees of
Freedom
3
437
440

Sum of Squares

Mean Square

0.00000350
0.00010877
0.00011227

0.00000117
0.00000025

0.031149
0.000499

Coefficient Variance
Sanction Mean

73.300092
0.003298

F
Value
4.68

Pr>F
Value
0.0031

The one-way ANOVA model with the dummy variable for inflection points as the
treatment with average disciplinary action as the dependent variable report a significance
of 0.0031. However, as expected, a low R-squared (0.031149) is generated by the test
results.
The Tukey's post hoc test with the Tukey-Kramer adjustment for unequal samples
is performed to rank the observations. The procedure is performed at the 0.05 level of
significance.

Results of each inflection point, McFarland Report and SARBOX, are

provided in Tables 5.22 and 5.23.
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Table 5.22 Results of Tukey-Kramer Ranked Means - McFarland Report
Mean
Ranking
N
First
0.00055592
110
Second
0.00046130
87
* Findings not significant at the 0.05 or 0.10 levels.

Time Period
Post-AICPA**
Pre-AICPA**

Table 5.23 Results of Tukey-Kramer Ranked Means - Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002
Ranking
Mean
N
First
0.00053732
124
Second
0.0003371
120
Findings are significant at the 0.05 level

Time Period
Post-Sox**
Pre-Sox**

Examining and Interpreting the
Model - ANOVA
The one-way ANOVA model with its single treatment was significant at the 0.05
level. The results are interpreted that the structural breaks within the data are significant
influences on the level of disciplinary actions. However, the model, as expected with
only one treatment level, reported an R-squared of 0.031149. This is interpreted that the
classification variable of the proposed inflection points aid in the explanation of only
3.11% of the variance in the mean of the average disciplinary actions. The Tukey's
Kramer post hoc test reported significance only between the means of the Pre-SARBOX
and Post-SARBOX inflection points. The Pre-McFarland Report and Post-McFarland
Report inflection points, while larger after the inflection point, was not significantly
different.
Introduction - Ordinary Least Squares
Regression with Chow Tests
A Chow Test for structural breaks using an OLS Regression is also used to
examine the signal theory hypothesis.

Initial methodology of an Auto-regressive
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Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) regression was described to mitigate potential
correlation within the error terms due to the time series nature of the data. However, tests
of the data reported no correlation within the data set (see Methodological and Analytical
Assumptions - OLS Regression below for diagnostic results). The Chow Test is used to
expand the analysis of the Tukey's Kramer ranked order ANOVA post hoc test to include
control variables that are examined for a structural break. This is a test of the coefficients
of two linear regressions examining two different data sets. The coefficients of the two
regressions are statistically similar if the two data sets do not have a structural break. If
the coefficients are statistically different, a structural break has occurred within the data
set. The Sum of Squared Residuals (SSR) from the equation is fitted to the data before
the identified break. A second SSR is fitted to the model after the proposed structural
break. A test using the F-Statistic is made comparing the two periods SSR. Significance
is noted at the 0.05 level (Dougherty 2007). The ANOVA tests performed as part of
empirical testing of this hypothesis reported only the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 as
significant. Therefore, only this structural break is significant. The OLS regression was
performed using equation number (9).
Summary of Input Data - OLS
Regression with Chow Tests
Disciplinary actions for the years 1997 to 2006 for the Accounting Profession are
used in the analysis of a structural break for the enactment of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of
2002. Average disciplinary actions by state are employed with identical coding and
exclusions as in the ANOVA previously performed. 243 observations are available for
this analysis of a potential 500 (50 states for ten years of observations). As previously
stated, the state of Kentucky has been excluded from analysis due to their regulatory

statues that limit disclosure of disciplinary actions.

The remaining 247 missing

observations result from a state board of accountancy non-issuance of a censure,
probation, suspension, or revocation in a single year. Disciplinary actions by state and by
year are provided in Tables 5.24 and 5.25 below.

Table 5.24 Disciplinary Actions by State from 1997 to 2006
for the Accounting Profession
Mid-Atlantic
State Actions

DE
MD
NJ
PA
WV

1
12
41
25
4

Total

83

Mid-West
State Actions

IA
IL
IN
KS
MI
MN
MO
ND
NE
OH
SD
WI
Total

3
30
5
7
19
17
18
3
2
14
2
8
128

Northeast
State Actions

Southeast
Stat
Actions

Southwest
State Actions

CT
MA
ME
NH
NY
RI
VT

15
12
1
4
48
1
1

AL
FL
GA
MS
NC
SC
TN
KY*
VA

5
26
15
6
14
6
6
0
12

AR
LA
OK
NM
TX

11
6
10
1
81

Total

82

Total

90

Total

109

West
State Actions

AK
AZ
CA
CO
HI
ID
MT
NV
OR
UT
WA
WY
Total

Table 5.25 Disciplinary Actions by Year from 1997 to 2006 for
the Accounting Profession
Year
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
Total

Disciplinary Actions
72
42
50
56
48
55
43
52
88
88
594

1
13
43
8
3
2
3
4
4
8
11
2
102
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Methodological and Analytical Assumptions OLS Regression
OLS regression makes several assumptions of the error term that require
diagnostic testing. These include a normal distribution, hetroscedasticity, and
independence. In addition to these assumptions, the regressor variables are assumed to
have a linear relationship with the dependent variable and that they are not co-linear.
Normality of the error terms assumes a normal distribution. The Cramer-Von Mises and
Anderson-Darling tests are used due to the size of the sample (243 observations). Results
of each test are reported in Table 5.26.

Table 5.26 Tests of Normality for Error Terms for OLS Regression
Test
Cramer Von Mises
Anderson Darling

W-Squared Statistic/ A-Squared
Statistic
0.890456
5.823873

Pr>0
0.005
0.005

The null hypotheses for these tests are assumed to be a normal distribution.
Findings of significance at the 0.05 level would report a potential departure from
normality. Results from the two tests suggests that the sample has a normal distribution
(Kutner 2005).
OLS regression makes the assumption that the standard deviations of the error
terms for the fitted model are constant and not dependent on the independent regressors.
This assumption, homoscedasticity, assures that the least square estimates are the best
linear unbiased estimator. The probability distribution for dependent variable has the
same standard deviation regardless of the independent variable.

Violations of

homoscedasticity can result in an overestimation of the goodness of fit of the model
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(Vogt 1999). The White test is chosen because it can accommodate the possibility that
jointly more than one variable can cause hetroscedasticity. The test makes the assumption
of no hetroscedasticity for the null hypothesis with any findings of significance as a
potential sign of lack of independence in the error term (White 1980). Results of the test
are reported in Table 5.27.

Table 5.27 White's Test for OLS Regression for Accounting
Profession for Years 1997 to 2006
Degrees of Freedom
44

Chi-Squared Critical Value
55.46

Pr > Chi-squared
0.1153

Results of the White's test performed on the data set report no significance at the
0.05 or 0.10 levels therefore no hetroscedasticity is assumed.
The next assumption of OLS Regression is the independence of the error term. If
an error term of one observation is correlated to another, the standard error can be
inflated and the goodness of fit of the model is questionable. The problem of
autocorrelation (correlated error terms) is a common concern within time series data
where observations are more likely to be dependent on each other. The Durbin-Watson
Test is a common diagnostic to examine the potential for autocorrelation. The test
assumes that the error terms are stationary and normally distributed with a mean of zero.
A score of close to two is generally accepted as a sign that no autocorrelation exists. The
Durbin-Watson test for the 1997 to 2006 data for the proposed model gives a score of
2.007 with a first order autocorrelation of -0.006. No significant autocorrelation is
interpreted within the results.
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The next level of diagnostics examines the potential influence of a single
observation on the entire data set. For this analysis, DFFITS is employed to examine the
data for potential outliers as well as data entry errors. DFFITS is defined as the change in
the predicted value for a point when it is left out of the OLS Regression. It is studentized
by dividing the estimated standard deviation of the fit at the point. Values that could be
potentially influential are greater than2-^jpln . For the data set, 14 observations were
noted as potential outliers that could influence the regression model. Each point was
verified for data entry accuracy (Belsley et al. 1980).
The final diagnostic examines the potential that the independent variables within
the model are correlated. Multicollinearity allows that the estimates of one independent
regressor's influence on the dependent variable are less precise if the predictor variables
are correlated. A Variance Inflation Factor Test was performed as a diagnostic for this
concern. The Variance Inflation Factor Test (VIF) is calculated by comparing the
standard error of the coefficient of an independent variable when other predictor variables
are excluded from the analysis. As a general rule, a VIF of five indicates a concern of
multicollinearity within an independent variable (O'Brien 2007). VIF values for each
independent variable are listed below in Table 5.28.

Table 5.28 VIF Scores for Independent Variables of OLS Regression
Variable
Fine
No Disclosure
Profession
Internet
Mid-Atlantic

VIF
1.16751
1.42466
1.28803
1.34674
1.29420

Variable
Midwest
Northeast
Southeast
Southwest
Population

VIF
1.86268
1.67269
1.70485
1.51575
1.34118
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Results of the VIF for the independent regressors report no score that is greater
than 5. Therefore, no multicollinearity is assumed.
Structural Changes and the Chow
Test for Stability
Results from the Chow test assume that the null hypothesis is no structural break
within the data. If significance is found that the 0.10 or the 0.05 level, a break within the
data set is assumed.

Specifically, the coefficients before and after the break, are

statistically different. Results from the Chow Test for Stability are reported below in
Table 5.29.

Table 5.29 Results of Chow Test for Accounting Disciplinary Action from
1997 to 2006 with 2002 Structural Break
Number Degrees of
Freedom
11

Dependent Degrees
of Freedom
222

F Value

Pr>F

2.08

0.023

The results of the test report a significance of 0.023 that is significant at the 0.05
level. This indicates that the coefficients before and after the inflection points failed the
stability test and that a structural break exists.
Conclusion - Signal Theory
Hypothesis
Results from the tests of Signal Theory report only one of the two proposed
periods as significant. The debate and ultimate passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 was significant using both the ANOVA tests with Tukey-Kramer Ranking order
method and the Chow Test for Structural Stability. The 1992 inflection point reported an
increasing number of average disciplinary actions.

However, the increase was not

significant at the 0.01 or 0.05 level. Findings suggest that the profession was, in effect,

101
signaling to a proposed legislative regime through increased disciplinary actions for the
implementation and passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. No statistical support is
found that the structural break for the 1992 McFarland Report was a signaling effort by
the profession.
Disclosure Theory
Types of Analysis Employed
Two separate statistical analyses are performed to examine the hypothesis of
disclosure theory. The first is an ANOVA of the average annual disciplinary actions by
type of disclosure with a Tukey's post-hoc test to establish their ranked order. The
second analysis uses a multinomial logistic regression that includes control variables.
The use of multinomial logistic regression offers the additional benefits of gaining the
significance, magnitude, and direction of the effects of the disclosure variable in
comparison with control variables in an effort to increase explanatory power.
Statistical Software was employed in the analysis of the data.

SAS

The specific code

employed is listed in Exhibit "A."
Introduction - ANOVA
An ANOVA is used for analysis of the third hypothesis because of its capacity to
generate a ranking order of disciplinary actions segmented by a class or control variable.
The ability to generate a ranked order by level of disclosure is a direct test of the third
hypothesis of disclosure. Tukey's post hoc test is employed due to its ability to examine
unequal sample sizes through the Tukey-Kramer method (Kuehl 2000).
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Summary of Input Data - ANOVA
Disciplinary actions for the years 1987 to 2007 are included in the analysis of
disciplinary actions segmented by disclosure type. Observations are an annual average of
disciplinary actions by total number of practitioners for each regulatory board. The time
period under analysis, 1987 to 2007, offers 3,150 potential observations. However, only
2,506 annual observations were available for analysis. 63 potential observations from the
state of Kentucky (21 observations for each of the three professions) were removed from
analysis due to the state board restrictions of disclosure of information. The remaining
581 missing observations are comprised of boards that did not generate a disciplinary
action during a single year over the period of the study. Disciplinary actions were totaled
by each state board and averaged by the number of practitioners.
Specific disciplinary actions excluded administrative proceedings that were
specific to the profession as well as common to all three professions. These actions were
not a violation of the profession's ethics codes or its standards of practice. Common
actions include failure to make timely payment of dues, failure to properly record transfer
of license from one regulatory region to another, or incomplete record reporting.
Profession specific administrative actions include lack of administrative oversight for
chemical dependency for medical professionals, failure to file timely motions before
court jurisdictions for attorneys, and failure to register with a state board that the firm was
conducting public company audits despite their registration with the Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board.
The remaining disciplinary actions are segmented into four specific actions:
censure, probation, suspension, and revocation. Censured professionals have committed
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a specific violation of the professional ethics codes or a professional standard that
required a written admonishment that is attached to their licensing records. No limitation
to their capacity to practice is made by their licensing board. Individuals that have been
placed on probation by their licensing boards are subject to written admonishment by
their licensing board. In addition, their ability to continue in their practice is restricted by
threat of suspension or revocation of their license if specific actions cited by their
regulatory boards are continued. Suspended licensees are not allowed to practice their
profession through a specific period of time. In addition, corrective actions are often
required of the professions to return to practice.

Corrective actions include the

completion of additional continuing education requirements or the requirement of
monitoring by secondary sources for quality of work product. Despite the corrective
actions as well as suspension, the professional has not lost the ability to practice
permanently. Revocation of license removes the ability to practice the profession of the
individual permanently.
Finally, violations are classified by the type of disclosure made by the regulatory
board at the time of the infraction. Four levels of disclosure have been examined in this
study:

no disclosure, disclosure to profession, internet disclosure, and other.

Observations from regulatory boards that did not make any form of public disclosure are
coded as no disclosure. Disclosure to profession are violations that were limited to
practitioner journals distributed by the profession. Internet disclosure allows for actions
to be made available to the public through posting on the individual board's website.
Finally, other forms of disclosure include searchable databases with listings of active
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practitioners only or public newspaper publishing. Summary statistics for each method
of disclosure are made below in Table 5.30.

Table 5.30 Summary Statistics of Average Annual Disciplinary Action
by Disclosure Type
Disclosure Type
None
Other
Profession
Internet

# of Observations
262
551
1,393
299

Mean
0.002373
0.00293
0.003451
0.004059

Standard Deviation
0.002237
0.002126
0.002482
0.002746

Methodological and Analytical
Assumptions - ANOVA
Analysis of Variance makes several assumptions that require some form of
diagnostic testing. First, the normality assumption is tested. Normality assumes that the
error term is and, by default, the entire sample, normally distributed.

Numerical

methodology is chosen for this analysis due to the size of the sample (2,506). Two tests
are chosen due to the size of the sample: Cramer-Von Mises and Anderson-Darling.
Results are reported in Table 5.31.

Table 5.31 Tests of Normality
Test
Cramer-Von Mises
Anderson-Darling

W-Squared Statistic/
A-Squared Statistic
4.75922
97.35941

Pr>0
>0.0050
>0.0050

Results of these tests are interpreted as the null hypothesis where the normality is
assumed. Findings of significance at the 0.10 or 0.05 levels would report the potential for
a distribution that is not normal. Reported results suggest that the distribution of the
sample is normal (Kutner 2005).
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Next, the assumption of the independence of the error terms is examined. It is
assumed that one observation is independent of the error of another observation. If the
error term of one observation is correlated to another observation, the standard error of
the data is inflated and the consistency of the ANOVA is questioned. Generally, an
experiment with random observations would not potentially suffer from correlation
within its error term. However, the secondary data used within this analysis may be
subject the error terms to correlation due to the time-series nature of the observations.
Correlation between error terms is tested using the Durbin-Watson Test.

The test

assumes that the error terms are stationary and normally distributed with a mean of zero.
Using this assumption as the null hypothesis, the Durbin-Watson Test would be
significant if the error terms were not stationary and are not normally distributed. A
finding of significance would report a level of lack of independence of the error term.
Results of the test report first order of autocorrelation of 0.00479 and a Durbin-Watson
Test score of 1.96904. A score of roughly two states that there is no auto-correlation
(Kutner 2005).
Finally, the assumption of homogeneity of variance is tested. Homogeneity of
variance assumes that the error terms of the ANOVA are random. Violations of this
assumption mean that the variance is not random and has the same finite variance.
Serious violations of homogeneity of variance result in overestimating the goodness of fit
of the model including its classifications. Tests for homogeneity of variance assume that
the error terms are random and not the same finite variance. The Levene's test is used
due to its robustness to departures of normality as well as is conservative characteristics.
Results report an F value of 0.60 and a Pr> F of 0.4389 (Kutner 2005).

106
Results of Analysis - ANOVA
A one-way ANOVA was performed with disclosure as the classification variable and
average disciplinary sanctions as the continuous variable. Results of the limited model
reported in Table 5.32.

Table 5.32 ANOVA with Disclosure as Classification Variable
Degrees of
Freedom
3
2501
2504

Sum of
Squares
0.0050136
0.01461982
0.01512119

R-Squared

0.033159

Root MSE

0.002418

Coefficient
Variance
Sanction Mean

Source
Disclosure
Error
Corrected
Total

Mean Square

F Value

0.00016712
0.00000585

28.59

Pr>F
Value
<0.0001

73.30092
0.003298

Results of the one-way ANOVA with disclosure as the sole treatment and average
sanction as the dependent variable report significance at the 0.0001 level. As expected,
with only one treatment within the analysis, the model reported an r-squared of 0.033
giving the model a low predictive power.
Next, the Tukey's post hoc test is performed that ranked the average observations
by sanction type. This procedure is performed with a level of significance of 0.05.
Results are reported in Table 5.33.

Table 5.33 Tukey-Kramer Post Hoc Test of Levels of Disclosure
Tukey Group
Ranking
First
Second
Third
Fourth

Mean

N

Disclosure Level

0.0040590
0.0034517
0.0029380
0.0023736

299
1393
551
262

Internet Disclosure
Disclosure to Profession
Other Disclosure
No Disclosure
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Examining and Interpreting the
Model - ANOVA
The one-way ANOVA model with one level of treatment reported significance at
the 0.0001 level. This can be interpreted that the level of disclosure is significant in
influences the level of average disciplinary action. The overall model reports an expected
low r-squared due to the single treatment included in the analysis. The Tukey's Kramer
post hoc test reported a ranking of the average disciplinary action by categories of
disclosure meets the expectation of the disclosure hypothesis.
Introduction - Multinomial
Logistic Regression
Multinomial logistic regression is employed for the analysis of the disclosure
hypothesis due to the use of a categorical dependent variable. Unlike ordinary least
square regression, multinomial logistic regression is an appropriate technique when
relating a number of independent variables with two or more categories within a
dependent variable. For this hypothesis, the outcome variable has four categories: no
disclosure, disclosure to the profession, internet disclosure, and other disclosure formats
(Wright 1995).
Summary of Input Data - Multinomial
Logistic Regression
For the years 1987 to 2007, the legal, medical, and accounting professions
reported 163,661 disciplinary actions that resulted in the revocation, suspension,
probation, or censure of the practitioner. These totals exclude the state of Kentucky
which, due to state law, does not allow the disclosure of disciplinary actions of its
professions. Classification of these actions is identical to those made with the ANOVA
analysis. Also, administrative actions, as described in the Summary of Input Data -
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ANOVA, are excluded from this analysis. The disciplinary actions, classified by type,
serve as the dependent variable for the Multinomial Logistic Regression. Independent
variables used in this analysis are the profession of the practitioner, the level of public
disclosure of the regulating authority, the geographic area, and the number of
practitioners by population quartile. The profession of the practitioner is a categorical
dependent variable representing the three professions.

Table 5.34 reports a cross-

tabulated breakdown of disciplinary actions by type for each the licensing board of the
three professions from 1987 to 2007.

Table 5.34 Disciplinary Actions by Type
Action
Censured
Probation
Suspension
Revocation
Totals

Frequency
36,079
34,594
50,914
42,081
163,661

Percent
22.04%
21.14%
31.11%
25.71%
100.00%

Independent variables used in this analysis are the profession of the practitioner,
the level of public disclosure of the regulating authority, the geographic area, and the
number of practitioners by quartile. The profession of the practitioner is a categorical
dependent variable representing the accounting, legal, and medical professions. Next,
public disclosure is also a categorical variable that represents the types of public
disclosure made by each profession for the four disciplinary actions taken by the
licensing boards of each profession. These variables represent no disclosure, disclosure
to members of the profession, internet disclosure to the public, and other means of
disclosure. Other means of disclosure include searchable databases of active and inactive
practitioners with disciplinary action information available. Telephone surveys and email
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communication were made to each licensing board to verify the types of disclosure made
over the twenty year period of data collection. Tables 5.35 through 5.38 report cross
tabulated summaries of disciplinary actions by profession, geographic area, number of
practitioners by quartile, and type of disclosure.

Table 5.35 Disciplinary Actions by Type and Profession
Accounting
55
39
749
291
1,134

Action
Censured
Probation
Revocation
Suspension
Total

Legal
22,433
13,289
11,386
27,862
74,970

Medical
13,584
21,266
29,946
22,761
• 87,557

Total
36,072
34,594
42,081
50,914
163,661

Table 5.36 Disciplinary Actions by Type and Geographic Area
Action
Censured
Probation
Revocation
Suspension
Total

MidAtlantic
2,584
1,288
3,310
3,585
10,767

Midwest

NE

SE

SW

West

Total

6,967
4,850
9,043
10,134
30,994

5,565
3,068
9,350
6,807
24,790

9,792
8,493
8,281
9,721
36,287

3,870
2,654
3,653
6,505
16,682

7,294
14,241
8,444
14,162
44,141

36,072
34,594
42,081
50,914
163,661

Table 5.37 Disciplinary Actions by Practitioner Population Quartiles
Action
Censured
Probation
Revocation
Suspension
Total

First
Quartile
1,838
1,274
2,635
2,194
7,941

Second
Quartile
6,318
2,953
4,971
5,943
20,185

Third
Quartile
8,207
5,807
8,863
10,186
33,063

Fourth
Quartile
19,709
24,560
25,612
32,591
102,472

Total
36,072
34,594
42,01
50,914
163,661
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Table 5.38 Disciplinary Actions by Disclosure Type
Action
Censure
Probation
Revocation
Suspension
Total

No Disclosure
8,244
3,078
8,782
10,168
30,272

Profession
18,867
19,223
20,176
27,824
86,090

Internet
7,059
8,507
10,674
10,883
37,123

Other
1,902
3,786
2,449
2,039
10,176

Total
36,072
34,594
42,081
50,914
163,661

Methodological and Analytical Assumptions Multinomial Logistic Regression
Multinomial logistic regression makes a number of assumptions that require some
form of diagnostic tests to consider. The first assumption made is that the model has
sufficient observations to provide enough degrees of freedom for analysis. Wright (1995)
provides that there should be at a minimum 10 observations per independent variables to
support a multinomial regression analysis.

This analysis includes each category of

independent variable to be assumed to be a stand alone variable. For analysis of this
hypothesis, 13 separate categories of variables are used which would require 130
observations. The existing data set has 163,661 observations are sufficient to support the
methodology. Table 5.39 below lists the total number of categories for each independent
variable.

Table 5.39 Independent Variables with Associated Categories
Area
MidAtlantic
Midwest
Northeast
Southeast
Southwest
West

Population
First Quartile
Second Quartile
Third Quartile
Fourth Quartile

Profession
Accounting
Legal
Medical

Disclosure
None
Profession
Internet
Other
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Next, Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000) establish that a secondary measure of
sufficiency of observations or numerical problems is a large standard error. This measure
reports that the number of predictor variables is too large in comparison to the number of
available observations. Multinomial logistic regression calculates standard error terms
for each item of the independent categorical variables as a model for each of the
dependent categorical terms. The range of the standard errors for each of these models
are from a low of 0.0187 (internet disclosure as the independent regressor and suspension
as the dependent regressor) to 0.2124 (legal profession as the independent regressor and
probation as the dependent regressor). These sufficiently small standard errors provide
no evidence of numerical problems with using the methodology.
Multinomial logistic regression (MLR) does not recognize cells with zero
frequencies. The action of the analysis is to remove the entire observation (predictor and
dependent variables) from the data set. The recommended correction for this concern is
to collapse common variables into single observations or delete the entire observation
with zero cell frequencies (Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000). The action taken to correct
this concern is to remove the specific observations with cell frequencies of zero from the
data set. The data is organized with groupings by year for the time period of 1987 to
1997 for three professions for 50 licensing boards. The total available annual grouped
data observations are 3,150 for all three licensing boards. After removing the zero cell
observations as well as the loss of the state of Kentucky in this analysis, the remaining
data set includes 2,506 annual grouped data sets.
Next, MLR analysis makes the assumption of no multicollinearity among the
predictor variables. Multicollinearity exists when two or more predictor variables are
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highly correlated. The appropriate test for examining multicollinearity is a variance
inflation factor test (VIF) (Meyers and Gamst 2006). A VIF test can be performed using
an ordinary least square regression (OLS) with a non-conforming dependent variable
because the test examines the impact of the dependent variable only (Hosmer and
Lemeshow 2000). An OLS variance inflation factor tests were performed using an
ordinary least squares regression. Tabachnick and Fidell (2001) allow that a measure of
four or greater in the VIF scores suggest multicollinearity among the independent
regresssors. No variable reported a VIF of greater than 4. A secondary measure of
examining multicollinearity is to examine standard errors for high values. Specifically, a
value of greater than two could signal a potential variable with multicollinearity. A value
of 2.0 or higher can report a potential concern (Tabachnick and Fidell 2001). No
individual predictor variable reported a value of greater than 0.2124. Therefore, no
multicollinearity was noted in the analysis.
Model Fit - Multinomial Regression
One method of examining the fit of a MLR initially involves testing the full
saturated model verses a constant only model. This methodology compares whether the
predictor variables improves the model by a possibility that is better than just chance.
This test is determined by a model that compares a chi-squared test of the log likelihood
ratio of the saturated model with the constant only model or the null hypothesis (Meyers
and Gamst 2006). The Wald Statistic and the Likelihood Ratio are provided to examine
the relationship between the null hypothesis and the full model. Tabachnick and Fidell
(2001) report that the Wald Statistic could be influenced by large coefficients of the
regresssors which potentially inflate the standard error and lower the Wald statistic. The
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Likelihood Ratio is potentially less likely to be influenced by larger coefficients
examine the fit of the model. Each model is significant at the p < .05 level which can be
interpreted that the additional predictor variables are potentially better at predicting the
disciplinary actions. Results of the each test are reported in Table 5.40.

Table 5.40 Wald and Likelihood Tests of the Null Hypothesis
Test
Wald Test
Likelihood Ratio Test

Chi-Squared
25604.3496
28342.8131

Pr > Chi-Squared
<.0001
<.0001

The next measure of fit is a pseudo r-squared Statistic that is used to examine the
proportion of variance explained in the dependent variable. Specifically, this measures
the change in the likelihood function between an intercept only model and the additional
independent predictor variables specified within the equation.

An r-squared statistic

generated by an OLS regression is a comparison of the variance of the dependent
variables that has been predicted by the independent regresssors. Pseudo r-squared and
max-rescaled r-squared are generated to examine fit. The two r-squared statistics differ
due to the introduction of the individual categorical variables into the max-rescaled rsquared statistic (Vogt 1999). The max-rescaled r-squared and pseudo r-squared statistics
for the full model are 0.1699 and 0.1590 respectively. The two statistics are interpreted
as the proportion of variance explained in the dependent variable by the predictor
variables. The max-rescaled r-squared is expected to be larger than the pseudo r-squared
due to the introduction of the total number of categorical variables as independent
regressors.
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Finally, the assumption of binomial variability is examined that could produce
over-dispersion within the data sample. A Pearson chi-squared statistic and the deviance,
divided by their degrees of freedom should be roughly equal to one. Failure to meet the
assumption reports potential over-dispersion within the dataset. The null hypothesis for
this test is that the Pearson statistic and the deviance, divided by their degrees of freedom
are equal to one. Over-dispersion can result in large data sets with a limited number of
predictor variables. The impacts of over-dispersion include impacts to fit of the model as
well as inflated values of significance.

Corrective models can be taken where the

covariance matrix is rescaled by dividing by the Pearson coefficient (Mebane and Sekhon
2004). Results from the Pearson test are reported in Table 5.41.

Table 5.41 Results of Pearson Test for Over-Dispersion
Value
33060.38

Degrees of Freedom
483

Value/DF
68.44

Pr> Chi-Square
<.0001

Due to the findings of the Pearson test, the model has been rescaled by the Pearson
coefficient to correct for over-dispersion.
Examination and Interpreting the Model
A likelihood-ratio test was conducted to evaluate the degree to which each
individual predictor contributes to the model. Specifically, a comparison of models is
performed with and without each independent regressor (Tabachnick and Fidell 2001).
All four independent variables are significant in predicting the four reference categories
of disciplinary actions for the four professions. Specifically, profession, disclosure, area,
and population reported < 0.0001 significance (Mebane and Sekhon 2004). Table 5.42
reports the results of the analysis.
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Table 5.42 Likelihood Ratio Tests Evaluating the Contribution of Each
Independent Variable to the Model
Independent Variable
Profession
Disclosure
Area
Population

Degrees of Freedom
6
9
15
9

Chi-Square
12290.65
2049.09
7150.11
3535.02

Pr > Chi-Square
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001

Within the model, the following parameter estimates are provided with the use of
a reference category of censured licenses. The use of a reference category gives log odds
as estimated parameters for censured licenses verses revoked, censured, or placed on
probation. In effect, the multinomial regression develops separate logistic regressions for
each of the dependent categorical variables. The use of a base reference category places
the dependent categorical variable as well as a base of independent reference categories
into the intercept by coding the variables as zero. The intercepts are interpreted as the
log-odds for the base category including the independent base reference categories as
compared to the other dependent regressor categories. The remaining parameters are the
individual categories for each independent and dependent regressor compared to the base
reference category.

Estimates are generated for each independent variable regressor

category that are log-odds ratios which reports the level of influence, direction, and
significance of the independent predictor variable category on the comparison between
the base reference category and another reference category of the dependent variable.
(Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000).
The parameter log-odds model chosen for this analysis uses censured licenses as
the dependent reference category with independent variables of the no public disclosure,
the legal profession, third quartile of the population of the profession, and the mid-
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Atlantic region for geography. The reference categories of censured licenses and nodisclosure are chosen because they are the lowest level of disclosure.

Comparisons

between disciplinary actions and levels of disclosure can be made from the lowest level
to the highest level.

Table 5.43 reports the 42 intercepts and independent variable

categories comparison relationships, estimates with direction, wald chi-squared values,
and their level of significance.
Analysis of the parameter estimates reports four terms that are not significant: the
suspended/intercept,

suspended/disclosure:

profession,

revoked/area:Midwest,

and

suspended/population: first quartile. The area and population variables are used for
controls to increase the predictive and explanatory powers of the model. Their lack of
significance may not be potentially significant in interpreting the results of the model.
The lack of significance of the suspended verses censured intercept is an unexpected
outcome.

Finally, the suspended verses censured parameter for disclosure to the

profession is also an unexpected outcome. Based on expected theory, an increase in the
level of disclosure, in this case from no disclosure to the profession, should be
statistically significant.
More important to analysis of this model is the expected signs of the regression
model within the disclosure parameter estimates. Theory expects that the levels of
increasing disclosure would report a positive sign as the level of disclosure is increased.
Signs for log-odds estimates are interpreted as increasing probabilities for positive
estimates and decreasing probabilities for negative estimates. For three of the nine
disclosure parameters, the signs are negative with increasing levels of disclosure.

117
Table 5.43 Non-Significant Parameter Maximum Likelihood Estimates Censure Reference Base
Parameter
Intercept
Intercept
Intercept
Profession: Accounting
Profession: Accounting
Profession: Accounting
Profession: Medical
Profession: Medical
Profession: Medical
Disclosure: Other
Disclosure: Other
Disclosure: Other
Disclosure: Profession
Disclosure: Profession
Disclosure: Profession
Disclosure: Internet
Disclosure: Internet
Disclosure: Internet
Area: Midwest
Area: Midwest
Area: Midwest
Area: Northeast
Area: Northeast
Area: Northeast
Area: Southeast
Area: Southeast
Area: Southeast
Area: West
Area: West
Area: West
Area: Southwest
Area: Southwest
Area: Southwest
Population: Fourth
Population: Fourth
Population: Fourth
Population: First
Population: First
Population: First

Action
Probation
Revoked
Suspended
Probation
Revoked
Suspended
Probation
Revoked
Suspended
Probation
Revoked
Suspended
Probation
Revoked
Suspended
Probation
Revoked
Suspended
Probation
Revoked
Suspended
Probation
Revoked
Suspended
Probation
Revoked
Suspended
Probation
Revoked
Suspended
Probation
Revoked
Suspended
Probation
Revoked
Suspended
Probation
Revoked
Suspended

Estimate
-2.0752
-0.7601
-0.0528
0.5571
3.5607
1.8164
1.2049
1.5674
0.4164
1.0742
-0.2938**
-0.2993**
0.4338
-0.1752**
-0.0129**
0.3829
-0.1054**
-0.0873**
0.1853
-0.00966
0.1198
-0.2775
0.1473
-0.2013
0.3673
-0.2833
-0.2075
1.413
0.2057
0.4601
0.1062
-0.2237
0.2472
0.8689
0.3301
0.3593
0.2904
0.3483
0.00712

Wald ChiSquared
2573.9512
517.6209
2.8654
6.8766
635.6125
149.9582
5079.26
9113.1602
786.7387
784.3835
63.4117
64.7757
252.2090
64.5142
0.3751
163.4344
17.8554
13.1074
19.8161
0.0847
14.0971
42.0798
20.0112
39.7032
81.4441
72.9632
41.6009
1046.4193
35.1966
194.4550
5.2421
33.6372
47.4423
1683.7591
276.3762
378.9164
45.2487
88.4158
0.0383

Pr > Chi
Squared
<.0001
<.0001
0.0905*
0.0087
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
0.5402*
<.0001
<.0001
0.0003
<.0001
0.7711*
0.0002
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
0.0220
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
0.8448*
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Table 5.43 (Continued)
Population: Second
Population: Second
Population: Second

Probation
Revoked
Suspended

-0.3776
-0.2672
-0.2869

166.8759
108.4474
146.1739

<.0001
<.0001
<.0001

* Not significant at the 0.05 level
* * Unexpected signs
Note: Base reference category for dependent regressor: Censure
Note: Base reference categories for independent regresssors: no disclosure, legal
profession, mid-Atlantic region, and third quartile of population

The base category for disclosure is no disclosure and with censure.

As the

categories increase in level of disclosure, the signs should be positive. Table 5.44 reports
the significance for signs within the parameter estimates for the disclosure variable.

Table 5.44 Parameter Estimates for Disclosure Variable Categories with
Base Reference of Censure and No Disclosure
Parameter

Disclosure:
Disclosure:
Disclosure:
Disclosure:
Disclosure:
Disclosure:
Disclosure:
Disclosure:
Disclosure:

Other
Other
Other
Profession
Profession
Profession
Internet
Internet
Internet

Action

Estimate

Wald Chi-Squared

Pr > Chi Squared

Probation
Revoked
Suspended
Probation
Revoked
Suspended
Probation
Revoked
Suspended

1.0742
-0.2938**
-0.2993**
0.4338
-0.1752**
-0.0129**
0.3829
-0.1054**
-0.0873**

784.3835
63.4117
64.7757
252.2090
64.5142
0.3751
163.4344
17.8554
13.1074

<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
0.5402*
<.0001
<.0001
0.0003

As reported in Table 5.44, the parameter estimates for the disclosure reference
categories have negative signs as they increase in level of disclosure for comparisons of
censure verses revocation and/or suspension. Probation, regardless of level of disclosure,
reports a positive sign. By examining the signs of the additional control variables, an
explanation may be available. Within regional and population estimates, Table 5.45
reports the parameters with a negative sign.

119
Table 5.45 Parameter Estimates for Area and Population Categories
with Base Reference of Censure and No Disclosure
Parameter

Action

Estimate

Wald Chi-Squared

Pr > Chi Squared

Area: Midwest
Area: Northeast
Area: Northeast
Area: Southeast
Area: Southeast
Area: Southwest
Population: Second
Population: Second
Population: Second

Revoked
Probation
Suspended
Revoked
Suspended
Revoked
Probation
Revoked
Suspended

-0.00966
-0.2775
-0.2013
-0.2833
-0.2075
-0.2237
-0.3776
-0.2672
-0.2869

0.0847
42.0798
39.7032
72.9632
41.6009
33.6372
166.8759
108.4474
146.1739

0.7711*
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001
<.0001

It appears that there is a potential interaction between the control variables of
region for the Midwest, Northeast, Southeast, and Southwest are the level of disciplinary
action increases from the base reference category of censure. In addition, the second
quartile of population reports negative signs as the level of disciplinary action increases.
It is important to establish that the variable of disclosure is significant in the overall
model. However, when additional explanatory variables are included in a model, the
expected signs of the variable are mixed.
Conclusion - Disclosure Hypothesis
Statistical findings tests of the disclosure hypothesis reported mixed results. With
one exception, the ranked order of average sanctions by classifications increased with the
higher levels of disclosure. The expected order of disclosure is no disclosure, disclosure
to profession, other disclosure (newspaper and internet searchable databases), and
internet disclosure.

This order meets expectations of no disclosure, disclosure to

profession, and internet disclosure. However, other disclosure reports the lowest levels
of average sanctions per practitioner.
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Next, the MLR reported significance for the categorical variable of disclosure
with the four separate levels with the types of sanctions controlled by population,
geographic area, and profession. Within this analysis, all independent regressors were
significant. Within the individual parameter estimates, the disclosure variable reported
signs that did not support the hypothesis. Specifically, disciplinary actions of revoked
and suspended were negative in relationship to the base category of no disclosure. In
effect, the probability odds of increasing disclosure were negative for half of the levels of
disciplinary actions. The expected signs were positive in comparison to the lowest levels
of disclosure. Finally, one of the parameter estimates of disclosure, to the profession,
was not significant at the 0.05 level due for suspension. Again, based on the expected
hypothesis, all disclosure estimates should have been positive.

CHAPTER 6

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This chapter summarizes the study, provides an overview of its results, reviews the
implications of the study's findings, offers its potential contributions, limitations of the
study, and possible extensions of the study.

Summary of the Study
The conflict between the public mission of the accounting profession and the
private interests of its membership has a developed literature steam within accounting
research.

This study expands this research by employing ETSR and its capacity to

employ side-by-side comparisons with other profession as a bench mark for behavior.
ETSR predicts that a profession will use its delegated self-regulatory function to the
benefit of its membership due to potential agency problems that generate information
asymmetry. This theory also predicts that two behaviors may mitigate the potential for
information asymmetry.

Specifically, the disclosure of disciplinary actions and

profession's desire to prevent external regulation by signaling a zealous disciplinary
function may serve to mitigate the agency concerns.

Existing accounting research

examining this phenomenon focuses on the specific behaviors of the accounting
profession. Four distinct areas of research have developed that include professionalism,
politics, the Parker model, and the public space.
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By expanding this research into ETSR, this study offers an extension of existing studies
by testing new theory within the accounting profession.
This research employs an empirical test of the accounting profession's
disciplinary function by reviewing actions taken by licensing boards to restrict the
practice of its membership due to violations of its ethics codes and practice standards. In
addition, the legal and medical professions are used as comparison benchmarks for
evaluation. To gauge membership's capacity to self-discipline, a field study is deployed
that uses the DIT2 as a level of moral ethical cognition. The DIT2 has established traits
that gauge the behavior of risk taking personalities as well as criminal behavior. Based
on existing research, the DIT2 should have an inverse relationship with disciplinary
actions of each of the three professions examined in this study. Next, ETSR postulates
that the threat of external regulation will result in an increase in disciplinary actions
within a profession.

This hypothesis is tested using inflection points within the

accounting profession where the profession was under the threat of external regulation
due to its actions. Finally, ETSR theorizes that increased disclosure will cause a higher
level of disciplinary actions to be taken by self-regulated licensing boards due to the
mitigation of information asymmetry. This theory is tested by evaluating the levels of
disclosure of disciplinary actions within the accounting, legal, medical professions.

Summary of Research Findings
The following three hypothesizes are tested in this study:
1. DIT2 scores from the Medical, Legal, and Accounting professions will note
report an inverse relationship to their levels of disciplinary actions.
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2. The accounting profession will increase disciplinary actions towards its
membership during periods of threats of external regulation
3. The type of disclosure of disciplinary actions made by state boards of
accounting, state bar associations, and state medical boards will impact the
number and severity of disciplinary actions
The DIT2 scores are ranked using a Tukey-Kramer post hoc test and report, in
order, the following rankings:

legal profession, medical profession, and accounting

profession. The same test was performed using the average disciplinary actions from
1987 to 2006 for the three professions. The ranking orders of disciplinary actions were
the medical, legal, and accounting professions. For this test to be invalidated based on
DIT2 scores, the order of disciplinary actions should have shown a ranked order of
accounting, medical, and legal professions. Accordingly, this hypothesis was supported.
Next, another Tukey-Kramer post hoc test is performed using average disciplinary
actions from 1987 to 1991 and 1992 to 1996. The break in this test reflected the issuance
of the McFarland Report in 1992 citing weaknesses within the accounting profession in
the aftermath of the savings and loan failures in the 1980's. While the post McFarland
Report data showed a higher average disciplinary action, it was not statistically
significant. A second Tukey-Kramer post hoc test is performed for the time periods of
1997 to 2001 and 2002 to 2006 using average disciplinary actions in the accounting
profession. The inflection point in this data represents the debate and ultimate passage of
SARBOX that created the PCAOB. Data from this test showed a significant difference
between the two inflection points. A secondary test was performed using a Chow Test
for Structural Integrity using control variables of geography, population, fines, and
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disclosure level for average disciplinary actions from 1997 to 2006. Results showed
significance at the 0.05 level.

Findings suggest that the accounting profession was

signaling to attempt to prevent external regulation for the implementation of SARBOX.
Finally, the disclosure hypothesis is tested using the Tukey-Kramer post hoc test
to compare the levels of disclosure for the three profession's average disciplinary actions
from 1987 to 2007. Results showed that each defined level of disclosure by this research
were significantly different at the 0.05 level. A secondary test was performed using MLR
with control variables of disclosure, geographic area, profession, and population. In this
analysis, the total number of individual disciplinary actions is analyzed. Disclosure was
again significant within this test. However, the direction of types of disclosure within the
parameter estimates reported signs that were negative verses the expected positive
direction. Further examination reported that the findings may have a geographic and
population interaction that impacted findings.

However, overall findings support the

hypothesis of increased disclosure.

Implications of Findings
Results of this study support ETSR and its predictive behaviors of Signal Theory
and Disclosure Theory. Licensing boards of the accounting profession engage in the
fewest disciplinary actions of the three profession and also report the lowest level of
ethical scores on the DIT2 exam. These findings suggest that an agency problem exists
within the profession's self-disciplinary processes. A more stark comparison is the sheer
volume of disciplinary actions of the medical and legal professions to the accounting
profession. While the three professions differ in function and ethical standards, the scale
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of difference between the accounting and its counter parts is of extreme difference. This
suggests that the profession should examine its disciplinary action functions.
Next, increasing the level of disclosure of sanctions within the licensing boards
mitigates the agency concern. Specifically, infractions are issued a greater rate and at
higher level as disclosure increases. Most importantly, the highest level of disclosure,
internet publishing, reports the highest average disciplinary actions. This suggest that the
licensing boards of the accounting profession increase their level of disclosure in an
effort to mitigate potential agency problems.
Finally, the accounting profession has attempted to signal that its disciplinary
function was sufficient allow continued delegation of duties. However, the threat of
external regulation is of such significance that it was a direct threat to the profession.
Specifically, SARBOX removed the capacity of the profession to regulate firms and
individuals that perform audits of publically traded companies. In addition, the capacity
to generate auditing standards is lost the profession for audits of public companies. This
suggests that the professions private interests held significant influence despite continued
threats of external regulation.

Potential Contributions
This research hopefully makes two contributions to the existing literature. First,
IGTAR is expanded to include ETSR. As part of this expansion, empirical testing of the
three profession's self-regulatory processes is made. To date, the literature reports studies
of the accounting and medical profession's disciplinary actions. However, only one study
of comparisons between the functions of the regulatory agencies is noted (Loeb 1972).
The second contribution is the use of Signal and Disclosure Theory to examine behaviors
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of the accounting profession. Signal and Disclosure Theory have been used extensively
within accounting research to examine the behaviors of markets and participating
companies. However, after literature review, it appears that these theories have not been
used to examine the profession itself.

Limitations of the Study
In employing ETSR, Disclosure Theory, and Signal Theory, this research makes
the assumption that the professions will act in a similar manner to the firm.

Firm

characteristics in studies employing Disclosure and Signal Theory are generally
homogenous with regulated firms such as public utilities removed from sample. The
characteristics within profession differ from large firms to sole practitioners. In addition,
behavior across professions is not homogeneous.
Next, this study is dependent on the record keeping functions of the three
professions. Within the medical and legal profession, disciplinary actions were gathered
from a voluntary submission process. While no empirical evidence suggests that the data
is flawed, the data was still collected on a voluntary basis by third parties and may be
subject to error.

Disciplinary actions for the accounting profession were collected

individually and coded by the author. While checks were made for potential outliers
within the data and care was taken in data processing, errors may have been made in
coding and collection of the data.
Finally, this study is reliant on the DIT2 test for comparison of the first
hypothesis. The DIT2 is the most widely used moral cognition test within the business
disciplines. However, it reports two significant biases. First, it reports a political bias
with those of conservative beliefs reporting lower scores than those of liberal beliefs.
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This potential bias may be represented within the differences of the three professions. A
control was placed within the survey instrument for self-identified political beliefs.
However, this control may not be sufficient to mitigate the bias. The second bias results
from individuals who participate in ethics courses as part of continuing education
requirements. These professionals may have the capacity to "game" the test due to
experience associated with ethics training. Ethics training for all three professions is
generally required by most licensing boards. However, it is not consistent.

Possible Extensions of Research
In a secondary examination of the public/private interest of the accounting
profession, the Parker (1994) and the Bedard (2001) models have not been applied to the
disciplinary processes of the United States. While the scope of a study using these
models may not be national, an examination of the types of disciplined practioners,
severity of fine, level of disclosure, evidentiary proof requirements, and control variables
may provide additional incite into the accounting profession's disciplinary processes. To
further the examination of the potential biases of the DIT2 examine, a continuation of the
Bailey et al. (2005) article that examines political bias within the accounting profession
could be expanded to review ethical training bias within the three professions.

APPENDIX A

SAS SOFTWARE CODE
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Hypothesis 1 - Economic Theory of the Profession
Proc import out= work.dit
datafile= "E:\dissert\data\total\sas_hl .xls"
dbms=excel replace;
sheet="DIT";
getnames=YES;
mixed=YES;
usedate=YES;
scantime=YES;
run;
proc sort data=DIT;
by profession;
proc means data=DIT maxdec=10 n mean sum std;
title2 'Simple Summary Statistics';
by Profession;
var DIT;
Proc plot data=DIT;
title2 'Plot of the Raw Data';
plot profession*DIT;
plot DIT*profession;
Proc anova data=DIT;
Title2 Tukeys Test';
class profession;
model DIT=profession;
means profession / tukey cldiff;
means profession / tukey lines;
ProcGLM data=DIT;
Title2 'Levene Test';
class profession;
model DIT=profession;
means profession / hovtest=levene hovtest=bf;
output out=sanfit p=yhat r=resid;
Proc Univariate data=DIT normal plot;
Title2 'Normal Test';
var sanction;
Proc reg data=DIT;
Title2 'Durbin Watson';
model DIT = /dw;
Proc reg data=sanfit;
model resid = /dw;
Proc Plot;
plot resid*profession;
plot resid*yhat;
run;

Proc import out= work.discipline
datafile= "E:\dissert\data\total\sas_hl .xls"
dbms=excel replace;
sheet="discipline";
getnames=YES;
mixed=YES;
usedate=YES;
scan time=YES;
run;
proc sort data=discipline;
by profession;
proc means data=discipline maxdec=10 n mean sum std;
title2 'Simple Summary Statistics';
by Profession;
var sanction;
Proc plot data=discipline;
title2 'Plot of the Raw Data';
plot profession*sanction;
plot sanction*profession;
Proc anova data=discipline;
Title2 'Tukeys Test';
class profession;
model sanction=profession;
means profession / tukey cldiff;
means profession / tukey lines;
Proc GLM data=discipline;
Title2 'Levene Test';
class profession;
model sanction=profession;
means profession / hovtest=levene hovtest=bf;
output out=sanfit p=yhat r=resid;
Proc Univariate data=discipline normal plot;
Title2 'Normal Test';
var sanction;
Proc reg data=discipline;
Title2 'Durbin Watson';
model sanction = /dw;
Proc reg data=sanfit;
model resid = /dw;
Proc Plot;
plot resid*profession;
plot resid*yhat;
run;
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Hypothesis 2 - Signal Theory
Proc import out=work.chow
datafile= "E:\dissert\data\total\sas_h2.xls"
dbms=excel replace;
sheet="h2";
getnames=yes;
mixed=yes;
usedate=yes;
scantime=yes;
run;
proc sort data=chow;
by chow;
run;
proc means data=chow maxdec=10 n mean elm ess cv lclm uclm std min max;
title2 'Simple Summary Statistics';
class chow;
by chow;
run;
proc sort data=chow;
by state;
run;
proc means data=chow maxdec=10 n mean elm ess cv lclm uclm std min max;
title2 'Simple Summary Statistics';
class state;
by state;
run;
proc sort data=chow;
by area;
run;
proc means data=chow maxdec=10 n mean elm ess cv lclm uclm std min max;
title2 'Simple Summary Statistics';
class area;
by area;
Run;
proc sort data=chow;
by chow;
run;
Proc GLM data=chow;
class chow;
model sanction=chow;
means chow / hovtest=levene hovtest=bf;
output out=sanfit p=yhat r=resid;
Proc Univariate data=chow normal plot;
var sanction;
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Proc reg data=chow;
model sanction = /dw;
Proc reg data=sanfit;
model resid = /dw;
Proc Plot;
plot resid*disclosure;
plot resid*yhat;
run;
Proc anova data=chow;
class chow;
model sanction=chow;
means chow / tukey cldiff alpha=.05;
means chow / tukey lines alpha=.05;
run;
Proc import out=work.chow
datafile= "E:\dissert\data\total\sas_h2.xls"
dbms=excel replace;
Sheet="aicpa"
Getnames=yes;
Mixed=yes;
Usedata=yes;
Scantime=yes;
Run;
Proc Sort data=chow;
by year;
Run;
Proc freq data=chow;
tables year;
Run;
Proc print data=chow;
Run;
Proc autoreg data=chow;
Title2 "Chow Test";
model DiscAct = Fine NoDisc Profession Internet Midatl Midwest NE SE SW
Population /Chow =121;
Run;
Proc reg data=chow;
Title2 "Collinearity and Autocorrelation Tests";
model DiscAct = Fine NoDisc Profession Internet Midatl Midwest NE SE SW
Population / VIF TOL DW;
output out=sinfit (keep=state fine nodisc profession internet midatl midwest ne se
sw population r lev cd dffit) rstudent=r h=lev cookd=cd dffits=dffit;
Run;
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proc print data=sinfit;
Title2 "Outliers Influence - Dffits";
where abs(dffit)> (2 *sqrt( 10/240));
var state fine nodisc profession internet midatl midwest ne se sw population dffit;
Run;
goptions reset=all;
Proc reg data=chow;
Title2 "White's Test and Residual Plot - Normality";
model DiscAct = Fine NoDisc Profession Internet Midatl Midwest NE SE SW
Population / spec;
output out=sinfit (keep= state fine nodisc profession internet midatl midwest ne se
sw population r fv) residual=r predicted=fv;
plot r. *p.;
Run;
proc univariate data=sinfit normal;
Title2 "Tests of Normality & QQPlot";
var r;
qqplot r / normal(mu=est sigma=est);
run;
Proc import out= work.chow
Datafile= "E:\dissert\data\total\sas_h2.xls"
Dbms=excel replace;
Sheet="state";
Getnames=yes;
Mixed=yes;
Usedate=yes;
Scantime=yes;
Proc Sort data=chow;
by state;
Run;
proc means data=chow maxdec=10 n mean std sum;
title2 'Simple Summary Statistics by Year';
by state;
var total;
Proc import out= work.chow
Datafile= "E:\dissert\data\total\sas_h2.xls"
Dbms=excel replace;
Sheet="sox";
Getnames=Yes;
Mixed=yes;
Usedata=yes;
Scan time=yes;
Run;
Proc Sort data=chow;
by year;
Run;
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Proc freq data=chow;
tables year;
Run;
Proc means data=chow mean sum n std;
class year;
by year;
run;
Proc autoreg data=chow;
Title2 "Chow Test";
model DiscAct = Fine NoDisc Profession Internet Midatl Midwest NE SE SW
Population /Chow = 124;
Run;
Proc autoreg data=chow;
Title2 "Chow Test - Reduced Model";
model DiscAct = Fine Population /Chow = 124;
Run;
Proc reg data=chow;
Title2 "Autocorrelation, Collinarity Tests";
model DiscAct = Fine NoDisc Profession Internet Midatl Midwest NE SE SW
Population / VIF TOL DW;
output out=sinfit
(keep=state fine nodisc profession internet midatl midwest
ne se sw population r lev cd dffit) rstudent=r h=lev cookd=cd dffits=dffit;
Run;
Proc print data=sinfit;
Title2 "Outliers Influential Observations";
where abs(dffit)> (2*sqrt( 10/244));
var state fine nodisc profession internet midatl midwest ne se sw population dffit;
Run;
Goptions reset=all;
Proc reg data=chow;
Title2 "Heteroscedasticity - Residual Plot - White's Test";
model DiscAct = Fine NoDisc Profession Internet Midatl Midwest NE SE SW
Population / spec;
output out=sinfit (keep= state fine nodisc profession internet midatl midwest ne se
sw population r fv) residual=r predicted=fv;
plotr. *p.;
Run;
proc univariate data=sinfit normal;
Title2 "Tests of Normality - QQPlot";
var r;
qqplot r / normal(mu=est sigma=est);
Run;

Hypothesis 3 - Disclosure Theory
Proc import out= work.disc
Datafile= "E:\dissert\data\total\sas_h3.xls"
Dbms=excel replace;
Sheet="sas_h3_class";
Getnames=yes;
Mixed=yes;
Usedate=yes;
Scantime=yes;
Run;
Proc Reg data=disc;
model count = disclosure area population / VIF;
run;
Proc freq data = disc;
tables action * profession / out=freqcount outexpect sparse;
weight Count;
run;
Proc freq data = disc;
table action / out=freqcount outexpect sparse;
weight Count;
run;
Proc freq data = disc;
tables action * area / out=freqcountl outexpect sparse;
weight Count;
run;
Proc freq data = disc;
tables action * population / out=freqcount2 outexpect sparse;
weight Count;
Run;
Proc freq data = disc;
tables action * disclosure / out=freqcount3 outexpect sparse;
weight Count;
Run;
Proc logistic data=disc;
freq count;
class action profession disclosure area population /
order=data
param=ref
ref=first;
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model action = profession disclosure area population /
link=glogit
aggregate
scale=williams
rsquare
covb
rb;
output out=predict predicted=predicted predprobs = i;
Run;

APPENDIX B
SURVEY INSTRUMENT
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DIT Survey with Demographic Questionnaire for Accounting
Page 1 - Question 1 - Yes or No
Acknowledgement:
Thank you for participating in this survey. Your participation is vital to the success of this research. This
study is concerned with how ACCOUNTING professionals define issues of a social problem.
Participation in this study is strictly voluntary. Results will be completely confidential and only viewed by
researchers. The survey should take between 15 and 20 minutes to complete.
The survey is divided into several stories about specific social problems. After each story, there will be a
list of questions. The questions that follow each story represent different issues that might be raised by the
problem. In other words, the questions/issues raise different ways of judging what is important in making a
decision about the social problem. You will be asked to rate and rank the questions in terms of how
important each one seems to you.
PLEASE TRY TO FINISH THE QUESTIONNAIRE IN ONE SITTING.
I acknowledge below that my participation in this research is strictly voluntary. I also understand that the
results of my survey will be confidential, accessible only to the researchers conducting the survey.
Acknowledgement:
O
O

Yes
No

Page 2 - Heading
Example of the task:
Imagine you are about to vote for a candidate for the Presidency of the United States. Before you vote, you
are asked to rate the importance of five issues you could consider in deciding who to vote for. Rate the
importance of each item (issue) by checking the appropriate box.
Page 2 - Question 2 - Rating Scale - Matrix
Rate the following issues in terms of importance:
Great

Much

S o m e

Little

None

1. Financially are you personally better off now than you were four years ago?
2. Does one candidate have a superior moral character?

•
•

•

•

•
•
•
•

•D

3.

D
D
D

Which candidate stands the tallest?

4. Which candidate would make the best world leader?
i, Which candidate lis llit lest ideas for on country's ioteraal problems, lite crime aid leal care!

•
•

•

D

D

D

•
•

a
a
D

•

Page 2 - Heading
Note. Some items may seem irrelevant or do not make sense (as in item #3). In that case, rate the item as
"NO".
After you rate all of the items you will be asked to RANK the TOP FOUR ITEMS in terms of importance.
Note that it makes sense that the items you rate as most important should be RANKED as well. So if you
only rated Item 1 as having great importance, you should rank it as most important.
Page 2 - Heading
Consider the 5 issues above and rank the FOUR ISSUES that are most important:
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Page 2 - Question 3 - Choice - One Answer (Drop Down)
What is the most important issue from above?
0
0
0
O
O

1. Financially are you personally better off now than you were four years ago?
2. Does one candidate have a superior moral character?
3. Which candidate stands the tallest?
4. Which candidate would make the best world leader?
5. Which candidate has the best ideas for our country's internal problems, like crime and health
care?

Page 2 - Question 4 - Choice - One Answer (Drop Down)
What is the second most important issue from above?
O
0
0
O
0

1. Financially are you personally better off now than you were four years ago?
2. Does one candidate have a superior moral character?
3. Which candidate stands the tallest?
4. Which candidate would make the best world leader?
5. Which candidate has the best ideas for our country's internal problems, like crime and health
care?

Page 2 - Question 5 - Choice - One Answer (Drop Down)
What is the third most important issue from above?
0
0
0
0
O

1. Financially are you personally better off now than you were four years ago?
2. Does one candidate have a superior moral character?
3. Which candidate stands the tallest?
4. Which candidate would make the best world leader?
5. Which candidate has the best ideas for our country's internal problems, like crime and health
care?

Page 2 - Question 6 - Choice - One Answer (Drop Down)
What is the fourth most important issue from above?
O 1. Financially are you personally better off now than you were four years ago?
O 2. Does one candidate have a superior moral character?
O 3. Which candidate stands the tallest?
0 4. Which candidate would make the best world leader?
0 5. Which candidate has the best ideas for our country's internal problems, like crime and health
care?
Page 2 - Heading
Again, remember to consider all of the items before you rank the four most important items and be sure that
you only rank items that you found important.
Note also that before you begin to rate and rank items you will be asked to state your preference for what
action to take in the story.
Thank you and you may begin the questionnaire!

Page 3 - Heading
Story 1
Famine
The small village in Northern India has experienced shortages of food before, but this year's famine is
worse than ever. Some families are even trying to feed themselves by making soup from tree bark. Mustaq
Singh's family is near starvation. He has heard that a rich man in his village has supplies of food stored
away and is hoarding food while its price goes higher so that he can sell the food later at a huge profit.
Mustaq is desperate and thinks about stealing some food from the rich man's warehouse. The small amount
of food that he needs for his family probably would not even be missed.
Page 3 - Question 7 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)
What should Mustaq Singh do? Do you favor the action of taking food?
O Should take the food
o Cannot decide
( 3 Should not take the food
Page 3 - Question 8 - Rating Scale - Matrix
Rate the following issues in terms of importance:
Is Mustaq Singh courageous enough lo risk gelling caught for stealing?
Is il not only natural for a loving father lo ore so much foi his family thai he would steal?
Should not the c o m m u n i t y ' s laws b e u p h e l d ?
Does Mustaq Singh know a good recipe for preparing soup from tree bark?
Does the rich man have any legal tight to store food when olher people are starving?
Is the motive of Mustaq Singh to steal for himself or to steal for his family?
7. What values are going to be the basis for social c o o p e r a t i o n ?
Is the epitome of eating reconcilable with the culpability of stealing?
Does the rich man d e s e r v e to be r o b b e d for being so g r e e d y ?
Is not private properly an insiitution to enable the rich to steal from Ihe poor?
Would stealing bring about more total good for everybody concerned or wouldn't it?
12 Are laws stltiti! in the way of Ihe most basic claim of any member of a society?

reat
D
D
D
D
D

•

D
D
D

a

•

D

M u c h
D
D

S o m e
D

N o n e
D

•

D

a
a

a
a

D

a

D

a

•

•

D
D
D

•
•
•

D

•

a
a

D
D

•D

D
D

•

D

D

a
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Page 3 - Heading
Consider the 12 issues above and rank the FOUR ISSUES that are most important:
Page 3 - Question 9 - Choice - One Answer (Drop Down)
What is the most J mportant issue from above?

o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Is Mustaq Singh courageous enough to risk getting caught for stealing?
Is it not only natural for a loving father to care so much for his family that he would steal?
Should not the community's laws be upheld?
Does Mustaq Singh know a good recipe for preparing soup from tree bark?
Does the rich man have any legal right to store food when other people are starving?
Is the motive of Mustaq Singh to steal for himself or to steal for his family?
What values are going to be the basis for social cooperation?
Is the epitome of eating reconcilable with the culpability of stealing?
Does the rich man deserve to be robbed for being so greedy?
Is not private property an institution to enable the rich to steal from the poor?
Would stealing bring about more total good for everybody concerned or wouldn't it?
Are laws getting in the way of the most basic claim of any member of a society?
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Page 3 - Question 10 - Choice - One Answer (Drop Down)
What is the second most important issue from above?
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
O
0

1. Is Mustaq Singh courageous enough to risk getting caught for stealing?
2. Is it not only natural for a loving father to care so much for his family that he would steal?
3. Should not the community's laws be upheld?
4. Does Mustaq Singh know a good recipe for preparing soup from tree bark?
5. Does the rich man have any legal right to store food when other people are starving?
6. Is the motive of Mustaq Singh to steal for himself or to steal for his family?
7. What values are going to be the basis for social cooperation?
8. Is the epitome of eating reconcilable with the culpability of stealing?
9. Does the rich man deserve to be robbed for being so greedy?
10. Is not private property an institution to enable the rich to steal from the poor?
11. Would stealing bring about more total good for everybody concerned or wouldn't it?
12. Are laws getting in the way of the most basic claim of any member of a society?

Page 3 - Question 11 - Choice - One Answer (Drop Down)
What is the third most important issue from above?
O
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1. Is Mustaq Singh courageous enough to risk getting caught for stealing?
2. Is it not only natural for a loving father to care so much for his family that he would steal?
3. Should not the community's laws be upheld?
4. Does Mustaq Singh know a good recipe for preparing soup from tree bark?
5. Does the rich man have any legal right to store food when other people are starving?
6. Is the motive of Mustaq Singh to steal for himself or to steal for his family?
7. What values are going to be the basis for social cooperation?
8. Is the epitome of eating reconcilable with the culpability of stealing?
9. Does the rich man deserve to be robbed for being so greedy?
10. Is not private property an institution to enable the rich to steal from the poor?
11. Would stealing bring about more total good for everybody concerned or wouldn't it?
12. Are laws getting in the way of the most basic claim of any member of a society?

Page 3 - Question 12 - Choice - One Answer (Drop Down)
What is the fourth most important issue from above?
O
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1. Is Mustaq Singh courageous enough to risk getting caught for stealing?
2. Is it not only natural for a loving father to care so much for his family that he would steal?
3. Should not the community's laws be upheld?
4. Does Mustaq Singh know a good recipe for preparing soup from tree bark?
5. Does the rich man have any legal right to store food when other people are starving?
6. Is the motive of Mustaq Singh to steal for himself or to steal for his family?
7. What values are going to be the basis for social cooperation?
8. Is the epitome of eating reconcilable with the culpability of stealing?
9. Does the rich man deserve to be robbed for being so greedy?
10. Is not private property an institution to enable the rich to steal from the poor?
11. Would stealing bring about more total good for everybody concerned or wouldn't it?
12. Are laws getting in the way of the most basic claim of any member of a society?
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Page 4 - Heading
Story 2
Reporter
Molly Dayton has been a news reporter for the Gazette newspaper for over a decade. Almost by accident,
she learned that one of the candidates for Lieutenant Governor for her state, Grover Thompson, had been
arrested for shop-lifting 20 years earlier. Reporter Dayton found out that early in his life, Candidate
Thompson has undergone a confused period and done things he later regretted, actions which would be
very out of character now. His shoplifting had been a minor offense and charges had been dropped by the
department store. Thomson has not only straightened himself out since then, but built a distinguished
record in helping many people and in leading constructive community projects. Now, Reporter Dayton
regards Thompson as the best candidate in the field and likely to go on to important leadership positions in
the state. Reporter Dayton wonders whether or not she should write the story about Thompson's earlier
troubles because in the upcoming close and heated election, she fears that such a news story could wreck
Thompson's chance to win.
Page 4 - Question 13 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)
Do you favor the action of reporting the story?
O
O
O

Should report the story
Cannot decide
Should not report the story

Page 4 - Question 14 - Rating Scale - Matrix
Rate the following issues in terms of importance.
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I How could reporter Dayton he so cruel and heartless as io report the damaging story about candidate Thompson?
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9. Does the right of "habeaus corpus" apply in this case?

D

10. Would the election process be more fair with or without reporting the story?
II, Should reporter Daytontatill indites lei oliite ii lie sue ray 1; reporting eieijlliij she Ins i l l ilei good or lid!
12. Isn't it a reporter's duty to report all the news regardless of the circumstances?

•
•

I. Doesn't ike public have a right to know all the facts about all the candidates for office?
I Would publishing the story help Reporter Dayton's reputation for investigative reporting?
1 If Dajlti its Hi publish tie slorj, niMi'l iilier reporter gel lie sloij nytiy id get Ik citl fir iiieiliatiii reputing!
i. Since voting is such ajote anyway, does it make an; difference what reporter Dayton does?
J. lasi't Thompson shown in the past Id years that he is a heller person than his earlier Jays as a shoplifter!

6. What would best s e r v i c e s o c i e t y ?
7. If the story is true, how can it be wrong to report it?
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Page 4 - Heading
Consider the 12 Issues above and rank the FOUR ISSUES that are most important:
Page 4 - Question 15 - Choice - One Answer (Drop Down)
What is the most important item from the issues above?
o
o
o
O
O

1. Doesn't the public have a right to know all the facts about all the candidates for office?
2. Would publishing the story help Reporter Dayton's reputation for investigative reporting?
3. If Dayton does not publish the story, wouldn't another reporter get the story anyway and get the
credit for investigative reporting?
4. Since voting is such a joke anyway, does it make any difference what reporter Dayton does?
5. Hasn't Thompson shown in the past 20 years that he is a better person than his earlier days as a
shoplifter?
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0
O
O
0
O
0
0

6. What would best service society?
7. If the story is true, how can it be wrong to report it?
8. How could reporter Dayton be so cruel and heartless as to report the damaging story about
candidate Thompson?
9. Does the right of "habeaus corpus" apply in this case?
10. Would the election process be more fair with or without reporting the story?
11. Should reporter Dayton treat all candidates for office in the same way by reporting everything
she learns about them good or bad?
12. Isn't it a reporter's duty to report all the news regardless of the circumstances?

Page 4 - Question 16 - Choice - One Answer (Drop Down)
What is the second most important issue from above?
0
o
O
O
O
O
0
0
0
0
0
0

1. Doesn't the public have a right to know all the facts about all the candidates for office?
2. Would publishing the story help Reporter Dayton's reputation for investigative reporting?
3. If Dayton does not publish the story, wouldn't another reporter get the story anyway and get the
credit for investigative reporting?
4. Since voting is such a joke anyway, does it make any difference what reporter Dayton does?
5. Hasn't Thompson shown in the past 20 years that he is a better person than his earlier days as a
shoplifter?
6. What would best service society?
7. If the story is true, how can it be wrong to report it?
8. How could reporter Dayton be so cruel and heartless as to report the damaging story about
candidate Thompson?
9. Does the right of "habeaus corpus" apply in this case?
10. Would the election process be more fair with or without reporting the story?
11. Should reporter Dayton treat all candidates for office in the same way by reporting everything
she learns about them good or bad?
12. Isn't it a reporter's duty to report all the news regardless of the circumstances?

Page 4 - Question 17 - Choice - One Answer (Drop Down)
What is the third most important issue from above?
0
0
O

1. Doesn't the public have a right to know all the facts about all the candidates for office?
2. Would publishing the story help Reporter Dayton's reputation for investigative reporting?
3. If Dayton does not publish the story, wouldn't another reporter get the story anyway and get the
credit for investigative reporting?
Q 4. Since voting is such a joke anyway, does it make any difference what reporter Dayton does?
0 5. Hasn't Thompson shown in the past 20 years that he is a better person than his earlier days as a
shoplifter?
0 6. What would best service society?
0 7. If the story is true, how can it be wrong to report it?
0 8. How could reporter Dayton be so cruel and heartless as to report the damaging story about
candidate Thompson?
O 9. Does the right of "habeaus corpus" apply in this case?
Q 10. Would the election process be more fair with or without reporting the story?
0 11. Should reporter Dayton treat all candidates for office in the same way by reporting everything
she learns about them good or bad?
O 12. Isn't it a reporter's duty to report all the news regardless of the circumstances?
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Page 4 - Question 18 - Choice - One Answer (Drop Down)
What is the fourth most important Issue from above?
O
0
O

1. Doesn't the public have a right to know all the facts about all the candidates for office?
2. Would publishing the story help Reporter Dayton's reputation for investigative reporting?
3. If Dayton does not publish the story, wouldn't another reporter get the story anyway and get the
credit for investigative reporting?
O 4. Since voting is such a joke anyway, does it make any difference what reporter Dayton does?
O 5. Hasn't Thompson shown in the past 20 years that he is a better person than his earlier days as a
shoplifter?
O 6. What would best service society?
0 7. If the story is true, how can it be wrong to report it?
0 8. How could reporter Dayton be so cruel and heartless as to report the damaging story about
candidate Thompson?
0 9. Does the right of "habeaus corpus" apply in this case?
0 10. Would the election process be more fair with or without reporting the story?
0 11. Should reporter Dayton treat all candidates for office in the same way by reporting everything
she learns about them good or bad?
O 12. Isn't it a reporter's duty to report all the news regardless of the circumstances?
Page 5 - Heading
Story 3
School Board
Mr. Grant has been elected to the School Board District 190 and was chosen to be chairman. The district is
bitterly divided over the closing of one of the high schools. One of the high schools has to be closed for
financial reasons, but there is no agreement over which school to close. During his election to the School
Board, Mr. Grant had proposed a series of "Open Meetings" in which members of the community could
voice their opinions. He hoped that dialogue would make the community realize the necessity of closing
one high school. Also, he hoped that through open discussions, the difficulty of the decision would be
appreciated, and that the community would ultimately support the school board decision. The first "Open
Meeting" was a disaster. Passionate speeches dominated the microphones and threatened violence. The
meeting barely closed without fist-fights. Later in the week, school board members received threatening
phone calls. Mr. Grant wonders if he ought to call off the next "Open Meeting".
Page 5 - Question 19 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)
Do you favor calling off the next "Open Meeting"?
0
0
0

Should call off the next meeting
Cannot decide
Should have the next open meeting
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Page 5 - Question 20 - Rating Scale - Matrix
Rate the following issues in terms of importance:
I. Is Mr. Grant required by law to have "Open Meetings" on major school board decisions'?
I. Would Sir. Grant k breaking Sis election campaign promises to lie tiniitj by discontiiiing tie "Open Meetings'?
3. Would the community be even angrier with Mr. Grand if he slopped the "Open Meetings'
4. W o u l d the c h a n g e in p l a n s p r e v e n t s c i e n t i f i c a s s e s s m e n t ?
i. II ik itkil taii is italintd,fcilie chairman lite lie legal aillnilf it pitted tie Board li laliig faiiiw in closed iiniijs!
t>. Would the community regard Mr. Grant as a coward if he stopped the open meetings?
7. Does Mr. Grant hate another procedure in mind for ensuring that divergent views are heard!
5. Does Mr. Grant lave lie authority to expel troublemakers from the meetings or pent themfrommaking long speeches?
5. Are sons people deliberately undermining Ike shcool board process 1; playing some sort of power game?
It i l l effect raid stopping lie discission lave on the community's alility to handle controversial issies in tie future?
II. Is lie trouble coming from only a few hotheads and is tie comiiiil; in general really fair-minded and democratic?
1?. Ihat is the litlihood that a good decision could be made ratal open discussion from tie community?
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Page 5 - Heading
Consider the 12 issues you rated above and rank only the FOUR issues which are the most important:
Page 5 Question 21 - Choice - One Answer (Drop Down)
What is the most important item from the issues above?
O
0

1. Is Mr. Grant required by law to have "Open Meetings" on major school board decisions?
2. Would Mr. Grant be breaking his election campaign promises to the community by
discontinuing the "Open Meetings"?
O 3. Would the community be even angrier with Mr. Grand if he stopped the "Open Meetings"
0 4. Would the change in plans prevent scientific assessment?
0 5. If the school board is threatened, does the chairman have the legal authority to protect the Board
by making decisions in closed meetings?
0 6. Would the community regard Mr. Grant as a coward if he stopped the open meetings?
0 7. Does Mr. Grant have another procedure in mind for ensuring that divergent views are heard?
0 8. Does Mr. Grant have the authority to expel troublemakers from the meetings or prevent them
from making long speeches?
0 9. Are some people deliberately undermining the shcool board process by playing some sort of
power game?
0 10. What effect would stopping the discussion have on the community's ability to handle
controversial issues in the future?
0 11. Is the trouble coming from only a few hotheads and is the community in general really fairminded and democratic?
0 12. What is the liklihood that a good decision could be made without open discussion from the
community?
Page 5 - Question 22 - Choice - One Answer (Drop Down)
What is the second important item from the issues above?
O
0
0
0

1. Is Mr. Grant required by law to have "Open Meetings" on major school board decisions?
2. Would Mr. Grant be breaking his election campaign promises to the community by
discontinuing the "Open Meetings"?
3. Would the community be even angrier with Mr. Grand if he stopped the "Open Meetings"
4. Would the change in plans prevent scientific assessment?
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5. If the school board is threatened, does the chairman have the legal authority to protect the Board
by making decisions in closed meetings?
0 6. Would the community regard Mr. Grant as a coward if he stopped the open meetings?
0 7. Does Mr. Grant have another procedure in mind for ensuring that divergent views are heard?
O 8. Does Mr. Grant have the authority to expel troublemakers from the meetings or prevent them
from making long speeches?
0 9. Are some people deliberately undermining the shcool board process by playing some sort of
power game?
0 10. What effect would stopping the discussion have on the community's ability to handle
controversial issues in the future?
0 11. Is the trouble coming from only a few hotheads and is the community in general really fairminded and democratic?
O 12. What is the liklihood that a good decision could be made without open discussion from the
community?
Page 5 - Question 23 - Choice - One Answer (Drop Down)
What is the third important item from the issues above?
O
O
O
0
O
O
O
O
0
O
0
0

1. Is Mr. Grant required by law to have "Open Meetings" on major school board decisions?
2. Would Mr. Grant be breaking his election campaign promises to the community by
discontinuing the "Open Meetings"?
3. Would the community be even angrier with Mr. Grand if he stopped the "Open Meetings"
4. Would the change in plans prevent scientific assessment?
5. If the school board is threatened, does the chairman have the legal authority to protect the Board
by making decisions in closed meetings?
6. Would the community regard Mr. Grant as a coward if he stopped the open meetings?
7. Does Mr. Grant have another procedure in mind for ensuring that divergent views are heard?
8. Does Mr. Grant have the authority to expel troublemakers from the meetings or prevent them
from making long speeches?
9. Are some people deliberately undermining the shcool board process by playing some sort of
power game?
10. What effect would stopping the discussion have on the community's ability to handle
controversial issues in the future?
11. Is the trouble coming from only a few hotheads and is the community in general really fairminded and democratic?
12. What is the liklihood that a good decision could be made without open discussion from the
community?

Page 5 - Question 24 - Choice - One Answer (Drop Down)
What is the fourth important item from the issues above?
O
0
0
0
0
0
0

1. Is Mr. Grant required by law to have "Open Meetings" on major school board decisions?
2. Would Mr. Grant be breaking his election campaign promises to the community by
discontinuing the "Open Meetings"?
3. Would the community be even angrier with Mr. Grand if he stopped the "Open Meetings"
4. Would the change in plans prevent scientific assessment?
5. If the school board is threatened, does the chairman have the legal authority to protect the Board
by making decisions in closed meetings?
6. Would the community regard Mr. Grant as a coward if he stopped the open meetings?
7. Does Mr. Grant have another procedure in mind for ensuring that divergent views are heard?
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8. Does Mr. Grant have the authority to expel troublemakers from the meetings or prevent them
from making long speeches?
0 9. Are some people deliberately undermining the shcool board process by playing some sort of
power game?
0 10. What effect would stopping the discussion have on the community's ability to handle
controversial issues in the future?
O 11. Is the trouble coming from only a few hotheads and is the community in general really fairminded and democratic?
0 12. What is the liklihood that a good decision could be made without open discussion from the
community?
Page 6 - Heading
Story 4
Cancer
Mrs. Bennett is 62 years old, and in the last phases of colon cancer. She is in terrible pain and asks the
doctor to give her more pain-killer medicine. The doctor has given her the maximum safe dose already and
is reluctant to increase the dosage because it would probably hasten her death. In a clear and rational
mental state, Mrs. Bennett says that she realizes this; but she wants to end her suffering even if it means
ending her life. Should the doctor give her an increased dosage?
Page 6 - Question 25 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)
Do you favor the action of giving more medicine?
0 Should give Mrs. Bennett an increased dosage to make her die
O Cannot decide
0 Should not give her an increased dosage
Page 6 - Question 26 - Rating Scale - Matrix
Rate the following issues in terms of importance:
reat
1. Isn't the doctor obligated by k sine laws is everyone- else if giving an overdose would be Ibe same is kiling her?
2. Wouldn't society be better off without so many laws about what doctors can and cannot do?
3. If Mrs. Bennett dies, would the doctor be legally responsible for malpractice?
4. Does the family of Mrs. Bennett agree that she should gel more painkiller medicine?
5. Is the painkiller medicine an active heliotropic drug?
6. Does the slate have the right to force continued existence of those who do not want to live?
7. Is helping end another's life ever a responsible act of cooperation?
8. Would the doctor show more sympathy for Mrs. Bennett by giving the medicine or not?
9. Would not the doctor feel guilty from giving Mrs. Bennett so much drug that she died?
10. Should only God decide when a person's life should end?
11. Shouldn't society protect everyone against being killed?
I'!. Where should society draw lie Ik between protecting life and allowing someone to die if the person nils to?
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Page 6 - Heading
Consider the 12 issues above and rank the FOUR ISSUES that are most important:
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Page 6 - Question 27 - Choice - One Answer (Drop Down)
What is the most important item from the issues above?
O

1. Isn't the doctor obligated by the same laws as everyone else if giving an overdose would be the
same as killing her?
0 2. Wouldn't society be better off without so many laws about what doctors can and cannot do?
0 3. If Mrs. Bennett dies, would the doctor be legally responsible for malpractice?
0 4. Does the family of Mrs. Bennett agree that she should get more painkiller medicine?
0 5. Is the painkiller medicine an active heliotropic drug?
O 6. Does the state have the right to force continued existence of those who do not want to live?
0 7. Is helping end another's life ever a responsible act of cooperation?
0 8. Would the doctor show more sympathy for Mrs. Bennett by giving the medicine or not?
0 9. Would not the doctor feel guilty from giving Mrs. Bennett so much drug that she died?
0 10. Should only God decide when a person's life should end?
0 11. Shouldn't society protect everyone against being killed?
0 12. Where should society draw the line between protecting life and allowing someone to die if the
person wants to?
Page 6 - Question 28 - Choice - One Answer (Drop Down)
What is the second most important issue from above?
O

1. Isn't the doctor obligated by the same laws as everyone else if giving an overdose would be the
same as killing her?
O 2. Wouldn't society be better off without so many laws about what doctors can and cannot do?
O 3. If Mrs. Bennett dies, would the doctor be legally responsible for malpractice?
0 4. Does the family of Mrs. Bennett agree that she should get more painkiller medicine?
0 5. Is the painkiller medicine an active heliotropic drug?
0 6. Does the state have the right to force continued existence of those who do not want to live?
0 7. Is helping end another's life ever a responsible act of cooperation?
0 8. Would the doctor show more sympathy for Mrs. Bennett by giving the medicine or not?
0 9. Would not the doctor feel guilty from giving Mrs. Bennett so much drug that she died?
0 10. Should only God decide when a person's life should end?
O 11. Shouldn't society protect everyone against being killed?
0 12. Where should society draw the line between protecting life and allowing someone to die if the
person wants to?
Page 6 - Question 29 - Choice - One Answer (Drop Down)
What is the third most important issue from above?

r
0
0
0
0
0

1. Isn't the doctor obligated by the same laws as everyone else if giving an overdose would be the
same as killing her?
2. Wouldn't society be better off without so many laws about what doctors can and cannot do?
3. If Mrs. Bennett dies, would the doctor be legally responsible for malpractice?
4. Does the family of Mrs. Bennett agree that she should get more painkiller medicine?
5. Is the painkiller medicine an active heliotropic drug?
6. Does the state have the right to force continued existence of those who do not want to live?
7. Is helping end another's life ever a responsible act of cooperation?
8. Would the doctor show more sympathy for Mrs. Bennett by giving the medicine or not?
9. Would not the doctor feel guilty from giving Mrs. Bennett so much drug that she died?
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O
O

10. Should only God decide when a person's life should end?
11. Shouldn't society protect everyone against being killed?
12. Where should society draw the line between protecting life and allowing someone to die if the
person wants to?

Page 6 - Question 30 - Choice - One Answer (Drop Down)
What is the fourth most important issue from above?
O
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1. Isn't the doctor obligated by the same laws as everyone else if giving an overdose would be the
same as killing her?
2. Wouldn't society be better off without so many laws about what doctors can and cannot do?
3. If Mrs. Bennett dies, would the doctor be legally responsible for malpractice?
4. Does the family of Mrs. Bennett agree that she should get more painkiller medicine?
5. Is the painkiller medicine an active heliotropic drug?
6. Does the state have the right to force continued existence of those who do not want to live?
7. Is helping end another's life ever a responsible act of cooperation?
8. Would the doctor show more sympathy for Mrs. Bennett by giving the medicine or not?
9. Would not the doctor feel guilty from giving Mrs. Bennett so much drug that she died?
10. Should only God decide when a person's life should end?
11. Shouldn't society protect everyone against being killed?
12. Where should society draw the line between protecting life and allowing someone to die if the
person wants to?

Page 7 - Heading
Story 5
Demonstration
Political and economic instability in a South American country prompted the President of the United States
to send troops to "police" the area. Students at many campuses in the U.S.A. have protested that the United
States is using its military might for economic advantage. There is widespread suspicion that big oil
multinational companies are pressuring the President to safeguard a cheap oil supply even if it means loss
of life. Students at one campus took to the streets in demonstrations, tying up traffic and stopping regular
business in town. The president of the university demanded that the students stop their illegal
demonstrations. Students then took over the college's administration building, completely paralyzing the
college. Are the student's right to demonstrate in these ways?
Page 7 - Question 31 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)
Do you favor the action of demonstrating in this way?
0
0
0

Should continue demonstrating in these ways
Cannot decide
Should not continue demonstrating in these ways
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Page 7 - Question 32 - Rating Scale - Matrix
Rate the following issues in terms of importance:
Great
1. Do the students have any right to tale over properly that does not belong to them?
2. Do the students realize that Ihe; might be arrested aid fined, and even expelled from school'!
3. Are the students serious about their cause or are they just doing it just for fun?
4. If the university president is soft on students this time, will it lead to more disorder?
5. Will Ihe public blame all students for the actions of a few students demonstrators?
i k the authorities to blame by giving in to Ihe greed of Ihe multinational oil companies?
7. Why should a few people like Presidents and business leaders have more power than ordinary people?
8. Does this student demonstration bring about more or less good in Ihe long run to all people?
9. Can the s t u d e n t s justify their civil d i s o b e d i e n c e ?
10. Shouldn't the authorities be respected by students?
11. Is taking over a building consistent with principles of justice?
12. Isn't it everyone's duty to obey the law whether one likes it or not?
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Page 7 - Heading
Consider the 12 issues above and rank the FOUR ISSUES that are most important:
Page 7 - Question 33 - Choice One Answer (Drop Down)
What is the most important issue from above?
0
O
O
0
O
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1. Do the students have any right to take over property that does not belong to them?
2. Do the students realize that they might be arrested and fined, and even expelled from school?
3. Are the students serious about their cause or are they just doing it just for fun?
4. If the university president is soft on students this time, will it lead to more disorder?
5. Will the public blame all students for the actions of a few students demonstrators?
6. Are the authorities to blame by giving in to the greed of the multinational oil companies?
7. Why should a few people like Presidents and business leaders have more power than ordinary
people?
8. Does this student demonstration bring about more or less good in the long run to all people?
9. Can the students justify their civil disobedience?
10. Shouldn't the authorities be respected by students?
11. Is taking over a building consistent with principles of justice?
12. Isn't it everyone's duty to obey the law whether one likes it or not?

Page 7 - Question 34 - Choice - One Answer (Drop Down)
What is the second most important issue from above?

0

O
0
O
0
0
0
0

1. Do the students have any right to take over property that does not belong to them?
2. Do the students realize that they might be arrested and fined, and even expelled from school?
3. Are the students serious about their cause or are they just doing it just for fun?
4. If the university president is soft on students this time, will it lead to more disorder?
5. Will the public blame all students for the actions of a few students demonstrators?
6. Are the authorities to blame by giving in to the greed of the multinational oil companies?
7. Why should a few people like Presidents and business leaders have more power than ordinary
people?
8. Does this student demonstration bring about more or less good in the long run to all people?
9. Can the students justify their civil disobedience?
10. Shouldn't the authorities be respected by students?
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O
O

11. Is taking over a building consistent with principles of justice?
12. Isn't it everyone's duty to obey the law whether one likes it or not?

Page 7 - Question 35 - Choice - One Answer (Drop Down)
What is the third most important issue from above?
O 1. Do the students have any right to take over property that does not belong to them?
O 2. Do the students realize that they might be arrested and fined, and even expelled from school?
O 3. Are the students serious about their cause or are they just doing it just for fun?
O 4. If the university president is soft on students this time, will it lead to more disorder?
O 5. Will the public blame all students for the actions of a few students demonstrators?
0 6. Are the authorities to blame by giving in to the greed of the multinational oil companies?
0 7. Why should a few people like Presidents and business leaders have more power than ordinary
people?
0 8. Does this student demonstration bring about more or less good in the long run to all people?
0 9. Can the students justify their civil disobedience?
0 10. Shouldn't the authorities be respected by students?
0 11. Is taking over a building consistent with principles of justice?
0 12. Isn't it everyone's duty to obey the law whether one likes it or not?
Page 7 - Question 36 - Choice - One Answer (Drop Down)
What is the fourth most important issue from above?
0
O
0
0
0
O
0
0
0
0
0
0

1. Do the students have any right to take over property that does not belong to them?
2. Do the students realize that they might be arrested and fined, and even expelled from school?
3. Are the students serious about their cause or are they just doing it just for fun?
4. If the university president is soft on students this time, will it lead to more disorder?
5. Will the public blame all students for the actions of a few students demonstrators?
6. Are the authorities to blame by giving in to the greed of the multinational oil companies?
7. Why should a few people like Presidents and business leaders have more power than ordinary
people?
8. Does this student demonstration bring about more or less good in the long run to all people?
9. Can the students justify their civil disobedience?
10. Shouldn't the authorities be respected by students?
11. Is taking over a building consistent with principles of justice?
12. Isn't it everyone's duty to obey the law whether one likes it or not?

Page 8 - Heading
Please provide the following information about yourself:
Page 8 - Question 37 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)
In terms of political views, how would you characterize yourself?
0
0
0
0
0

Very Liberal
Somewhat Liberal
Neither Liberal nor Conservative
Somewhat Conservative
Very Conservative
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Page 8 - Question 38 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)
Are you a citizen of the U.S.A.?
O
O

Yes
No

Page 8 - Question 39 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)
Is English your primary language?
O
O

Yes
No

Page 8 - Question 40 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)
What is your gender?
O
O

Male
Female

Page 8 - Question 41 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)
What is the closest approximation for your age?
O
O
O
O
O

25 to 35 Years Old
36 to 45 Years Old
46 to 55 Years Old
56 to 65 Years Old
Older than 65 Years

Page 8 - Question 42 - Choice - One Answer (Drop Down)
In what state do you reside?

o
o
o
o
o
o
o(3
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

AK
AL
AR
AS
AZ
CA
CO
CT
DC
DE
FL
FM
GA
GU
HI
IA
ID
IL
IN
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O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
(3
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O

O
O

KS
KY
LA
MA
MD
ME
MH
MI
MN
MO
MP
MS
MT
NC
ND
NE
NH
NJ
NM
NV
NY
OH
OK
OR
PA
PR
PW
RI

O sc
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O

SD
TN
TX
UT
VA
vi
VT
WA
wi

O wv
O

WY

Page 8 - Question 43 - Choice - Multiple Answers (Bullets)
What is your area of specialization?
Q
Q
Q
Q

Audit
Consulting
Corporate Accountant
Tax

'wrf

1 CIA.

Q

Other, please specify
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Page 8 - Question 44 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)
Area of Employment:
0
O
0
0
0

Private Practice
Business or Industry
Government
Education
Other, please specify

Page 8 - Question 45 - Choice - Multiple Answers (Bullets)
What type of certification or license do you hold?
LJ
CJ
Q
Q
LJ
Ul
Q

Certified Fraud Examiner
Certified Internal Auditor
Certified Managerial Accountant
Certified Public Accountant
Chartered Accountant
None
Other, please specify

Page 9 - Heading
Test Taking Environment
We would like to know something about how you completed this questionnaire. Your answers will not
affect the results of the test.
Page 9 - Question 46 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)
I completed the questionnaire in one sitting.
0
0

Yes
No

Page 9 - Question 47 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)
Music was playing when I completed the questionnaire.
O
0

Yes
No

Page 9 - Question 48 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)
I received phone calls while completing the questionnaire.
O
O
0

Yes - more than one
Yes-just one
No
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Page 9 - Question 49 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)
The TV was on while I completed the questionnaire.
0
0

Yes
No

Page 9 - Question 50 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)
I made a phone call while completing the questionnaire.
0
0
O

Yes - more than one
Yes - just one
No

Page 9 - Question 51 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)
I received emails/text messages while completing the questionnaire.
0
0
0

Yes - more than one
Yes-just one
No

Page 9 - Question 52 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)
I responded to emails/text messages while completing the questionnaire.
O
0
0

Yes - more than one
Yes - just one
No

Page 9 - Question 53 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)
I stopped and talked to friends while completing the questionnaire.
O
0
0

Yes - more than once
Yes-just one
No
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Demographic Information - Legal Profession
Page 8 - Question 40 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)
What is your gender?
O
O

Male
Female

Page 8 - Question 41 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)
What is the closest approximation for your age?
O
O
O
O
O

25 to 35 Years Old
36 to 45 Years Old
46 to 55 Years Old
56 to 65 Years Old
Older than 65 Years

Page 8 - Question 42 - Choice - One Answer (Drop Down)
In what state do you reside?

o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
a

AK
AL
AR
AS
AZ
CA
CO
CT
DC
DE
FL
FM
GA
GU
HI
IA
ID
IL
IN
KS
KY
LA
MA
MD
ME
MH
MI
MN
MO
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o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
(3
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

MP
MS
MT
NC
ND
NE
NH
NJ
NM
NV
NY
OH
OK
OR
PA
PR
PW
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VA
VI
VT
WA
WI
WV
WY

Page 8 - Question 43 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)
Area of Employment:
O
3
v.
0
O
O
i
3

Private Practice
Government
Industry
Judiciary
Education
Other, please specify

158
Demographic Information - Medical Profession
Page 8 - Question 40 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)
What is your gender?
O
O

Male
Female

Page 8 - Question 41 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)
What is the closest approximation for your age?
O
O
O
O
O

25 to 35 Years Old
36 to 45 Years Old
46 to 55 Years Old
56 to 65 Years Old
Older than 65 Years

Page 8 - Question 42 - Choice - One Answer (Drop Down)
In what state do you reside?

o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

AK
AL
AR
AS
AZ
CA
CO
CT
DC
DE
FL
FM
GA
GU
HI
IA
ID
IL
IN
KS
KY
LA
MA
MD
ME
MH
MI
MN
MO
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o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o

MP
MS
MT
NC
ND
NE
NH
NJ
NM
NV
NY
OH
OK
OR
PA
PR
PW
RI
SC
SD
TN
TX
UT
VA
VI
VT
WA
WI
WV
WY

Page 8 - Question 43 - Choice - One Answer (Bullets)
Area of Specialization:
O
O
O
O
O
O
O
O

Internal Medicine
Anesthesiology
Pediatrics
Psychology
General Practice
Radiology
Surgery
Other, please specify
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